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I n t r o d u c t i o n and Summary 
T h i s t h e s i s i s concerned w i t h the growth o f I r a n i a n 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y over the 1955-1972 p e r i o d . I t d e p i c t s i t s 
f a s t growth and g i v e s an account o f the major c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the 
growth process, as w e l l as examining the r o l e of government p o l i c i e s 
i n s t i m u l a t i n g t h i s g r o w t h . 
I n I r a n , as i n many o t h e r d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n 
has been a c e n t r a l o b j e c t i v e oi" economic p o l i c y . As such, i t s 
p r o g r e s s has been c o n s c i o u s l y and v i g o r o u s l y a s s i s t e d by the I r a n i a n 
government. T h i s a s s i s t a n c e has ma i n l y t a k e n t h e form o f a 
v a r i e t y of i n c e n t i v e s f o r p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e 
government i t s e l f has i n v e s t e d d i r e c t l y i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n such 'heavy' i n d u s t r i e s as i r o n and s t e e l . I n t h i s t h e s i s we 
c o n c e n t r a t e on government a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r . 
Government i n c e n t i v e s t o the p r i v a t e s e c t o r have p r e d o m i n a n t l y 
aimed a t i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i n g g r o w t h . Thus, p a r t i c u l a r l y d u r i n g the 
1960's, almost every new v e n t u r e v/as undertaken i n response t o 
e x i s t i n g and a n t i c i p a t e d demand on t h e I r a n i a n market h e r e t o f o r e 
s a t i s f i e d by i m p o r t s . T h i s p a t t e r n of in v e s t m e n t was encouraged by 
awarding p r o t e c t i o n , by f a r the most i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f which was a 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d t a r i f f s t r u c t u r e . I n a d d i t i o n t o p r o t e c t i o n , the 
government has p r o v i d e d o t h e r , ' p r o m o t i o n a l ' , i n c e n t i v e s . C h i e f 
among these has been the p r o v i s i o n o f l o n g and medium term c r e d i t f : r 
p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . 
There are f i v e c h a p t e r s i n t h e t h e s i s , e x c l u d i n g t h i s 
i n t r o d u c t i o n and a f i n a l c o n c l u s i o n . Chapter 1 i s o f the n a t u r e of a 
' l i t e r a t u r e survey' and p r e s e n t s a d i s c u s s i o n on the major aspects o f 
i m p o r t s u b s t i t u t i o n . I t c o n t a i n s t h r e e s e c t i o n s . The f i r s t s e c t i o n 
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d e a l s w i t h the concept and measures o f i m p o r t s u b s t i t u t i o n . I t 
p o i n t s o ut t h a t i m p o r t s u b s t i t u t i o n can be conceived o f b o t h as an 
occurance and a l s o as a conscious development p o l i c y . For t h e r e s t , 
t h i s s e c t i o n i n t r o d u c e s t h e Chenery method o f measuring i m p o r t 
s u b s t i t u t i o n and d i s c u s s e s two proposed a l t e r n a t i v e methods f o r 
measuring i m p o r t s u b s t i t u t i o n g i v i n g reasons why Chenery's method i s 
p r e f e r a b l e . 
The second s e c t i o n o f chapt e r 1 discusses the v a r i o u s t h e o r e t i c a l 
arguments t h a t have been used i n f a v o u r of the p o l i c y of i m p o r t -
s u b s t i t u t i n g i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n . The purpose o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n i s t o 
p r o v i d e a g e n e r a l t h e o r e t i c a l background f o r the d e s c r i p t i o n o f v a r i o u s 
government p o l i c i e s i n ch a p t e r J>. F i n a l l y , t h e t h i r d s e c t i o n c o n s i d e r s , 
i n g e n e r a l terms and r a t h e r b r i e f l y , some consequences of i m p o r t 
s u b s t i t u t i o n as i t has a c t u a l l y been p r a c t i s e d i n d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s . 
Chapter 2 deals w i t h the growth and s t r u c t u r e of I r a n i a n 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g s e c t o r over the 1955-1972 p e r i o d . I t shows, u s i n g 
p u b l i s h e d d a t a , t h a t m a n u f a c t u r i n g has grown very r a p i d l y over t h i s 
p e r i o d and t h a t t h i s growth has been p r e d o m i n a n t l y i m p o r t -
s u b s t i t u t i n g and o r i e n t e d towards the home market r a t h e r than based 
on e x p o r t expansion. T h i s c h a p t e r a l s o shows t h a t over the p e r i o d 
consumer goods i n d u s t r i e s had the l a r g e s t share o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
o u t p u t . At the same time o t h e r c a t e g o r i e s o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y those p r o d u c i n g m a i n l y i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o d u c t s i n c r e a s e d 
t h e i r r e l a t i v e share i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g o u t p u t s i g n i f i c a n l y . Chapter 3 
as has a l r e a d y been i n d i c a t e d , i s concerned w i t h the p o l i c y o f t h e 
government towards the m a n u f a c t u r i n g s e c t o r . I t p r o v i d e s a f a i r l y 
d e t a i l e d account o f the most i m p o r t a n t measures t h a t the government 
has used t o p r o v i d e i n c e n t i v e f o r p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s . These i n c l u d e 
p r o t e c t i v e i n s t r u m e n t s such as t a r i f f s , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i m p o r t c o n t r o l s 
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and i m p o r t r e g i s t r a t i o n d e p o s i t s . I n a d d i t i o n , as we have noted 
a l r e a d y , the government has a l s o used ' p r o m o t i o n a l ' measures t o h e l p 
p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t . These i n c l u d e l o n g and medium term c r e d i t , 
f r e e or s u b s i d i s e d p r o v i s i o n of t e c h n i c a l and man a g e r i a l a s s i s t a n c e 
as w e l l as generous t a x al l o w a n c e s . 
Chapter 4 d e a l s w i t h t h e growth o f t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r . T h i s , 
i n many ways i s one of the most i m p o r t a n t developments i n the 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g s e c t o r over t h e p e r i o d o f t h i s s t u d y . The chapt e r 
shows t h a t t h e p o l i c y framework d e s c r i b e d i n chapt e r 3 has been 
e f f e c t i v e i n p r o v i d i n g a p o w e r f u l s t i m u l u s f o r p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s and 
t h a t b o t h domestic and f o r e i g n p r i v a t e i n v e s t o r s have p a r t i c i p a t e d 
i n t h e expansion o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g . 
Chapter 5 i s concerned w i t h some problems o f i m p o r t s u b s t i t u t i o n • 
i n I r a n . F i r s t l y , i t examines the e f f e c t o f government p o l i c y on 
f a c t o r i n t e n s i t i e s . T h i s i s done f o l l o w i n g the methodology suggested 
by Corden whereby the s c a l e o f e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f s f o r d i f f e r e n t 
a c t i v i t i e s i n d i c a t e s t h e d i r e c t i o n o f r e s o u r c e p u l l and push between 
them. The r e s u l t shows t h a t government p o l i c y has f a v o u r e d t h e 
growth o f c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i e s . Consequently t h e a v a i l a b l e 
evidence suggest t h a t , even though m a n u f a c t u r i n g employment has 
i n c r e a s e d v e r y r a p i d l y , the growth has not been s u f f i c i e n t t o p r e v e n t 
t h e p e r s i s t e n c e o f urban unemployment over t h e p e r i o d o f our s t u d y . 
Another r e s u l t o f f a v o u r i n g c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i e s (and 
t e c h n o l o g i e s ) has been t h a t the l a r g e number o f s m a l l e r m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
businesses have n o t b e n e f i t e d from government p o l i c y . 
Secondly, c h a p t e r 5 a l s o c o n s i d e r s t h e problems o f i m p o r t 
s u b s t i t u t i o n i ~ - oonev-hat breeder u y n t c x t . i t shows t i i a t , i n s p i t e 
of t h e i r v e r y r a p i d growth, by 1972 m a n u f a c t u r i n g a c t i v i t i e s were s t i l l 
if 
r a t h e r i s o l a t e d from the r e s t o f t h e economy. T h i s a p p l i e s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y t o t h e more advanced s e c t i o n s o f I r a n i a n i n d u s t r y . 
The s i t u a t i o n was f u r t h e r a g gravated by the h i g h l y unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f income and the d i s a p p o i n t i n g performance o f a g r i c u l t u r e . 
F i n a l l y , t h i s i s an a p p r o p r i a t e j u n c t u r e a t which t o add a note 
* 
about the q u a n t i t a t i v e m a t e r i a l s t h a t we have used i n t h i s t h e s i s ; 
As w i l l be seen we have r e l i e d almost e x c l u s i v e l y on the i n f o r m a t i o n 
p u b l i s h e d by v a r i o u s m i n i s t r i e s ,and p u b l i c a gencies. Most w r i t e r s 
and r e s e a r c h workers concerned w i t h I r a n i a n c o n d i t i o n s have q u e s t i o n e d 
the r e l i a b i l i t y o f I r a n i a n s t a t i s t i c s . While the c r i t i c i s m o f 
I r a n i a n s t a t i s t i c s i s i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y f a i r , we have had t o accept 
a l l the a v a i l a b l e i n f o r m a t i o n a t face v a l u e , except where the 
i n f o r m a t i o n o b v i o u s l y d i d n o t make sense or c o n t r a d i c t e d o t h e r 
i n f o r m a t i o n which was r e g arded as more r e l i a b l e . I n such cases we 
have r e f r a i n e d from u s i n g the data i n q u e s t i o n . 
(*) - For v a l u e f i g u r e s we have used b o t h the I r a n i a n 
c u r r e n c y and the U.S. d o l l a r . The r e l e v a n t 
c o n v e r s i o n r a t e i s : 
75 r i a l s = 1 US d o l l a r 
I n 1972 the r i a l was r e v a l u e d (68.8 r i a l s -
1 US d o l l a r ) b u t f o r c o m p a r a b i l i t y we have 
i g n o r e d t h i s and used the p r e v i o u s exchange 
r a t e f o r 1972. 
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Chapter 1 
A Discussion o f Some Aspects o f Import S u b s t i t u t i o n 
I n the post-war years most developing c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those 
i n Asia and L a t i n America, have experienced a considerable degree o f 
i n d u s t r i a l growth. W i t h few exceptions, the common p a t t e r n o f i n d u s t r i a l -
i s a t i o n i n developing c o u n t r i e s has been one based on t h e replacement o f 
imports o f , i n i t i a l l y , consumer goods followed by attempts a t 'deepening' 
the process i n t o the manufacture o f intermediate and c a p i t a l goods f o r the 
domestic market. This p a t t e r n o f i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n has i n t u r n been 
a c t i v e l y s t i m u l a t e d by economic p o l i c i e s , c h i e f l y p r o t e c t i v e , which encour-
age and increase the f l o w of resources i n t o the manufacturing sector. 
The volume o f l i t e r a t u r e and debate on the various aspects o f import 
s u b s t i t u t i o n i s now considerable. I n t h i s chapter we concentrate on a 
number o f issues t h a t can be regarded as amongst the more important issues 
a r i s i n g out o f import s u b s t i t u t i o n . I n section I we deal w i t h the concept 
and measurement o f import s u b s t i t u t i o n . 
Section I I i s concerned w i t h the various economic arguments which have 
been put forward i n favour o f an import s u b s t i t u t i o n s t r a t e g y . Generally 
speaking these arguments take the form o f various o b j e c t i o n s t o f r e e trade 
and i n favour o f p r o t e c t i o n i s t i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , on grounds t h a t one or 
other o f the assumptions t h a t u n d e r l i e the case f o r f r e e trade break down 
i n the circumstances o f developing c o u n t r i e s . The opposing group o f 
economists, while not o b j e c t i n g t o import s u b s t i t u t i o n or i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n 
as such, argue t h a t p r o t e c t i o n i s u s u a l l y the most i n e f f i c i e n t means o f 
achieving these objectxves. I n "cnis connection the recent developments 
i n trade theory concerning the o p t i m a l i t y o f various i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n 
f o r e i g n trade i n the presence o f 'domestic d i s t o r t i o n s 1 are o f immediate 
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relevance. 
I n s e c t i o n I I I some o f the consequences o f import s u b s t i t u t i o n 
p o l i c i e s i n developing c o u n t r i e s v r i . l l be considered. Generally speaking 
the r e s u l t s o f import s u b s t i t u t i o n p o l i c i e s appear t o have been such as t o 
produce a sense o f disenchantment even among some o f the proponents o f these 
p o l i c i e s . This d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t i s u s u a l l y expressed i n terms o f the f a i l -
ure o f import s u b s t i t u t i o n t o gain a degree o f s e l f - s u s t a i n e d growth. 
Thus i t i s pointed out t h a t import s u b s t i t u t i o n has f r e q u e n t l y shown a strong 
tendency t o 'get stuck 1 a t the 'easy' stage o f consumer goods i n d u s t r i e s . 
Such i n d u s t r i e s have u s u a l l y been very i n e f f i c i e n t and high cost and can 
only be v i a b l e w i t h very high (and i n some cases extremely high) l e v e l s o f 
p r o t e c t i o n . What i s more, t a r i f f s l e v i e d on competing imports u s u a l l y 
underestimate the p r o t e c t i o n enjoyed. A more appropriate measure i s e f f e c -
t i v e p r o t e c t i o n which measures the p r o t e c t i o n o f value added and takes account 
o f t a r i f f s l e v i e d on tradable inputs used by the i n d u s t r y . 
As a r e s u l t o f the high l e v e l o f p r o t e c t i o n enjoyed by e x i s t i n g consumer 
goods i n d u s t r i e s i t has become very d i f f i c u l t t o expand the manufacturing 
sector i n the d i r e c t i o n o f intermediate and c a p i t a l goods i n d u s t r i e s . 
More gen e r a l l y , i t i s o f t e n complained t h a t the p o l i c i e s adopted have meant 
t h a t i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n has been achieved at the expense o f a g r i c u l t u r e , 
provided l i t t l e e x t r a employment and has r e s u l t e d i n a very unequal d i s t r i -
b u t i o n o f income. This i n t u r n has l i m i t e d the growth i n the domestic 
market thus i n h i b i t i n g the prospects f o r the growth o f manufacturing i n d u s t -
r i e s even more. 
Cn the other hand, some economists, while accepting t h a t i n many cases 
p r o t e c t i o n has been too high and too i n d i s c r i m i n a t e , argue t h a t c r i t i c i s m s 
i n g c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the l a r g e r and medium-sized ones, problems o f 
< 
extending i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n backward i n t o intermediate and c a p i t a l goods have 
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not proved too g r e a t . 
I - Import S u b s t i t u t i o n ; Concepts and Measures 
Import s u b s t i t u t i o n can be conceived o f both as on occurrence and 
as a part o f a celiberate s t r a t e g y t o promote economic development.^ 
As an occurrence, i n t u r n , import s u b s t i t u t i o n can take place i n response 
t o several d i s t i n c t motive f o r c e s . F i r s t o f a l l , import s u b s t i t u t i o n 
can take place ' n a t u r a l l y 1 , t h a t i s i n response t o the gradual growth o f 
income. 
The major e m p i r i c a l study which showed t h a t import s u b s t i t u t i o n takes 
place i n response t o the gradual growth i n income i s Chenery's 1960 paper. 
I n t h i s paper Chenery set out to challenge the then prevalent explanation 
o f i n d u s t r i a l growth which was p r i m a r i l y i n terms o f changes i n the compos-
i t i o n and income e l a s t i c i t i e s o f demand. His aim was t o "incorporate 
changes i n both demand and supply conditions i n t o a more general explanation 
o f the growth o f i n d i v i d u a l sectors o f production which can then be used t o 
2 
explain the observed p a t t e r n o f i n d u s t r i a l growth". 
Broadly speaking t h e r e f o r e , Chenery's procedure involved two steps. 
F i r s t he e s t a b l i s h e d a 'normal 1 p a t t e r n o f s e c t o r a l growth by e s t i m a t i n g 
a cross-section regression equation i n which per cap i t a value added inseach 
sector depended on per capi t a income and upon p o p u l a t i o n . The r e s u l t s 
i n d i c a t e d t h a t the manufacturing sector has a much higher growth e l a s t i c i t y 
w i t h respect t o income than the other economic sectors. Broadly, t h i s means 
t h a t manufacturing grows a t higher r a t e o f growth than t h a t o f income per 
c a p i t a . 
The second step, and t h i s r e l a t e s t o the more o r i g i n a l aspect o f 
Chenery's work, i s t o e x p l a i n t h i s observed non-proportional growth o f 
manufacturing i n terms o f "three causes o f i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n " : ( l ) sub-
s t i t u t i o n o f domestic output f o r imports; (2) growth i n the f i n a l use o f 
8 
i n d u s t r i a l products; and (3) growth i n intermediate use stemming from 
( l ) and (2). S i g n i f i c a n t l y , h i s c a l c u l a t i o n s showed t h a t over the 
100 t o 600 d o l l a r s income range, changes i n supply c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t i s 
the growth o f import s u b s t i t u t i o n , was a much more s i g n i f i c a n t explanation 
of manufacturing growth than changes i n the demand f o r the f i n a l and i n t e r -
mediate uses o f manufactured products.^ 
Thus, as we have emphasised, Chenery's concept o f import s u b s t i t u t i o n 
c l e a r l y represents changes i n supply conditions r e s u l t i n g from changes i n 
comparative advantage over time.**" 
Another set o f motive forces t h a t give r i s e t o import s u b s t i t u t i o n 
are such t h i n g s as war, serious depressions and other circumstances t h a t 
d r a s t i c a l l y d i s r u p t the f l o w o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e . The Great Depression 
o f the 1930's and the Second World War g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d i n d u s t r i a l devel-
opment i n a number o f developing c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those i n L a t i n 
America. Faced w i t h a sudden collapse o f t h e i r exports and the consequent 
i n a b i l i t y t o o b t a i n t h e i r import requirements, domestic production o f some 
pre v i o u s l y imported items was the only s o l u t i o n . During the War, although 
export earnings recovered, imports from the developed countries were unobtain-
able. The e f f e c t was again t o give a boost t o the development o f domestic 
manufacturing i n a l a r g e number o f developing c o u n t r i e s . 
Yet another explanation o f the autonomous growth o f import s u b s t i t u t i o n 
i n developing countries i n more recent years has been the operations o f m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s . These f u n c t i o n i n o l i g o p o l i s t i c markets and are 
mainly concerned t o preserve t h e i r market share or t o increase i t r a t h e r 
than t o maximise p r o f i t s . This m o t i v a t i o n i n t u r n i m p l i e s t h a t m u l t i -
n a t i o n a l f i r m s are l i k e l y t o set up manufacturing capacity i n developing 
countries they already supply i n order to pre-etrvnt f u t u r e competition. 
One o f the r e s u l t s o f t h i s p a t t e r n o f behaviour has been t h a t "the nature 
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o f d i r e c t f o r e i g n investment has changed from t h a t o f raw m a t e r i a l e x t r a c -
5 
t i o n p r o j e c t s t o assembly and production f o r the domestic market". 
This change has meant t h a t " f o r e i g n investment has played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e 
i n expanding domestic value added and thus i n promoting import s u b s t i t u t i n g 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s " . 
The f i n a l motive force behind the growth o f import s u b s t i t u t i o n as an 
occurrence i s the frequent balance o f payment c r i s e s t h a t most developing 
countries have had t o face. Import c o n t r o l s which are i n i t i a l l y viewed 
as a curb on the consumption o f less e s s e n t i a l items and are meant t o save 
f o r e i g n exchange f o r more e s s e n t i a l requirements o f t e n become a permanent 
fea t u r e and have the unwanted e f f e c t o f encouraging domestic production o f 
l u x u r i e s . 
Import s u b s t i t u t i o n as a conscious p a r t o f a development s t r a t e g y i s 
b a s i c a l l y a post-war phenomenon. At t h i s j u n c t u r e i t i s u s e f u l t o o u t l i n e 
some aspects o f the general background t o the adoption o f import s u b s t i t u -
t i o n as a matter o f p o l i c y . F i r s t o f a l l , t h e i r experience i n the i n t e r -
war per i o d and during the war i t s e l f was an important f a c t o r i n i n f l u e n c i n g 
p o l i c y i n the developing countries and i n g i v i n g i t an import s u b s t i t u t i n g 
emphasis i n the post-war years. L i t t l e - } S c i t o v s k y and Scott have expressed 
t h i s p o i n t i n the f o l l o w i n g terms: 
" I t i s t r u e t h a t the developed co u n t r i e s s u f f e r e d as much or more 
from the great depression; b u t , u n l i k e them, the developing countries 
could blame the outside world f o r t h e i r t r o u b l e s . The developed 
countries emerged w i t h the resolve never again t o l e t depression and 
unemployment to reach such depths; the developing countries seem t o 
have made up t h e i r mind t o reduce t h e i r dependence on the world 
economy" 7 
I n a d d i t i o n , an 'inward-looking* development s t r a t e g y was advisable, 
not o n l y because i t would reduce v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o sudden and d r a s t i c d i s -
r u p t i o n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e , but also because there v/as widespread p e s s i -
mism regarding the a l t e r n a t i v e 'out-ward' or 'export-oriented' p o l i c i e s , 
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even under normal c o n d i t i o n s . This i n t u r n was g r e a t l y i n f l u e n c e d by 
what has become known as the 'Frebish-Singer-Myrdal' t h e s i s . Very b r i e f l y 
expressed, t h i s t h e s i s h e l d t h a t u n l i k e the experience o f primary producers 
i n the 19th century, exports prospects o f many developing countries were 
now l i m i t e d . This was so because primary exports faced a low income e l a s t -
i c i t y o f demand, because o f the development o f man-made s u b s t i t u t e s , and 
also because t e c h n o l o g i c a l growth tended t o reduce the raw m a t e r i a l i n p u t 
i n t o many manufactured products. 
Economic s t r u c t u r e i n developed c o u n t r i e s , t o o , i t was argued, had 
adverse i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the trade prospects o f developing n a t i o n s . 
"Monopolistic 1 s t r u c t u r e o f i n d u s t r y and the labour market meant t h a t 
p r o d u c t i v i t y growth, instead o f r e s u l t i n g i n cheaper exports o f i n d u s t r i a l 
products t o developing c o u n t r i e s , was almost e x c l u s i v e l y r e f l e c t e d i n h i g h e r 
p r o f i t s and wages i n the developed c o u n t r i e s . The combination o f t h i s and 
the demand problems noted above i m p l i e d a d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f the terms o f 
trade and a consequent t r a n s f e r o f income. Whether or not t h i s l i n e o f 
reasoning was v a l i d - and from the beginning there were many who questioned 
g 
both i t s t h e o r e t i c a l and e m p i r i c a l v a l i d i t y - i s n o t r e a l l y the issue. 
What matters i s t h a t i t seems t o have met w i t h widespread acceptance among 
p o l i c y makers i n the developing c o u n t r i e s . I n t h i s context, import sub-
9 
s t i t u t i o n , viewed as an # inward-looking development process" , or more 
s p e c i f i c a l l y , as "an attempt by economically less-developed countries t o 
break out o f the world d i v i s i o n o f labour which had emerged i n the nineteenth 
century and the e a r l y part o f the t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y " ^ , was n a t u r a l l y regarded 
as the most e f f e c t i v e path t o economic development: 'Development through 
import s u b s t i t u t i o n ' , t h a t i s development based on a 'dynamic 1 manufacturing 
Not o n l y d i d developing countries want t o reduce t h e i r dependence on 
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the world economy, but there was also greater acceptance of the need for 
intervention in the domestic economy i t s e l f , and this in turn became an 
additional factor working in favour of the policies of import substitution. 
Thus there was generally more support for planning and regulation of econ-
omic l i f e . In some countries, as for example in India, this was jus t i f i ed 
on ideological grounds and as a part of ' soc ia l i s t ' economic policies. 
In others, the notion of a coordinated development 'strategy* was regarded 
as useful, because i t implied an approach that seeks to modify the nature 
of the economy in quite fundamental ways. To some extent therefore, import 
substitution was regarded as a part of a strategy for structural change. 
How exactly import substitution was able to achieve this was spelled out 
in terms of a number of arguments for protectionist industrialisation that 
are the subject of section I I of the present chapter. 
Measures of Import Substitution 
Most discussions of import substitution, whether they treat i t as on 
historical process or a development strategy, have used Chenery's measure 
of import substitution or other measures that are very closely based on 
h is . Chenery defined import substitution as the "difference between 
growth in output with no change in the import-ratio and the actual growth"^ 
To express his definition algebraically, consider the following identity: 
Q+M = R + D + E 
Yfhere Q = domestic production, 
M = imports, 
R = intermediate demand, 
D = f ina l domestic demand, 
E - exports 
Expressing the above identity in incremental values we get: 
AQ + A M = A R + A D + A E 
1 2 
Defining total supply, S s Q + M, we can write: 
A s = A R + A D + A E 
Let = Q^/Sj in the base year. 
I f remains fixed then the change in domestic output,A Q» i s given by 
1*2 • A s » o r u 2 # ( ^ R + ^ D + A E ) . 
I f however over the period changes to U2 = Q2/S2J then the change in 
output i s given by: 
AQ = u : ( A S + A D) + u x ( A E) + ( u 2 - u 2 ) . S 2 ( I ) 
Relationship ( i ) divides the growth in domestic output between 
a ) A R + A D)i that i s the expansion in intermediate and domestic 
f ina l demand on the assumption that the ratio of domestic output to total 
supply ( U 2 ) remains fixed; 
b) A E ) , expansion of exports again on the assumption of a fixed U 2 ; 
and c) (U2 - U g ) . which i s the change in domestic output implied 
by the actual change in the ratio of domestic output to total supply. 
This i s Chenery's measure of import substitution. 
In the next chapter we have used this measure to quantify the extent 
of import substitution in 15 manufacturing industry groups in Iran over 
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the 1960-1972 period. This measure has been subjected to several 
criticisms,the most important of which we wi l l consider. Basically the 
criticisms f a l l into two categories. Thus a number of writers, while 
accepting his underlying methodology show that Chenery1s measure of import 
substitution involves inconsistencies when aggregation over time periods 
or over industry groups i s involved.^ 
Oth^T* w r i t e r s Viny/^v^r ^^V^ i 9 c t" ci Ch^nsi'v* s "h i^r.ii.r! r^ f:"hV;r^ rir:!! n.^v. "^f*. 
least implicit ly , and i t i s only this lat ter group of criticisms that we 
consider in this chapter. These writers either question Chenery's concept 
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of imports and argue that his particular definition i s too narrow and 
to that extent, his measure of import substitution i s inadequate; or they 
question his valuation of domestic outputa 
The last mentioned crit ic ism, relating to the valuation of output, 
i s in a sense the most fundamental of a l l . I t can be argued that,in 
computing import substitution, i t i s illegitimate to evaluate domestic 
output at the actual prices observed in the domestic economy. Measuring 
manufacturing output in this way implies that the share of manufacturing 
in national income, that i s i t s claim on total national product, i s equal 
to i t s contribution to output. This , i t has been argued, i s a very un-
rea l i s t i c assumption in the context of most developing countries. The 
most important reason for this i s that in most developing countries manu-
facturing i s heavily protected or otherwise subsidised and that these subsid-
ies "add up to the subsidised sectorSs share in national product without 
necessarily adding to i t s measurable contribution to output".^' 
Domestic prices, therefore, over-estimate the 'true' value of manufactur-
23 
ing output. I t i s easy to see that a measure of import substitution which 
uses the observed value of domestic output i s consequently l ike ly to be an 
over-estimate. 
The obvious solution to this problem i s to value domestic output at 
world prices, using the c . i . f . prices of comparable imports. While this 
in principle i s an acceptable and desirable procedure, there are a number 
of practical d i f f i cu l t i e s which often preclude i t s application. F i r s t of 
a l l , to be meaningful, the comparison between domestic output and imports 
has to be at a very disaggregated and in fact individual commodity l eve l . 
Often data of the required level of disaggregation are not available. 
" h i s I S CSI ' t r . lT i ly t l ' i i C- . i ;C f o r i l i C L C L C L J - U i C i i , cVcii a. SJLiigJ.e OUIiUilOU-
i t y , there are often differences in quality which again make comparison 
d i f f i c u l t . 
1*t 
Another, more fundamental, d i f f i cu l ty i s that i t i s , in many cases, 
d i f f icu l t to ascertain what the long-term world price for a commodity i s . 
Thus import prices from different origins often conflict and i t i s not 
easy to see whether differences in price reflect genuine differences in 
long term costs or merely short term fluctuations in demand. Because of 
these d i f f i cu l t i e s we have not attempted to measure import substitution in 
this modified manner for Iran . 
Another crit icism which implies a rejection of Chenery's methodology 
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has been advanced by S.A. Morley and G-. Smith. Basically their objection 
i s that Chenery1s concept of imports i s too narrow. To see why Chenery1s 
concept of imports is said to be narrow consider the following identity: 
Q. + M. = P. + i a . . . Q. 
TChere = domestic production of sector i 
M. = imports of i 1 
3\ = f ina l demand (domestic and exports) for the products of sector i 
a. .=-• observed input-output ratios 
Expressing the above identity verbally, we can write that domestic output 
of sector i plus import of i , are identically equal to the f ina l demand for 
i plus the total amount of intermediate use of sector i ' s products by other;-
sectors. In this framework, imports, M s^ supplement domestic production, 
Q ,^ in satisfying gross ( f ina l plus intermediate) demand only for the 
products of one sector ( i ) . 
Morley and Smith argue, however, that this i s unnecessarily restr ic t ive . 
They point out that "an import ultimately substitutes for or supplements the 
outout of manv domestic sectors * I f an import i r. +.n. >.p ™-~ •;:—•:• v j i t h o u . 
induced rises in imported inputs....production must be increased not only 
in the industry f ina l ly processing the good, but also in i t s supplier industry 
and in their supplier industries and so for th" .^ 
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Suppose, for example, that o i l i s discovered in a country and as a 
result of the subsequent setting up of refining capacity, a l l imports of 
refined o i l terminate. Chenery's measure would show import substitution 
for refined o i l equal to i t s domestic production, but none for crude o i l . 
But import substitution for the refined product has only been possible 
because the discovery of crude o i l in effect substituted for the ' implicit' 
imports of crude o i l . 
Another example may perhaps c lar i fy this point further. In 194-9* 
the Brazil ian production of metals satisf ied 80 percent of the direct use 
of metals. But most of supply needed by such heavy metal using sectors 
as transport equipments, machinery and e lectr ical equipment was s t i l l 
imported. When import substitution progressed in these lat ter industries 
most of the increased requirement of metals was sat isf ied domestically. 
Now, Chenery's measure would identify this latter increase in the output 
of the Brazilian metals sector as an increase in the intermediate use of 
metals. Morley and Smith argue however that i t should be regarded as import 
substitution in metals. Generally, Morley and Smith point out that Chenery's 
measure underestimates import substitution in industry groups producing 
mainly intermediate goods. 
Morley and Smith suggest an alternative procedure which accommodates 
implicit or indirect imports. They assume that the economy can be described 
by an open input-output matrix. Assuming that A i s such a matrix whose 
typical element, a . . , "remains constant over the relevant range", we can 
write: 
q + m = f ( I ) 
Yfaere I the identity matrix 
m the vector of imports 
f the vector of f i n a l demand 
Dividing ( i l ) through by I I - Al we get: 
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q + f x - . 
-1 
[ i - A ] \ f ( I I ) 
-1 
The second expression on the l e f t hand side of ( i l ) 1 , £ l - A J . m = m<!, 
i s thus the redefined vector of imports which should be used in the calcul-
ation of import substitution. As Morley and Smith point out "m* converts 
imports to a gross production basis and allocates them to their proper 
domestic sectors. I t can be viewed as the domestic production neeessary 
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to substitute completely for imports, holding g l l f ina l demand constant" 
I t i s clear that Morley and Smith's method of measuring import substit-
ution requires data of a greater degree of sophistication and accuracy. 
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Cne needs a "sufficiently detailed and accurate input-output table" the 
existence of which cannot be assumed for a significant number of developing 
countries. Furthermore, input-output ratios are l ike ly to change quite 
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substantially in developing countries over relatively short periods , and 
cannot be assumed constant. 
Not only i s the application of their measure often hindered by lack of 
the necessary data, but, i t has been argued, Morley and Smith's method i s 
not necessarily superior to Chenery 1s. This has been argued by George Pane. 
His point can be i l lustrated by the following examples which he provides. 
Consider a hypothetical case where a l l f i n a l demands remain constant 
and where the domestic gross output rises by one unit in industry 1 and 
remains constant in a l l other industries: 
21
A Q j = 0 ( j = 2,3 ) 
Imports must adjust to balance supply and demand for each industry: 
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As Fane points out Morley and Smith would record no import substitution 
or demand expansion for industries 2, 3,.,..,etc. This i s because the 
output of these industries has not increased and the increases in imports 
(a.,.) i s in response to the increase in the requirements of industry 1 
whose output has increased. Chenery, on the other hand would record increase 
in the intermediate demand for industries 2.3. .j>etc, but that this source 
of growth was exactly offset by negative import substitution: imports rose 
by the f u l l amount of the extra intermediate demand (a., .) and domestic 
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gross output fai led to capture any of the potential growth. 
Thus as this example i l lus trates , "Chenery1s description i s at least 
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as informative as Morley and Smith's description" . For a l l these reasons 
we have not attempted to use their measure of import substitution in chapter 
2. 
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I I - Theoretical Arguments for Import Substituting Industrialisation 
The arguments that have been advanced in favour of the policies of 
import substitution in developing countries are in some respects similar 
to the older arguments for the restriction of free trade. In this 
connection, in fact , i t has been argued that import substitution i s "more 
of a new label than a new concept" and that "providing protection against 
imports has long been a foundation stone of the 'infant industry' approach 
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to industrialisation". However in the post-war years these arguments 
have gained a sharper focus and av;imore immediate relevance as a result of 
the greater interest in the problems of developing countries. Furthermore, 
as Professor Johnson has pointed out "not only the traditional arguments 
for protection have been reformulated and sharpened, but the emphasis has 
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shifted to new arguments and new versions of old arguments." 
&enerally, the various arguments for protection attempt to show that 
the existing structure of the economy is 'biased' against the growth of 
manufacturing industries and that, without intervention, the working of 
price and market mechanisms w i l l not channel enough resources into manu-
facturing and thus inhibits i t s progress. I t follows therefore that as a 
corrective, protection can legitimately be used to provide an added incentive 
for the growth of manufacturing. Although in substance many of the arguments 
for protection do overlap, i t i s convenient to present four f a i r l y distinct 
sets of arguments: 
a) - Infant industry arguments; 
b) - External economies arguments; 
c) - Arguments arising from labour market distortions, and; 
d) - Arguments relating to savings and the rate of growth. 
After considering each of -che above arguments we then consider the objection 
that, although the above arguments are probably acceptable rationale for 
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giving special favour to industry, i t does not follow that protection i s 
the best way of doing so. In fact, i t can, almost invariably be shown 
that protection is a 'second best' policy (or even worse). The ' f i r s t 
best' policy in relation to the objectives i s often some 'promotional' 
measure which, depending on the circumstances, i s l ike ly to be a combination 
of appropriate tax and subsidy devices. F ina l ly , we w i l l examine the 
argument that this lat ter analysis has l i t t l e relevance for the developing 
countries because of lack of finance for 'promotional' measures. 
I I - A - Arguments for Protection 
(a) - Infant industry arguments 
This i s the oldest argument for protection. I t was accepted, along 
with the 'optimal t a r i f f 1 case, as the only instances where the c lass ical 
case for free trade did not hold. The c lass ical economists recognised two 
versions of the infant industry case. They, interpreted the term 'infant 
industry 1 both in the broad sense so that i t became synonymous with 'indust-
r ia l i sat ion' and also more narrowly in the relation to the establishment of 
one specific industry.^ 
Later writers in the c lass ica l and neo-classical tradition, however, 
generally recognised only the narrow version of the argument and then as a 
case which was theoretically valid and interesting but had relatively l i t t l e 
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practical significance. The narrow infant industry case states that i t 
may be d i f f i cu l t to establish a new industry given that competitors have 
been established abroad. Thus, even though the industry may potentially 
possess long run comparative advantage, without protection i t w i l l be under-
sold by imports and cannot gain a foothold. This i s b ecause i t s costs w i l l 
be i n i t i a l l y high and i t wi l l take some time before, as a result o f the 
experience and increasing familiarity with the industry, i t can reduce i t s 
costs and successfully compete with imports. There i s a case, therefore, 
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for giving temporary protection to the industry. 
As we have already noted, many economists point out that, in practice, 
this argument does not amount to a valid case for protection. In particular, 
before the infant industry can qualify for protection at least two other 
conditions need to be f u l f i l l e d . F i r s t l y , i t has been argued that the 
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industry should meet what has been called the 'Bastable tes t ' . That i s , 
not only should the industry have a potential comparative advantage - which 
i s the 'Mill test' - but the .potential comparative advantage be such that 
the eventual gain from lower prices (than imports), properly discounted, 
should be greater than the i n i t i a l costs of protecting the industry. 
In other words there should be a net gain to society from the establishment 
29 
of the industry. 
Secondly, even i f both the above tests are in fact met, there may s t i l l 
be no grounds for protecting the industry i f private entrepreneurs perceive 
the situation and are prepared to accept the i n i t i a l losses in expectation 
of future profits . This , i t i s presumed, wi l l be the case i f the gains 
involved in the learning process are appropriable by the firm i t s e l f , that 
i s i f they are internal economics. 
I f however the costs of each firm are lowered because of factors that 
are common to the industry as a whole and the benefits created cannot be 
confined to any one firm then intervention i s called for because no firm 
i s prepared to take the r i sks . A well known example of this i s the economies 
which arise as a result of the training of labour. The pioneering firm 
may have to bear the cost of training of i t s labour force who may subsequently 
move on to other firms. Even.for th is , however the case for protection 
is not easily conceded. I t is pointed out the labour force of the pioneer-
ing firm may well be willing to ' internalise' the external economics arising 
from the learning process. The workers may thus be will ing to pay for 
their training by accepting lower wages during a period of apprenticeship.^ 
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I t may well "be argued that the above objections do not seriously 
weaken the case for infant industry protection in the developing countries. . 
Thus, for example, the mere fact that the economies created may be approp-
riable by the firm i t s e l f , w i l l not mean that the investment w i l l take 
place. In developing countries businessmen have a very high discount 
rate of the future and the private rate of return may be insufficient to 
induce them to i n v e s t . ^ Similarly for the labour training case, i t i s 
sometimes assumed that the workers can maintain their standard of l iv ing 
during the apprenticeship by borrowing on the strength of their future 
earnings. I t can be seen that this requires a f a i r l y sophisticated capital 
market which i s again lacking in most developing countries. 
Another fact which i s important and should be taken into account i s 
the often persistent preference of consumers for imported products even 
in cases where no obvious differences in quality exist . Here again> tempor-
ary protection can help an* infant industry in gradually gaining acceptance 
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from domestic consumers. 
In general however, the narrow infant industry case does not seem to 
provide a very strong basis for the policies of import substitution. 
In fact , of course, those writers who have advocated the use of protection 
for the industrialisation of developing countries have had a conception 
of the infant industry case that is akin to the broad version of the class-
i c a l case but also goes beyond i t . 
The broad c lass ical infant industry argument emphasised the 'develop-
mental* aspects of p r o t e c t i o n . T h u s such writers as L i s t , Hamilton, and 
also John Stewart Mill approached the infant industry case in this 'devel-
opmental' s p i r i t . According to M i l l , for example, the most important 
? l a ™ . e n t -in t h n ~rr.r>.-.: v -+y = r d pre s p i r i t ; , - o f c ration, w h i c h w i l l t d i . c a. 
long time to develop, i s "a population trained in the general atmosphere 
3i. 
of industrial pursuits". Similarly Ldst advocated protection of the 
'main branches' of manufacturing industry so as to promote "the increase 
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in the mental and material capital ec\ d the sp ir i t of enterprise in the 
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nation" . The general presumption, i t seems, i s that industrialisation, 
in changing the economic and social structure of the country, creates 
benefits that wi l l not be taken into account in the working of the market 
mechanism. Hence the case for protection. The nature of such external 
economies has been most elequently expressed by Hans Singer: 
"The most important contribution of an industry i s not i ts immediate 
products (as i s perforce assumed by economists and stat ist ic ians) 
and not even in i t s effects on other industries and immediate social 
benefits (thus far economists have been led by Marshal and Pigot) 
but perhaps beyond this in i t s effect on the general level af , 
education, . sk i l l s , way of l i f e , inventiveness, habits, store of 
technology, creation of new demands, etc 
This i s precisely the reason why manufacturing industries are 
so universally desired by underdeveloped countries: they provide 
growing points for increased technical knowledge, urban education 
and the dynamism and resilience that goes with urban c iv i l i sa t ion , 
as well as the direct external economics of Marshall" 36 
The point that should be noted i s that these 'sociological' and 'educative' 
benefits are regarded as a product of an irreversible learning process. 
As such their realisation demands temporary rather than permanent protection. 
This i s why they can legitimately be regarded as an argument for infant 
industry protection. 
Professor Myint has questioned the relevance of the broad infant 
industry argument for protection in the context of import substituting 
industrialisation. He points out that: 
"Import substitution amounts to selecting the industries according 
to their capacity to satisfy the existing pattern of domestic 
demand for manufactured consumer goods. Cn the other hand, the 
infant industry argument, however broadly interpreted, i s concerned 
with an industry's capacity to lower i t s costs in the future through 
the process of learning by doing. Prima facie, we vsould not, 
therefore, expect a group of industries selected for their capacity 
to match the pattern of domestic demand to be the same as a group of 
genuine infant industries selected on their prospects of lowering 
costs in the future" 37 
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'balanced growth1 whereby the emphasis is on the expansion of the market 
for manufactured goods through the more or less simultaneous setting up 
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of consumer industries. As such however, the costs of each industry-
decrease primarily as a result of the economics of scale, implicit in 
J O 
the increase in the total size of the market. This however i s different 
from the infant industry process of learning: "an industry's capacity to 
lower i t s costs by moving towards i t s optimum scale of output does not 
depend on i t s special capacity to improve efficiency, but i s assumed to 
follow automatically from the enlargement of the overall size of the protect 
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ed market". 
In this connection, two points should be noted. F i r s t of a l l , the 
infant industry argument, at least in i t s broad version, does not emphasise 
improvements in efficiency due to factors which may be specific to individ-
ual industries. vYhat is emphasised i s the kind of external economies which 
are not specific and can be generated by almost any combination of l ight 
industries. Examples are a growing pool of ski l led labour and a gradual 
penetration of an industrial way of l i f e . So even i f import substitution 
i s based on 'balanced growth*, there i s no reason wiry the economies should 
be of a purely scale character and without any learning or inherent improve-
ments in efficiency. 
The second point that may be noted i s that Professor Myint conceives 
of import substitution as based on the existing pattern of demand. 
•While import substitution naturally starts with f ina l consumer goods, these 
being the products for which a market already exists, an important character 
i s t i c of the process i s the creation of new demand. In fact much of the 
dynamism attributed to en import substitution strategy ar ises , at least in 
theory, from the creation of new investment opportunities consequent on 
setting up of 'finishing touches' industries. Viewed in this way then, 
imuort substitution i s not based on 'balanced prov.-th1 Professor Vyr'nt 
suggests. P.ather the emphasis i s on 'imbalanced growth'. 'Finishing 
touches' industries create investment opportunities at stages further back 
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along the industrial spectrum. Hence external economies are transmitted 
vert ical ly along different stages of production rather than horizontally at 
the consumer goods stage. 
(b) - External Economies arguments 
The external economies that arise in connection with the infant 
industry case are a l l related to the process of learning and accumulation 
of knovf-how arising from industrialisation, hence their i rrevers ib i l i ty . 
In other words the external economies in this case are basically a function 
of time; that through time involvement, in industry gives rise to experience 
and knowledge and these are not reflected in market prices. In addition, 
however, industrialisation gives rise to another set of external economies 
that are somev/hat different and of a more technical nature. Here we 
consider external economies that arise as a result of the interdependence 
of investment decisions, induced linkages, and economies of scale. 
The interdependence of investment decisions gives rise to external 
economies that can be regarded as an extension of the Mar'shalian concept of 
external economies. The latter was concerned with economies external to 
the firm but internal to the industry i t s e l f , here we are concerned with 
the economies that expansion of one industry bestows on another. The 
following example helps i l lustrate the point. Consider a case where 
investment in extracting coal reserves may be unprofitable i f , in the 
absence of a* steel industry, there i s not a sufficiently large domestic 
market and transport costs rule out exporting. In such conditions the 
creation of a steel industry w i l l create external economies for coal extrac-
tion. On the other hand the steel industry i t s e l f w i l l be d i f f i cu l t to 
establish without domestic supply of coal; steel production with imported 
supplies w i l l not be able to compete with imports. Vert ical integration 
whereby one firm owns the whole complex, thus 'internalising' the economies 
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i s unlikely because of the sheer amount of 'lumpy11 investment which such 
an undertaking necessitates. In the circumstances of developing countries 
where the a v a i l i b i l i t y of finance i s always an important constraint, the 
possibil ity of vert ical integration i s even less l ike ly 
In theoretical terms the above kind of external economy may be 
considered as 'dynamic' in the sense that i t involves a divergence between 
the social and private return on investment. This type of divergence arises 
because market prices, even in a competitive market, do not transmit s u f f i -
cient information regarding the future. Thus as Scitovsky has pointed out: 
"Market pr ices . . . re f l ec t the situation as i t i s and not as i t w i l l 
be. For this reason, they are more useful for" coordinating current 
production decisions, which are immediately effective and guided by 
short-run considerations, than they are for coordinating investment 
decisions which have delayed effects and - looking ahead for a long 
future period - should be guided not by what the present economic 
situation i s , but by what the future economic situation i s exoected 
to be" .42 
In addition to interdependence between investment decisions, another cause 
of the dynamic divergence between social and private return is stressed by 
Hirschman. According to Hirschman, an important difference between various 
investment projects i s that they are l ike ly to differ in the extent of 
opportunities they provide for latent entrepreneurial forces. An industry 
like oi l -ref ining may attract investment because i t i s privately more prof i t -
able than the manufacture of, say> shoes'* Yet the shoe industry wi l l 
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provide much more inducement for backward linkages. Entrepreneurs w i l l 
be mobilized to supply leather, laces, glue and other inputs into the 
shoe industry. I t should be pointed out, that the existence of induced 
linkages provides a general argument for protecting the manufacturing 
sector relative to agriculture. This i s because as Professor Hirsohman 
has argued, manufacturing act iv i t ies create a greater scope for induced 
investment decisions in terms of backward and forward linkage effects, than 
agriculture. 
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Final ly , we may consider the external economies that are a function 
of the scale of production. The interest in economies of scale in 
relation to industrialisation has been revived mainly in connection with 
the attempts to overcome the small size of national markets and the forma-
tion of common markets or custom unions between developing countries. 
This was a major policy proposal of the 130+ Conference on Trade and 
Development. The proposal was largely based on the postulate that 
economics of saale "are a logical extension of the infant industry argument" 
and that cost reductions resulting from learning of s k i l l s and know-how i s 
1*5 
not merely a function of time but also depends on the size of the market. 
However as was indicated earl ier many economists would object to this 
extension of the infant industry concept/1"^ 
Apart from i t s relevance to economic integration between developing 
countries the existence of the economies of scale can also be used as an 
argument for protection in the context of national commercial policy. 
The existence of scale economies have been firmly established for 
public u t i l i t i e s such as e lectr ic i ty , inland transport, telephones and so 
on. I t can be argued that the existence of such economies provides a case 
for the protection of manufacturing industries, since they increase the 
demand for the services of 'public u t i l i t i e s ' thereby making the realisation 
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of economies of scale and reduction in costs possible. More generally, 
the creation of industries using inputs whose production are subject to 
economies of scale, bestow an external economy by expanding the market for 
the inputs. This can be seen in an industry l ike motor cars whose various 
components enjoy economies of scale. 
Some external economies also arise i f the industry uses inputs that 
have to be maae to special design (rather than being standard, as in the 
case of motor cars) . In such cases no one firm wi l l need enough of the 
input to jus t i fy integrating the production process and i t is expensive and 
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inconvenient to import the input. I f the industry expands, however, 
there w i l l he a large enough market and therefore a specialist f i rm may 
I Q 
profitably provide the input. 
(c) - Arguments arising from labour market distortions 
As we have already indicated, economic arguments for protection 
constitute a set of objections to the welfare (or 'normative*) propositions 
of trade theory. They a l l point out that some or a l l of the assumptions 
which support the case fo r free t rade break down in the conditions of develop-
ing countries. Thus we have seen that the existence of external economies 
makes for a divergence between private and social costs. 
I t is also often argued that, contrary to the assumption of trade 
theory, the labour market is characterized with 'distort ions ' which over-
state the real cost of labour in manufacturing. Under free trade, therefore, 
the output of manufacturing would be below i t s optimum. 
There are two versions of the above case. "Firstly, wages in manufactur-
ing may be above the real opportunity cost of labour in agriculture, where, 
i t is claimed there i s 'surplus' labour. The second version of the case 
argues from an observed wage d i f fe ren t i a l between agriculture; and manufact-
uring, without necessarily at t r ibut ing the existence of the d i f f e ren t i a l 
to the existence of surplus labour. 
S t r i c t ly speaking, the existence of surplus labour in agriculture 
implies that actual wages are positive in circumstances where the ' shadow-' 
wage is zero. More generally, i t is suff icient that the actual wage be 
more than the 'shadow' wage while both are positive. The divergence between 
the actual and the 'shadow1 wage is caused by the inert ia and the immobility 
of the rural surplus labour force. Hence protection is necessary to 
compensate manufacturing sector for the payment of relat ively high wages. 
The va l id i ty of the above argument naturally depends on whether there 
2.8 
is in fac t , a surplus labour in agriculture. About a l l that can be said 
here is that this cannot be assumed even for apparently overpopulated 
countries such as India or Egypt, and that the situation is often complic-
ated by seasonal employment and the particular farming practice and i n s t i t u -
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tions of the country in question. 
The second version,whereby no assumption about surplus labour is 
necessary, is more interesting since i t has a more jeneral application. 
There are numerous developing countries, such as those in West Afr ica , 
which by no means are overpopulated, but s t i l l the manufacturing sector 
may have to bear higher wages. In fact Professor Hagen has pointed out 
that wage different ials between agriculture and manufacturing are a necessary 
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concomitant to economic growth. Economic growth implies a more than 
proportional growth in manufacturing, hence demand for labour from manufactur-
ing grows faster than that of the other sectors. In order to attract and 
keep i t s required labour force, manufacturing has to pay higher wages than 
the rest of the economy. This, in the absence of protection, w i l l depress 
5 1 
the output of the manufacturing sector below i t s optimum. 
(d) - Arguments relating to savings and the rate of growth 
Finally, i t can be argued that protection of manufacturing is desirable 
because i t increases saving in the economy. This can be achieved in two 
ways. F i r s t l y , protection is l i k e l y to increase the share of prof i ts in 
income. Hence protection redistributes income in favour of groups with a 
higher propensity to save. This, i t is assumed, w i l l be re-invested and 
w i l l lead to a higher rate of growth. This argument is particularly 
attractive, since the alternative of mobilising smaller household savings 
is usually d i f f i c u l t and requires an e f f i c i en t capital market. 
The second way that protection may lead to an increase in saving is 
through i t s influence on the inflow of foreign capital . Thus i t is possible 
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that protection w i l l induce foreign firms to set up manufacturing or 
assembly capacity in the country and this could lead to higher overall 
savings being mobilized in the economyo There are however many aspects 
to foreign investment, including transfer of technology, the discussion 
of costs and benefits of which is beyond the scope of this study. 
I I - B - 'Promotion1 Versus Protection 
I t should be clear that a l l the above arguments for protection are in 
fact largely inseperable from the rationale fo r industrial isation. Each 
of the above arguments that we have considered are somehow reducable to one 
or other desired characteristic of industry. And while most economists have 
been prepared, in varying degrees, to accept the case for industrialisation, 
they have been much more reluctant to accept that protection is the best way 
of achieving i t . 
Thus L i t t l e , Scitovsky and Scott have argued that: 
"Almost every reason that has ever been advanced for making industry-
more profitable by protecting i t from the competition of imports 
really turns out to be a reason f o r providing i t with better services, 
or for subsidising i t s employment of some factor of production, or 
for compensating i t directly for some 'external benefit 1 which i t 
produces. These are a l l 'promotional' policies rather than purely 
protective".^2 
Unt i l recently, the disl ike for protective as distinct from 'promotional' 
measures such as taxes and subsidies was based on po l i t i ca l and psychological 
factors. I t was thought that protection gives rise to vested interests 
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which might make i t s subsequent reduction or removal po l i t i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t . 
Similarly, subsidies were considered superior because, among other advantages, 
"the payment of a subsidy is a constant reminder to society that nursing the 
infant (industry) is costing i t resources, leading to more frequent and 
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incisive reviews of the social value of the project". 
In addition to the above kind of considerations, recent developments 
in trade theory have provided f i rm theoretical reasons for prefering taxes, 
subsidies and other promotional measures to protection. These developments 
55 
can best be described in terms of two relatively simple propositions. 
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The f i r s t proposition i s that the correction of 'domestic* distortions 
does not require intervention in foreign trade. Thus i f free trade does 
not produce an optimal allocation of resources "because of an imperfection 
in the capital market ( infant industry cum external economies arguments), 
or an imperfection in the labour market ('shadow' wage and wage differen-
t ia l s ) , or a divergence between private and social discount rates (leading 
to inadequate savings), then in each case a domestic distort ion is involved. 
An optimal policy is therefore one which attempts to remove these distortions 
directly rather than by interfering in foreign trade. 
Such a policy would include, as already indicated, subsidising the 
employment of labour and where necessary of other inputs,and reducing 
consumption by an appropriate taxation policy. This kind of policy also 
embraces attempts to improve the capital market which may take the form of 
establishing development banks or other financial media. 
More generally, promotional policies also include the provision of 
a l l those services which industry cannot e f f i c i en t ly provide for i t s e l f . 
Examples are general education, roads, e lec t r ic i ty , telephones, water and 
so on. They should also include "management and accounting schools, 
technical training inst i tut ions , and sometimes research inst i tutes. 
Something l ike an industrial extension service-analogous to i t s counter-
part in agriculture - which can teach small-scale businessmen elementary 
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technical accounting, management and sales techniques" 
Such direct assistance to industry is ' f i r s t best' policy and superior 
to protection. The reason for this is that a l l protective measures, 
t a r i f f s , or quantitative restrictions raise the price of the product above 
the free trade level , both to the producers and to the consumers, whereas 
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The second proposition is that 'second best/' policies are not 
necessarily superior to no intervention at a l l . This is because protection } 
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while indirect ly helping to remove one set of - domestic - distortions, 
introduces a new set of distortions resulting from the interference in 
free trade and consumer's choice, 'V/hether the overall impact of protection 
improves or reduces welfare depends on the relative weights of the domestic 
and foreign distortions involved. Thus a p r io i and without "comprehensive 
empirical information on the taste and technology of the economy", i t is 
impossible to predict that protection leads to an improvement in welfare. 
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This in turn strengthens the case fo r following promotional policies. 
Impl ic i t in the above analysis is that tax and subsidy measures are 
costless operations. In fact there are costs arising both from collection 
of taxes and also the administration and distribution of subsidies. 
The collection of taxes necessitates an e f f i c i en t and honest adminsttfation, 
which cannot always be assumed in developing countries. Collection d i f f i -
culties are further aggravated by the fact that the majority of population 
are poor farmers and l ive in isolated vil lages. I t should also be remembered 
that taxes also 'd i s to r t ' consumption choices and this may be an important 
consideration.. 
For a l l these reasons governments in developing countries have 
tradi t ional ly relied on t a r i f f s and trade taxes for a major part of their 
revenue. Trade taxes are a far more convenient source of revenue than 
domestic taxes, since they can be collected on a few ports or custom offices 
and thus require much less in terms of personnel and other administrative 
resources. 
The implication is that although promotional policies may be theoret-
ica l ly ' f i r s t best' in the real world 'second best' protective measures 
may in fact be preferable since they may be cheaper to implement. I t 
may well De tnat an excessively protectionist policy may in fact reduce 
imports so much that the revenue derived from them becomes very small, and 
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to that extent the practical advantage of protection may be reduced. 
Nevertheless once i t i s recognised that a policy of promotion, i f not 
impossible is certainly not costless, i t becomes less easy to generalize 
about the optimality of various measures. Whether promotional measures 
are feasible can only be decided in the context of an actual situation 
where i t is possible to determine empirically what the costs and benefits 
of each alternative are. Thus instead of general policy prescription, 
what is needed i s a 'case by case' approach and "tai loring of policies to 
individual country s i tuat ions" .^ 
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I I I - Import Substitution in Practice 
As we noted in the introduction to the present chapter, there has 
been a considerable amount of disenchantment with import substitution in 
practice. In fact i t is very largely the experience of developing countries 
rather than theoretical arguments that has turned opinion against import 
substitution. Many countries now seem to have changed their policies and 
appear to be more anxious to take advantage of their exporting opportunities.^ 
G-enerally speaking, the most important cri t icism of import substitution 
as i t has actually been practicised i s that i t has encouraged the growth 
of manufacturing at the expense of other sectors to an excessive and harmful 
degree, that i t has had an inbui l t and unnecessary bias against exports of 
a l l kinds, and that, within the manufacturing sector i t s e l f , i t has provided 
too much incentive for the growth of consumer goods at the expense of capital 
and intermediate goods. 
Furthermore the indiscriminate use of protection has led to a complete 
disregard fo r comparative advantage; protection has greatly overstated the 
social cost of labour and understated the social cost of capital and conseq-
uently neither factor has been used economically. Import substitution has 
often provided too few jobs while many of the factories i t has helped to 
establish operate well below their capacity. 
In addition to the above 'allocative* inefficiencies the use of 
protection has also caused what has variously been called ' X 1 , ' technical' 
or'mundane' ineff iciencies . Sheltered from the competition of imports, 
import substitute industries have had no incentive to reduce costs through 
possible improvements and innovations.^ 
The combination of a l l these shortcomings has resulted in a situation 
i : : ..riich the prospects t i i c 5 i-u'n l i i vl' mcu iu fe iu t i i r ing are not very promising. 
Expansion of manufacturing necessitates either the development of industries 
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producing intermediate and capital goods, or entry into export markets, 
or both. But for several reasons neither alternative is easy. In this 
chapter we w i l l concentrate on some of the obstacles facing the f i r s t a l ter-
native. 
However, before considering these problems i t is useful to point out 
that what underlies a l l the various problems that import substitution has 
faced, is the very heavy amount of protection that existing industries have 
enjoyed. This becomes clear when effective rates of protection are consid-
ered. Since the concept of effective protection has a direct relevance for 
the problems arising out of import substitution, i t is useful to consider 
some central aspects of i t . 
The Relevance of Effective Protection 
The effective rate of protection, in contrast to the nominal rate of 
protection, measures the percentage increase in value added per unit of 
economic ac t iv i ty which results from the existence of protection at d i f f e r -
ent levels of production.^ Thus i f free trade value added by an ac t iv i ty , 
V. , i s , as a result of protection, increased to V.*, then the effective rate J J 
of protection, g . , i s : J 
v . » , _ V -
s j ^ 2- ( i ) 
Value added in the free trade and post-protection situations can in turn 
be expressed as follows; 
V. = P. ( 1 - £ a . .) ( I I ) 
V = p j f ( 1 + V - £ a i j ( 1 + 
V.iicx-e 7 . is the price of a unit or j in the absence of t a r i f f s , a. . , i s 
the share of an input, i , in the cost of j in the absence of protection, 
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t . and t . are the t a r i f f rates on i and j respectively. Substituting I I 
and I I I into I and simplifying, we get the effective rate of protection 
in terms of t a r i f f rates and input shares: 
I t should be clear from TV that i f the t a r i f f rate on the product, t . , is 
J 
greater than the t a r i f f on the inputs, t ^ s then the effective rate of 
protection, g . l is greater than the nominal t a r i f f , t . . I t should also 
be apparent that the magnitude of effective protection w i l l depend on the 
share of the imported inputs into the product. For example i f the nominal 
t a r i f f on a product is 30 percent and an input which accounts for 50 percent 
of i t s costs is imported duty free then the effective rate of protection 
afforded to the industry is 60 percent. 
I t can be seen that the concept of effective protection rather ideally 
describes the structure of protection that usually results from the policies 
of import substitution. Import substitution is induced by high t a r i f f s on 
the products of the protected ac t iv i t y while their capital and intermediate 
inputs can be imported free of restr ict ions. Consequently the nominal rates 
of protection w i l l be less than the effective protection. This has in fact 
been confirmed by studies concerned with industrialisation in the developing 
countries 
In addition to reflect ing the absolute magnitude of protection better 
than nominal rates, effective rates of protection can also be used, given 
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certain assumptions, to indicate the incentives that the structure of 
protection provides fo r the movement of resources between different indust-
r ies. I f different act ivi t ies ay? r?nked s.r.r.orfl^.r.^ t n t.i-..™iv respc-cLiv-j 
effective rate of protection, the resulting scale w i l l t e l l us the direction 
in which resources have moved between them. Domestic production w i l l sh i f t 
i J i 
g j (IV) 
i j 
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from industries with the lowest rates of protection to those with the 
highest. Given that production and consumption elas t ic i t ies of substitu-
tion between different industries are known or can be calculated, then the 
scale of effective protection can be used to indicate not only the direction 
but also the magnitude of resource pul l and push between different indust-
. 66 nes . 
This resource allocation aspect of effect ive rates is naturally very 
useful in studying the impact of import substitution on the economics of 
developing countries. Relative rates o f e f f e c t i v e protection can be used 
to show how much incentive there has been against the expansion of export 
industries^ and against investment in agriculture and other sectors. 
Studies of industrialisation in developing countries undertaken by the OEGD 
and the World Bank have used such a methodology in evaluating the policies 
of import substitution. 
D i f f i c u l t i e s o f Backward Linkage Import Substitution 
What we have already said regarding the concept of effective protection 
is immediately relevant to the d i f f i c u l t i e s that backward linkage import 
substitution faces. Thus the most obvious is that the structure of protec-
t ion i s biased against i t . Not only imported inputs pay l i t t l e t a r i f f , 
but they come in at an exchange rate that substantially understates their 
costs to society. Gordon Wilson has demonstrated how the existence of an 
over valued currency can create a systematic incentive in favour of import-
ing even in conditions where suitable domestic substitutes may be available. 
This in turn leads to an unnecessary capital intensive method of production 
and under-utilisation of capacity. 
The structure of protection also encourages what has been called the 
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•premature widening1 of the structure of production. This means that 
the structure of protection encourages expansion into a large number of 
consumer goods industries each operating on a relat ively small scale rather 
than concentrating on a few large scale operations which could benefit from 
economies of scale. This is l i k e l y to occur because industries i n i t i a l l y 
established have been themselves relat ively small and have not been able 
to grow because their uneconomic structures (too capital intensive) and 
high cost have made i t d i f f i c u l t to break into a wider market. This in 
turn means that their demand fo r inputs is not suff ic ient to make their 
domestic production feasible. Therefore the easiest policy seems to be 
setting up other consumer goods industries which in turn operate on a 
small scale. This gradually leads to the 'premature widening1 of the 
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industrial structures. 
The motor car industry in developing countries provide a good example 
of some of the inefficiencies of import substitution in developing count-
r ies. One study concerned with the industry in Chile, for example showed 
that the 1963 output of cars ra.s only 8,180 u n i t s . ^ Furthermore, this 
small volume was divided between twenty different models. For Latin 
America as a whole, the output of cars in the late 1960's was around 
600,000 units, this was produced by around ninety different firms. Cn 
average, therefore the output of each firm was 6,700 u n i t s . ^ Calculations 
have shown that the optimum output for a single model is at least 20,000 
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units . In such circumstances the d i f f i c u l t i e s of backward linkages and 
the domestic production of components and parts is even more d i f f i c u l t since 
for the la t te r economies of scale is even more pronounced and requires a 
big market for standard inputs. 
Many countries have however attempted to force backward linkages 
through what is known as 'content protection 1 . This policy, which is 
particularly popular where domestic manufacture or assembly is carried out 
by -rnrpTc-n .-v-r.s.f f i r m s , c t i ^ u l c i t ^ c tho.t wi ' - O L c u L i u n u i the ac t iv i ty w i l l 
only be maintained i f the percentage of value added by domestic factors is 
38 
increased regularly. I t can be seen, however, that in a situation where 
the i n i t i a l industry operates on small scale, a policy of 'content protec-
t ion ' can lead to a waste of resources. Here again the car industry in 
developing countries provides a good example.^ 
Although i t is true that in some industries, as for example in the 
car industry, that the production of industrial inputs requires a large 
scale to be viable, i t i s by no means true of a l l . The minimum economic 
scale of production does not always increase as one proceeds along backward 
linkage import substitution. Many capital goods industries can operate at 
a relat ively small or medium scale of production as for. example in the 
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machine tool industry. 
Furthermore, as Professor Hirshman has argued, the cri t icism regarding 
the 'premature widening' of industrial structure and subsequent exhaustion 
of import substitution possibi l i t ies has been exaggerated. Thus, even i f 
there may be an unduly large number of consumer goods industries most of 
which operate on a small scale, they would s t i l l need a number of identical 
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inputs such as steel, paper and glass. As a result of this 'product 
divergence' there is l i ke ly to be a f a i r l y large market for such inputs. 
In a large number of developing countries, excluding perhaps the very small 
ones, there is thus room for at least one steel m i l l . 
Another, though related, d i f f i c u l t y that backward linkage import 
substitution may face is the likelyhood of a vested interest against them 
on the part of using industr ia l is ts . I t is easy to see why this should 
be so in circumstances where inputs can be imported cheaply and where 
domestic substitutes, at least i n i t i a l l y , w i l l be of an infer ior quality 
and irregular in delivery. With regard to the la t te r point however, i t 
mav be not«d tb«?t. I n c our.tr4. r-r. ch often f^-uu l - i ^ o = o f gasmen I crises 
the importation of inputs may be curtailed at regular intervals, the resistence 
to backward linkage import substitution is l i ke ly to disappear."^ The 
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problems may also be reduced to the extent that the government may 
undertake the development of the heavier industries such as iron and 
steelo 
ko 
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Chapter 2 
G-rowth and Structure of Iranian Manufacturing Industry: 1955-1972 
Since the middle of the 1950*s manufacturing industry i n Iran has 
experienced a very rapid growth. This can be seen i n Table 2-1 below 
which presents the available data on output, value added, investment 
and employment i n Iranian manufacturing f o r 1955 through to 1972 . 
Considering the period as a whole 1, a l l these variables show very high 
rates of growth. Output and value added have grown at annual average 
compound rates of 15 .6 and 14 per cent respectively, both i n constant 
1955 prices. Investment data on a consistent basis have been obtained 
2 
only from 1962 onwards • A l l observers agree however that between 1955 
and 1960 manufacturing investment did increase very rapidly, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
by the private sector^. The available data from 1962 onwards show that 
between 1962 and 1972 f i x e d investment, that i s investment i n equipment 
and structures, increased at an average annual compound rate of 24 .1 percent 
i n real terms. As a further indication of the enormity of the growth magni-
tude involved, i t i s ins t r u c t i v e to point out t h a t , according to o f f i c i a l 
s t a t i s t i c s the net addition to manufacturing c a p i t a l stock i n 1972 was 
greater than the t o t a l manufacturing capital stock existing at the end of 
1963^". The growth of employment i n the manufacturing sector has been some-
what less rapid though s t i l l very substantial. The number of people employed 
i n manufacturing increased from about 781,000 i n 1955 to about 1820 ,000 i n 
1972 , implying an annual average compound rate of growth of 5*2 percent over 
the period. 
This chapter has two aims. F i r s t l y i t sets out to der.ict and analyse 
the outstanding feature of the growth of Iranian manufacturing over the 
1955-1972 period. I t w i l l be shown that throughout the period manufacturing 
^8. .. 
TABLE 2 -1 : Basic data on Iranian manufacturing industry, 1955-1972 . 
Value figures i n b i l l i o n (1000 m i l l i o n ) r i a l s . Employment 
i n 1000 persons. 
Year Output Value added Investment Employment 
1955 29 .5 1 3 . 4 781 
1956 31 .7 1 4 . 4 816 
1957 3 7 . 0 1 6 . 7 851 
1958 4 3 . 1 1 9 . 5 881 
1959 4 8 . 7 22 .2 927 
1960 5 8 . 1 25 .9 968 
1961 61 .6 2 7 . 3 1 ,010 
1962 7 7 . 6 3 3 . 2 6 . 6 1 ,083 
1963 8 9 . 7 38 .5 5 . 1 1 ,070 
1964 105 .6 4 2 . 2 6 . 8 • 1 ,103 
1965 153.3 48 . 4 1 0 . 5 1 ,170 
1966 177.5 5 6 . 0 1 6 . 0 1 ,252 
1967 226.6 6 8 . 0 19 .3 1 ,335 
1968 252.9 7 7 . 1 3 0 . 0 1 ,402 
1969 276 .2 8 6 . 6 39 .3 1 ,468 
1970 304 .2 9 5 . 0 4 5 . 1 1 ,543 
1971 343 .3 1 0 7 . 1 4 9 . 4 1,625 
1972 379 .7 1 2 2 . 1 5 2 . 4 1,820 
*) Deflated by the General Index of Wholesale Prices 1955 = 100 
**) Deflated by the General Index of Wholesale Prices 1962 = 100 
Sources: Ministry of Economy, S t a t i s t i c s on Large I n d u s t r i a l Establish-
ments of.Iran i n 1969 , p. v i i i , Ministry of Economy, Iranian 
I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s f o r 1350 ( 1 9 7 1 - 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. •khl - 'd' 
( i n Persian^. Ministrv o f ^conoirw* Ir?yii?n I n d i i s t r i s l S t c t i u t i c s 
f o r 1 3 5 l ( l 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 3 ) i pp. 21-22 and p.26 ( i n Persian), International 
Labour Office, Employment and Income Policies f o r I r a n , p.31. 
Wholesale price series constructed from data i n , Farhad Daftary, 
•The Balance of Payment D e f i c i t and the Problem of I n f l a t i o n i n 
Ira n , 1955 -1962 ', Iranian Studies (Winter 1972), p . 1 3 , Bank 
Markazi I r a n , Annual Report and Balance Sheet 1349(1970-1971), 
p. 150, Bank Markazi I r a n , Annual Report and Balance Sheet 1351 
( 1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 3 ) , p.180. 
'+9 
growth has been through the process of import substitution and orientation 
towards the home market. I n the second h a l f o f the 1950*s the main mech-
anism of growth was the replacement of imports i n a small number of consumer 
good industries. During the 1960*s and the early 1970's the process o f 
import substitution became more widespread, extending to a wider range of 
consumer goods, notably household appliances and other consumer durables as 
well as to a sig n i f i c a n t number of intermediate products. Estimates of 
import substitution i n 15 sectors comprising the Iranian manufacturing 
industry over the 1960-1972 period, f o r which r e l a t i v e l y detailed information 
and data have been gathered, are presented. 
The second aim of t h i s chapter, which i s closely related to the f i r s t , 
i s t o analyse the structure of manufacturing industry with respect to the use 
di s t r i b u t i o n of output. D i s t r i b u t i o n of output between the use categories 
of consumption, intermediate and investment i n two years, 1960 and 1972 , 
shows that i n both years consumer goods, which have been the main benefic-
i a r i e s of import substitution, had the largest share i n manufacturing output 
and that the dominance of consumer goods was more pronounced i n I96O than i n 
1972. I n the l a t t e r year the structure of manufacturing output was more 
d i v e r s i f i e d mainly due to the appearance of a number of consumer durables 
and intermediate goods which were not produced i n Ir a n before the I 9 6 C s . 
I - Import Substitution and Growth of Manufacturing 
Table 2-2 shows the d i s t r i b u t i o n of Iran's imports between consumption, 
intermediate and investment goods f o r the period 1954-1972 . The figures 
show that the share o f consumer goods, which dominated Iran's import structure 
i n the m i d - f i f t i e s , has steadily declined from about 5 7 » 4 percent of t o t a l 
iiijjOx La i i i 1954 to about 1 2 . 5 percent i n 1972 . The share of consumer good 
imports would have been even smaller were i t not f o r the increase i n the 
imports of food items towards the end of the period under study; the 
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proportion o f manufactured consumer goods has f a l l e n even more rapidly-
through the period and by 1972 probably accounted for no more than 8 . 7 
5 
percent of t o t a l imports • 
Pa r a l l e l to the decline i n consumer good imports, domestic production 
of such goods has been on the increase a l l through the period. This 
increase i n domestic productive a c t i v i t y i s d i r e c t l y reflected i n the fact 
that imports of investment and p a r t i c u l a r l y intermediate products have been 
growing and have increased t h e i r shares i n t o t a l imports. Furthermore, 
available data regarding the d i s t r i b u t i o n of imports among d i f f e r e n t economic 
sectors indicate that a major portion of intermediate and investment imports 
have been used by manufacturing. A l l these facts point to import substit-
ution as a major mechanism f o r the growth of Iran's manufacturing industries. 
To provide further demonstration that t h i s has i n fact been the case,further 
analysis of import and output data are necessary. 
Mainly due to the lack of continuity i n the data, i t i s best to consider 
the 1955-1960 and 1960-1972 period separately. This can also help to high-
l i g h t some of the major distinguishing elements, from both periods. 
1955-1960 
For t h i s period, i t has not been possible to measure import s u b s t i t -
ution i n various industries by the use of the Chenery method. Although 
data pertaining to imports of di f f e r e n t manufactured products do ex i s t , 
data on domestic production p r i o r t o 1960 are very scanty. Nevertheless 
i t i s s t i l l possible t o give an adequate picture of import substitution by 
using data on the volume ( r a t h e r than the value) of output as well as isolated 
figures f o r public and private investment i n the major industries o f the 
period. The use of volume rather than value figures does not produce a 
great problem since the industries considered did not produce a very 
heterogeneous output. 
The div i s i o n of consumer goods imports between durable and non-durable 
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categories shows that i n 1954 the overwhelming share of consumer good 
imports, 80 .3 percent, consisted of non-durable items^. Furthermore 
the bulk of such imports consisted of a small number of non-durable items. 
In 1956, f o r example, two items of mass consumption, t e x t i l e s and sugar, 
accounted f o r 62 percent of the value of a l l non-durable consumer good 
imports^. What i s more, imports of t e x t i l e s and sugar were by f a r the 
largest source of domestic consumption of these goods. I n 1956 the share 
q 
of imports i n the t o t a l volume of sugar consumed approached 80 percent • 
Similarly imports were the dominant source of supply f o r t e x t i l e s . I n 
1955 imports accounted f o r 53*8 and 65«8 percent of the t o t a l volume of 
cotton and woollen c l o t h consumption, respectively^. 
I t i s therefore not surprising that i n subsequent years these two 
industries, t e x t i l e s and sugar, attracted much of the investment funds 
channelled i n t o the manufacturing sector. During the Second Development 
Plan ( 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 7 2 ) , the Plan Organisation invested 61 .5 percent of i t s event-
ual allocation to the manufacturing sector f o r the modernisation and expansion 
of sugar and t e x t i l e i n d u s t r i e s ^ . Outside the Plan Organisation, the 
Ministry of Industry and Mines i n s t i t u t e d a major loan programme f o r private 
investors i n manufacturing industry^". Between 1957 and 1960 , 5 3 « 4 percent 
of the t o t a l value of these loans, amounting to 3*337 m i l l i o n r i a l s were 
12 
advanced to private investors i n sugar and t e x t i l e s • Such loans helped 
to mobilize a substantial amount of private capital to these industries 
because each loan only financed up to a t h i r d of the cost o f investment"^. 
As a result of the increased investment a c t i v i t y by the public and 
the private sectors, domestic production of sugar and t e x t i l e s increased 
very rapidly. Sugar production increased from 7 5 » 0 0 0 tons i n 1955 to 
110 ,000 tons i n 1 9 5 9 ^ f « Consequently the share of domestic output i n 
t o t a l supply (domestic output plus imports) rose from 20 to 37 percent 
15 
over the period • Likewise, the t e x t i l e industry grew very rapidly. 
53 
Between 1959 and 1960 the output of the two major products of t h i s industry, 
cotton and woollen c l o t h , increased at an average annual compound rate of 
30 and 18.5 percent respectively^*. The share of imports i n the t o t a l 
volume of cotton and woollen cloth had by 1960 declined to 33 and 62 percent 
r e s pe ct i v e l y ^ • 
Thus by 1960 s i g n i f i c a n t import substitution had taken place i n two 
of Iran's most important industries, although p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r further 
import substitution s t i l l existed, since, as the above figures show, imports 
were s t i l l a very important source of supply f o r the products of these 
industries. 
Over the 1955-1960 period import substitution was not t o t a l l y confined 
to the t e x t i l e and sugar industries. I t was characteristic of the growth 
process i n almost a l l of Iran's manufacturing industries. However import 
substitution i n t e x t i l e s and sugar alone would go a long way i n explaining 
the growth of manufacturing as a whole. This i s because these two indust-
ries weighed so heavily i n the sector. One indication o f the dominant role 
of these industries i s the fact that i n 1955 they employed 40.8 percent of 
the t o t a l labour force working i n Iranian f a c t o r i e s 1 ^ . 
In addition import substitution was important i n consumer goods l i k e 
19 
tea, vegetable o i l and some simple, metal fabricated consumer durables . 
More in t e r e s t i n g l y even such industries as cement and glass, whose products 
may be described as 'non-tradable 1 (because they are heavy or f r a g i l e and 
therefore t h e i r domestic production would enjoy a natural protection and 
locational advantage), i n fact grew against the background of substantial 
quantities of imports. Imports of cement and sheet glass were over 50 
percent of t o t a l supply of these products i n 1955* Furthermore 1955 can 
in no way be regarded an unrepresentative year so f a r as these two indust-
r i e s are concerned. I n fact available data on the volume of output of 
these industries show that imports of cement and sheet glass were roughly 
5<> 
50 percent of t o t a l supply of these items a l l through the f i r s t h a l f o f 
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the 1950's • The subsequent growth of these two industries resulted i n 
very rapid decline i n import shares. By 1960 i n fact imports had f a l l e n 
to 4 and 40 percent of the volume of t o t a l supply of cement and sheet glass 
r e s p e c t i v e l y ^ . 
1960-1972 
During the I96O 1s and the early 1970"s the growth of the manufacturing 
sector continued to be based on import su b s t i t u t i o n . A general picture 
of import substitution emerges from an analysis of the 'sources' of growth 
i n manufacturing output between 1960 and 1972 . Using the Chenery method 
i t has been possible t o divide the growth i n the output o f 15 manufacturing 
industries between 'import substitute* and 'demand expansion* components. 
The 'demand expansion' component describes that portion of growth which i s 
•due' to the increase i n the demand fo r the products of the industry. 
This increase may emanate from a ri s e i n the use of the products by other 
industries as intermediate inputs, or from an increase i n the f i n a l demand 
for the products of the industry both at home and also as exports. The 
•import substitute' component, on the other hand, describes that part of 
the growth i n output which i s •due' to a decline i n the share of imports i n 
the t o t a l supply of the industry. Accordingly, as was also noted i n the 
l a s t chapter, import substitution i s measured as the difference between the 
growth that has actually taken place and the growth that would have taken 
place had the r a t i o of imports to t o t a l supply remained unchanged over the 
period under consideration. 3h table 2-3 below the results of the comput-
ations f o r 15 industries which comprise the manufacturing sector i n Iran 
are presented. 'Import substitute* and'demand expansion* components i n 
the growth of the output of each industry are divided by the t o t a l growth 
of the output i n the same industry and are presented as percentages: 
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Table 2 - 3 : Percentage D i s t r i b u t i o n of the Growth of Manufacturing 
Output between 'Import Substitute 1 ( is) and 'Demand Expansion 
(DE) Components: 1960-1972. 
Industry IS DE 
Pood, beverages and tobacco 21 .3 7 8 . 7 
Textiles 2 1 . 0 7 9 . 0 
Clothing and footwear 5 . 9 9 4 . 1 
Wood and fu r n i t u r e 5 1 . 9 4 8 . 1 
Leather 10 .5 8 9 . 5 
Paper and p r i n t i n g 6 3 . 0 3 7 . 0 
Rubber 8 4 . 0 1 6 . 0 
Chemicals and petrochemicals 7 4 . 0 26 .0 
Non-metallic minerals 25 .0 7 5 . 0 
Basic metals 7 2 . 4 27 .6 
Metal products 1 3 . 3 8 6 . 7 
Machinery, non-electric 9 2 . 9 7 . 1 
Machiner, e l e c t r i c 89 .5 1 0 . 5 
Transport equipment 5 3 . 6 4 6 . 4 
Other industries 5 5 . 6 4 4 . 4 
Sources: Output data from, Ministry of Economy, Iranian I n d u s t r i a l 
S t a t i s t i c s for 1349 ( 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 7 1 ) , pp . 53 -90; Ministry of 
Economy, Iranian I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s f o r 1531 ( 1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 3 ) , 
pp. 5 2 - 7 1 . Import data from, United Nations, International 
Trade S t a t i s t i c s , 1960, pp.291 ; Ministry of Economy, Input-
Output of Iranian Import and Export ( 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 7 0 ) , pp.8-31; 
Plan Organisation, P i f t h National Development Plan: 1351-1357 
( 1 9 7 3 - 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 886-900 . 
Before in t e r p r e t i n g the results of the computations shown above, i t should 
b e c i l i p i i a s i s c u . lhai w i e y a r e C u i l j r o u g h i i i d l u a i o i ' s u f ti l l O r d e r O i l l l & g i i i i u u t i • 
One important l i m i t a t i o n that should be mentioned i s that we could not 
ascertain whether import data for 1972 were 1 c i f ' figures or whether they 
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22 included t a r i f f s • S i m i l a r l y , as we noted i n the l a s t chapter, i t would 
be desirable to evaluate the output of domestic industries at world prices. 
However th i s required a comparison between domestic and world prices of a 
detailed l i s t of commodities, which i s not possible with published Iranian 
s t a t i s t i c s . I n the absence of the p o s s i b i l i t y of more refined calculations, 
the results presented i n the above table do give a rough picture of the 
growth pattern of Iran's manufacturing industry over the period. 
Table 2-3 shows that between 1960 and 1972 a l l manufacturing industries 
have experienced some import substitution and that i n 8 out of the 15 industry 
groups l i s t e d import substitution accounts f o r more than 50 percent of the 
increase i n output. These l a t t e r were i n fact Iran's most 'dynamic1 indust-
ries of the period, enjoying exceptionally high growth rates between 1960 
and 1972. The average compound rate of growth f o r the 8 industries combined 
was 24 .9 percent over the period. This rate compares with an average annual 
compound rate of growth of 1 6 . 4 percent f o r the manufacturing sector as a 
whole. As a result of the above average rates of growth, the combined share 
of the 8 industry groups i n t o t a l manufacturing output increased from under 
23 
17 percent i n 1960 to nearly 3^ percent i n 1972 • 
I n the remaining industry groups 'demand expansion* has been a more 
important source of growth than import substitution, although import sub-
s t i t u t i o n i s s t i l l quite significant i n foods, t e x t i l e s and non-metallic 
minerals. I n addition, of course i t should be remembered that 'demand 
expansion*, refers, almost exclusively, to the expansion of domestic demand; 
export expansion has not played a very s i g n i f i c a n t role i n the growth of 
Iranian manufacturing. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true of the growth of the. more 
recently established industries. The bulk of Iran's manufactured exports 
consist o f carpets (which alone accounts 1* ^0 n i s r o s T i t tV"*5 " - ^ a l ) ancl 
items such as dried f r u i t and leather products which have undergone l i t t l e 
24 
processing even though they a r e c l a s s i f i e d as 'manufactured* exports • 
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There are a number of reasons why (domestic) demand expansion has 
been more important than import substitution i n some of Iran's manufacturing 
industries. One reason i s that some of these industries had already achieved 
a measure of import substitution i n the 1950's. We have already seen that 
woollen and cotton cl o t h , sugar, cement and glass, among others, experienced 
sig n i f i c a n t import substitution between 1955 and 1960. This to some extent 
explains the low degree of import substitution i n 1 food, beverages and tobacco 
' t e x t i l e s ' and'non-metallic mineral' industry groups between 1960 and 1972 . 
However a more important reason 7/hich helps to explain the low share of 
import substitution i n the growth of some industries relates to the nature 
of the demand for t h e i r products. A closer examination of the industries 
with low import substitution shows that they produce output, a major part 
of which does not compete with imports. The output o f ' t e x t i l e s ' , for 
example, includes carpets which as we have already noted i s a major (non-
o i l ) export. The same i s true of 'leather'. 
The industry with the lowest ( 5 . 3 percent) share of import substitution 
i n output growth, 'clothing and footwear', i s a major r u r a l industry and 
the bulk of i t s output s a t i s f i e s r u r a l requirements. Between 1967 and 
1972, f o r which an industry breakdown of output between r u r a l and urban 
components of output has been obtained, an average of 58 percent of the 
25 
output of •clothing and footwear' was produced i n r u r a l areas • To a 
lesser extent the same factor operates i n the case of 'foods' and ' t e x t i l e s ' 
industry groups. During the 1967-1972 period the r u r a l component i n the 
output of these two industries averaged 32 and 29 .6 percent respectively • 
'Metal products', another industry with a lor; share of import substit-
ution i n the growth of output also produces goods which f o r the most part 
do not compete with imports, satisfying what may, f o r want o f a b e t t e r word ; 
be termed as ' t r a d i t i o n a l * requirements i n r u r a l and urban areas, although 
i n t h i s case the industry i s actually urban based and only a mere 4 percent 
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of i t s output i s produced i n r u r a l areas 2^. Much of the produce of 
th i s industry i s composed of ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' items l i k e samavars, copper 
and enamel wear and various cooking u t e n s i l s 2 ^ . This industry also 
supplies simple equipment for a g r i c u l t u r a l and construction use such as 
spades, shovels and metal doors and window frames. Such items are t y p i c a l l y 
produced i n a large number of very small workshops. Between 1969 and 1971 
an average of 70 percent of the output o f 'metal products' was produced i n 
manufacturing establishments employing less t h a n 10 workers 2^. 
Generally speaking, import substitution has been the growth mechanism 
mainly f o r the modern factory based sector of Iran's manufacturing indust-
r i e s ^ 0 . Throughout most of the 1955-1972 period and p a r t i c u l a r l y since 
1960 large scale urban manufacturing establishments have been responsible 
f o r the greatest part of the growth of Iranian manufacturing, serving to 
emphasise the important role that import substitution has played i n the 
ove r a l l growth of Iranian manufacturing. Rural and small scale urban 
manufacturing have not grown as f a s t . I t seems safe to say that i n t h e i r 
case the growth that has taken place has been i n response to r i s i n g popula-
t i o n and also the steady growth i n per capita incomes. Table 2-4 below 
presents a breakdown of manufacturing value added between large and small 
units f o r the 1955-1972 period: 
The table shows that i n most years the increase i n value added 
at t r i b u t a b l e to large scale units is much greater than that by small u n i t s . 
As a result of t h i s the share of large scale units i n t o t a l value added has 
increased over the period covered by the table. I f we ignore 1964 and 
1965 (when the share of large units shows an abnormal growth) large scale 
units have steadily increased t h e i r share i n t o t a l value added from 47 to 
67 percent. 
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Table 2-^ 4: Distribution of Manufacturing Value Added (VA) i n Urban 
areas between Large and Small Units: 1955-1972. 
( B i l l i o n R i a l s , Current P r i c e s ) . 
Year VA by Large VA by Small % Share 
U n i t s a Units* 3 Units i r 
1955 6:0 6.7 47 
1956 7.1 7.9 47 
1957 8.0 8.7 48 
1958 9.2 10.0 48 
1959 12 . 2 10.0 55 
1960 14 .0 12 .3 53 
1961 15.0 12 .7 54 
1962 19.0 15.1 55 
1963 23.0 16 .9 57 
1964 28 .0 17.4 61 
1965 39.0 13.0 75 
1966 43 . 0 18 .5 70 
1967 47.0 22.7 67 
1968 52.0 23.8 68 
1969 58.0 29.3 66 
1970 63.6 34 .9 65 
1971 73.7 40 . 0 65 
1972 89.2 44 .2 67 
(a) - Employing ten or more workers 
(b) - Employing l e s s than ten workers. 
Sources: Ministry of Economy, S t a t i s t i c s on Large I n d u s t r i a l E s t a b l i s h -
ments of Iran in 1969» T>T5« v i i - v i i i : Ministry of ?.r.cr.any. 
Iranian I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s for 1351 (1972-1973). pp. 38-41. 
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I I - Structure of Manufacturing Output: 1960-1972 
In 1960, as table 2-5 shows, the bulk of manufacturing output 
consisted of non-durable consumer goods^". Poods, t e x t i l e s and clothing, 
together accounted for nearly 60.2 percent of a l l manufactured products^. 
Durable consumer goods had a very small share of output. Two products, 
carpets and wooden furniture accounted for more than 79*5 percent of the 
value of a l l durable consumer goods.^ S i g n i f i c a n t l y , i n I96O domestic 
production or assembly of automotive and e l e c t r i c a l household appliances 
was almost t o t a l l y non-existent. Consumption of such items, which was 
confined to the highest income groups i n the urban areas, was more or l e s s 
t o t a l l y s a t i s f i e d by imports. 
Table 2-5: Structure of Manufacturing Output i n 1960. Values i n 
Million R i a l s . 
Percentage i n t o t a l 
Consumer G-oods 56,418 87»0 
(a) - Non-durable 53,389 (94.6) 
(b) - Durable 3,024 ( 5 * 4 ) 
Intermediate G-oods 7,797 12.0 
(a) - Construction 
Materials 5,337 (68.4) 
(b) - Others 2,460 (31.6) 
Investment Goods 585 1.0 
Total 64,800 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Economy, Iranian I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s for 1348 
(1969-1970), pp .57-94. 
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Intermediate manufactured products in I96O amounted to some 12 
percent of t o t a l output. As the table shows the greater part of i n t e r -
mediate output was composed of construction materials. I n fact only 
three basic materials used by construction-bricks, cement and glass-accounted 
for 34*7 percent of the t o t a l of domestically manufactured intermediate 
products i n 1960^*". 
Production of investment goods was r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t i n I96O. 
The output of 'modern' investment goods-capital machinery and equipment -
was negligible. According to o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s the value of such goods 
was about 77 million r i a l s (about 13.1 percent of the t o t a l ) • The 
remainder of the investment goods was composed of very simple equipment and 
hand-tools used by the construction industry as well as agriculture. 
From the above account of the structure of Iranian manufacturing i n 
1960, i t can be seen that in that year the structure of output reflected 
an economy at the very early stages of i n d u s t r i a l growth. A l l manufact-
uring a c t i v i t y heavily depended on the domestic economy for i t s raw materials. 
These were supplied by agriculture and livestock sectors (cotton and woollen 
t e x t i l e s , carpets and leather goods), or by domestically available minerals 
(cement, bricks and other construction materials). 
The structure of manufacturing output i n 1972 was broadly s i m i l a r to 
that i n I96O i n the sense that i n both years consumer goods had the largest 
share in t o t a l output. However, as table 2-6 shows, the structure of 
output was more d i v e r s i f i e d i n the l a t t e r year to the extent that the 
other two categories, intermediate and investment goods had increased t h e i r 
r e l a t i v e shares: 
62 
Table.2-6: The Structure of Manufacturing Output in 1972. Values 
i n Million R i a l s . 
Percentage i n t o t a l 
Consumer Goods ?57,820 70.3 
(a) - Non-durable 307,370 (85.9) 
(b) - Durable 50,450 (14 . 1 ) 
Intermediate Goods 113,592 22.3 
(a) - Construction 
Materials 32,143 (28 . 3 ) 
(b) - Others 81,449 (71.7) 
Investment Goods 37,488 7.4 
Total 508,900 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Economy, Iranian I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s for 1351 
(1972-1973), PP. 52-70. 
Considering the r e l a t i v e shares of each category i n 1972, we can say 
that, generally speaking by that year Iranian manufacturing industry had 
completed the •consumer' or 'easy' stage of import substitution and had 
made a s i g n i f i c a n t s t a r t on the next stage of expansion along the l i n e s 
of intermediate, and to a l e s s e r extent, investment goods. 
Not only there were changes in the re l a t i v e shares of each major 
category, but within each of them there was a much greater d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n 
of the product mix i n 1972 than i n 1960. For example, whereas i n 1960 
consumer goods produced by the chemical industries accounted for only 1.5 
percent of the value of non-durable consumer goods, by 1972 the ra t i o had 
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increased to 5.6 percent • Sim i l a r l y , the share of intermediate products 
other than c o n s t r u c t i o n ma te r i a l s vrent. ur. f rnm 3'-»" p s r c ? n t i n 1?60 to 
71.1 percent i n 1972. Intermediate goods produced by the chemical indust-
r i e s had the highest r a t e s of growth i n t h i s category and by 1972 accounted 
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for percent of i t s t o t a l output^. 
Another major difference between the structure of output in the 
two years i s the much greater importance of durable consumer goods i n 
1972 than 1960. According to published o f f i c i a l data in 1960 Iran did 
not produce cars, motor cycles, refrigerators, radio or t e l e v i s i o n . 
By 1972 however these commodities together with scores of other household 
items were being produced or assembled in increasing quantities in I r a n . 
The growth of .assembly operations has in some ways been very character-
i s t i c of the growth of manufacturing industries. Almost every new industry 
set up has been engaged in assembly for further processing of imported parts 
and components. As we have just noted, t h i s i s largely reflected by the 
growth of consumer durables, but i s by no means confined to them. The 
pharmeceutical industry, for example, b a s i c a l l y performs mixing and packag-
ing operations on imported i n g r e d i e n t s ^ . I n the ca p i t a l goods industries 
too, a predominant part of the output i s assembled from imported components. 
This applies to the assembly of transport equipment such as l o r r i e s , t r a c t o r s , 
bused and commercial vehicles. Another example i s the assembly of station-
ary d i e s e l engines, ball-bearings and machine-tools. 
Thus whereas i n I96O the output of manufacturing industry heavily 
depended on domestic material inputs, by 1972 a si g n i f i c a n t and growing 
part of the manufacturing industry depended on imported parts and components 
and in some cases raw materials for i t s operations. This, in turn reflected 
the greater t echnological complexity of the fastes t growing sectors of the 
Iranian manufacturing industry., 
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Chapter 3 
Government Policy and the Growth of the Manufacturing 
Sector: 1955-1972 
From the l a s t chapter i t emerged that the manufacturing sector in 
Iran has had a very rapid growth since the middle of the 1950's and that 
nearly a l l of t h i s growth has been import replacing and oriented towards 
the home market. The present chapter examines the role of government 
policy i n t h i s growth process. 
Throughout the period encouraging the growth of manufacturing indust-
r i e s has been an in t e g r a l and increasingly important part of development 
objectives in Ir a n . During the Second Development Plan (1955-1962) 
i n d u s t r i a l growth was encouraged as a means of increasing income and 
employment opportunities i n the country and also as a means of "increasing 
national s e l f sufficiency in a few strategic consumer goods " - mainly 
t e x t i l e s and sugar\ During the subsequent period the aims of i n d u s t r i a l 
policy became more ambitious. The Third Plan (1962-1967) and more emphat-
i c a l l y the Fourth Plan (1968-1972) regarded i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n as a basic 
policy for effecting s t r u c t u r a l change and si g n i f i c a n t d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n in 
economic a c t i v i t y . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n was j u s t i f i e d in 
the following terms: 
"1 - Industry has a higher rate of growth as compared to other 
sectors. 
2 - I n d u s t r i a l growth w i l l r e s u l t in the extension of advanced 
production techniques and better management in other f i e l d s 
of economic a c t i v i t y . 
3 - Unlike the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector, (industry) i s l e s s affected 
by natural and climatic conditions. 
to the requirements of the economy." 2 
Apart from these general advantages, i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n was also necessary 
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for reasons more s p e c i f i c to the circumstances of the Iranian economy, 
thus: 
" I n d u s t r i a l d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n and increased exports to reduce the 
country* s dependence on o i l i s one of the lynch-pins of the 
Iranian plans for the future; the rapid expansion of industry 
i s the natural corollary to t h i s trend$.^ 
I n practice the above objectives have implied a policy of import 
substitution i n stages, beginning with investment i n a limited number of 
"stra t e g i c " consumer goods i n the 1950's, extending to a much wider range 
of consumer durables and non-durables during the 1960's while the Fourth 
Plan envisaged the extension of the manufacturing sector into intermediate 
and c a p i t a l goods industries. 
This increasing emphasis on import substitution can be seen most 
c l e a r l y through the government's commercial p o l i c i e s through the period. 
While these p o l i c i e s have always aimed at protecting domestic industries, 
the protection awarded was much greater during the 1960's and early 1970's 
than in the previous sub-period. 
In addition to direct protection from imports, the government has also 
used other, 1 promotional', measures to encourage the growth of import 
substitute industries. Most important among these has been the provision 
of long and medium term credit for private industry through i n d u s t r i a l 
development banks. Other promotional measures include favourable tax and 
subsidy p o l i c i e s . 
In the res t of t h i s chapter both sets of po l i c i e s w i l l be considered 
in d e t a i l . 
I - Protective P o l i c i e s 
The use of trade r e s t r i c t i o n s as a device for stimulating the growth 
that, between 1955 and 1960, there was much l e s s use of protection; the 
government followed a r e l a t i v e l y "open door" trade policy. The major a i d 
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to private industry took the form of l i b e r a l monetary and credit measures. 
For t h i s e a r l i e r sub-period, very l i t t l e information on the actual 
l e v e l of protection i s available. HYhat quantitative information e x i s t s , 
i s highly aggregated and refers to the whole of the economy rather than 
the manufacturing sector. According to one source, over the 1955-1961 
period the r a t i o of custom revenues to t o t a l imports by value a c t u a l l y 
f e l l from about 22 percent to about 16 percent2*". This implies a rather 
low, and declining magnitude for the average t a r i f f levied on different 
items. However, because no information on the structure of protection 
differences between t a r i f f rates on major consumption, intermediate and 
capi t a l goods i s available for t h i s period, i t i s not possible to obtain 
any estimates of the l e v e l of effective protection. Nevertheless there 
i s general agreement that the net effect of t a r i f f s and other trade taxes 
were only mildly protectionist^. 
By contrast, during the subsequent period protection became a very 
powerful stimulus for i n d u s t r i a l growth; protection and expansion of 
domestic industries became the main aim of foreign trade p o l i c i e s . 
These p o l i c i e s were deployed to protect and expand already existing indust-
r i e s end also to encourage assembly and progressive manufacture in major 
new manufacturing industries. Thus: 
"...efforts w i l l be made to prevent, to the extent that the economic 
and f i n a n c i a l well-being of the country requires, the import of 
foreign manufactured goods the production of which within the 
country i s t e c h n i c a l l y feasible and economically and f i n a n c i a l l y 
profitable. Such goods should be imported i n the form of parts 
or semi-manufactured components and gradually the various stages 
of the production of the finished product should take place i n 
I r a n . But, the issuance of license for establishing such factor-
i e s s h a l l depend, from the very beginning on the fi x a t i o n of the 
percentage of the parts which w i l l be gradually manufactured i n 
Iran; and the degree of the exemption from the payment of import 
duties and commercial benefit tax granted to assembly plants s h a l l 
be based on the type of product as well as the percentage of the 
parts manufactured within Iran 1'. " 
To give effect to these objectives the government uses three protective 
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devices: 
(a) - t a r i f f s , (b) - an adminstrative system of import control which i s 
tantamount to import licensing and (c) - a system of import registration 
deposits. 
(a) - T a r i f f s 
T a r i f f s are by far the most important protective device in I r a n . 
They are made up of two parts, custom duties and 'commercial benefit taxes' 
(CBT)^. Changes i n custom duties require l e g i s l a t i v e authority whereas 
the CBT i s an adminstrative t a r i f f and can be changed at any time and to 
any required extent by the Ministry of Economy. This f l e x i b i l i t y has made 
the CBT the major instrument of t a r i f f protection. Custom duties, on the 
other hand, have tended to act as a revenue r a i s e r for the government. 
Since the government has not attempted to maximise i t s revenues from them, 
the l e v e l of custom duties have tended to be rather stable through the 
period, much more so than that of the CBT^. Economically, however, both 
the CBT and custom duties have the same character and combine to protect 
Iran's manufacturing industries. 
As has already been mentioned during the 1960's and the early 1970's 
t a r i f f l e v e l s were much higher than previously. In 1970 for example, 
the average l e v e l of t a r i f f s was 4 . 8 times higher than that in 1960^. 
I n table 3-1 below average t a r i f f rates for sixteen industry groups which 
comprise the manufacuring sector in Iran are presented. They r e f e r to 
1965, the only year for which s u f f i c i e n t quantitative data are available. 
There are some indications that in subsequent years the structure of 
nominal t a r i f f s has changed somewhat. I n p a r t i c u l a r during 1971 and 1972 
some reductions i n t a r i f f rates for a number of consumer goods took place. 
Thus i t i s l i k e l y that since 1965 some gradual s h i f t i n g of the structure 
of nominal t a r i f f s in favour of intermediate and investment goods has been 
effected. This, at any rate, would be consistent with government 
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Table 3-1: Structure of Nominal T a r i f f (Ad Valorem) Rates in 1965 
Industry G-roup Average T a r i f f Rate(Percent) Rank 
Food Processing 121.0 6 
Beverages 351.8 1 
Tobacco 239.0 2 
Chemicals 58.1 11 
Leather & Footwear 179.3 3 
Furniture 126.5 5 
Paper & Printing 11.7 16 
Rubber products 55.4 12 
T e x t i l e s 90.1 7 
Wearing Apparel 144.1 4 
Non-Metallic Minerals 81 .8 8 
Basic Metals 18 .7 15 
Metal Products 42.6 13 
Machinery 30.4 14 
Transport Equipment 70.7 9 
Other Manufacturing 69.8 10 
* Custom duties and CBT combined, 
** Includes e l e c t r i c as well as non-electric machinery. 
Source: United Nations, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, 
E f f e c t i v e Protection and Interregional Trade, Vol . 1 1 , p.70. 
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pronouncements in the early 1970's"^. However, in the absence of any 
information as to the extent of these t a r i f f changes we have assumed the 
structure of nominal t a r i f f s i n 1965 i s broadly representative of l a t e r 
years. 
The table shows that, in general, average t a r i f f rates in Iran 
conform to the "cascaded" structure which i s observed in most countries. 
Industry groups ranking highly in the table produce mainly consumer goods. 
Thus, beverages, tobacco, leather and footwear, wearing apparel and furn-
iture occupy the f i r s t f i v e highest ranks in the table. On the other 
hand, industry groups producing predominantly intermediate or investment 
items have low ranks. Thus, as the table shows, basic metals, metal 
products, machinery and paper and printing are amongst the sectors with 
lowest l e v e l s of average t a r i f f . 
However, as may be expected, the average t a r i f f rate for each industry 
group hides considerable variations that e x i s t among i n d i v i d u a l t a r i f f 
rates levied on the different products within the same industry group. 
For example, in the transport equipment sector individual t a r i f f s vary 
from zero on boats to 300 percent on luxury cars'*'"'". S i m i l a r l y in the 
chemicals sector there i s a range of zero (on DDT and f e r t i l i z e r s ) to 300 
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percent on cosmetics and related products • This kind of variation e x i s t s 
for a l l industry groups and has a similar character: zero or very low rates 
on those commodities which are e s s e n t i a l from the point of view of consump-
tion as well as investment; and very high rates on luxury and non-essential 
items. This i n t r a - s e c t o r a l variation in individual t a r i f f rates reinforces 
the "cascaded" structure which e x i s t s at the more aggregate l e v e l . 
Another,more important, shortcoming of the average t a r i f f rates 
pi"co6iiv ,6ci i i i oduj.6 JI-J. should be uoLt jd . The averages are calculated by 
reference to a l l the commodities which are c l a s s i f i e d under the various 
sectoral groupings in the t a r i f f ' schedule; However a s i g n i f i c a n t number 
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of the commodities with assigned t a r i f f rates are not produced i n Iran 
(or at any rate were not produced i n ^ 9 6 5 ) ^ . Therefore i t should be 
clear that the average t a r i f f rates i n table 3-1 are not ne c e s s a r i l y an 
adequate indicator of nominal t a r i f f protection. This i s for the rather 
obvious reason that unless a commodity i s produced domestically i t cannot 
be said to be protected even though i t s imports are subject to t a r i f f s or 
other r e s t r i c t i o n s . 
To overcome t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , table 3-2 presents the nominal rates of 
t a r i f f protection for thirteen industry groups. This i s done by comparing 
the gross value of the output of each industry group a t domestic prices 
with that of the output at 'world prices': 
OD; - OVft 
Nominal T a r i f f Protection = -*• -
OWi 
where: 
ODi = The value of output of industry group i at domestic prices 
OWj. = The value of output of industry group i at 'world prices* 
i = 1, ,13 
The value of the output of each industry group at 'world prices' i s 
calculated by deflating the domestic value of the output of each individual 
commodity i n the group by the appropriate t a r i f f rate and summing the 
r e s u l t ^ . 
Table 3-2 i s l e s s comprehensive than table 3-1 since the former only 
covers 13 industry groups and accounts for 85 percent of manufacturing 
output in 1965. Nevertheless some comparisons between the two tables i s 
s t i l l possible. I t can be seen t h a t in most cases average 'ad velcrerr> 
t a r i f f rates underestimate the nominal t a r i f f protection that the industry 
groups enjoy. This i s because i n general most of Iran's manufacturing 
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T a b l e 3 - 2 : The S t r u c t u r e o f Nominal T a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n i n 1 9 6 5 
I n d u s t r y group Average o f p r o t e c t i o n Rank 
( P e r c e n t ) 
Food P r o c e s s i n g 1 6 . 0 1 2 
Beverages 1 5 7 . 0 2 
Tobacco 2 4 9 . 0 1 
T e x t i l e s 5 7 . 0 6 
Paper & P r i n t i n g 1 1 . 0 1 3 
L e a t h e r Product s 6 2 . 0 5 
Rubber P r o d u c t s 5 3 . 0 7 
C h e m i c a l s 9 5 . 0 4 
B a s i c Meta l s 3 1 . 0 1 0 
N o n - M e t a l l i c M i n e r a l s 3 0 . 0 1 1 
Machinery 4 6 . 5 9 
Metal P r o d u c t s 4 6 . 6 8 
T r a n s p o r t Equipments 1 0 5 . 5 3 
* I n c l u d e s e l e c t r i c a s w e l l a s n o n - e l e c t r i c machinery 
Source : U n i t e d N a t i o n s , Economic Commission f o r A s i a and the F a r E a s t , 
E f f e c t i v e P r o t e c t i o n and I n t e r r e g i o n a l T r a d e , op . c i t . , p . 7 1 . 
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output i s composed o f f i n a l consumer goods which have h igh t a r i f f s , 
whereas s e c t o r a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s i n t a r i f f s c h e d u l e s i n c l u d e a l l goods 
which e n t e r i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e , many o f which are i n t e r m e d i a t e o r 
investment goods which b e a r low t a r i f f s and a r e not produced i n I r a n . 
T h i s can he i l l u s t r a t e d most e a s i l y by comparing the average ad valorem 
w i t h the nomina l t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n o f the t r a n s p o r t equipments i n d u s t r y 
group. I n t h i s case nominal t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n i s n e a r l y 5 0 p e r c e n t 
h i g h e r than the average t a r i f f . The reason f o r t h i s i s the f a c t t h a t 
n e a r l y a l l o f the output o f t h i s i n d u s t r y group i s composed o f assembled 
c a r s from imported p a r t s and components. 
We have so f a r been concerned w i t h nominal t a r i f f s and the nominal 
p r o t e c t i o n r e s u l t i n g from such t a r i f f s - we have c o n s i d e r e d how t a r i f f s 
a f f e c t the v a l u a t i o n o f domest ic output . As we noted i n the f i r s t 
c h a p t e r , a more a p p r o p r i a t e measure i s e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n o r the p r o t e c -
t i o n of v a l u e added. 
I n t a b l e 3 - 3 below e s t i m a t e s o f e f f e c t i v e r a t e s o f ( t a r i f f ) p r o t e c t i o n 
f o r four teen i n d u s t r y groups a r e p r e s e n t e d . These e f f e c t i v e r a t e s have 
been c a l c u l a t e d on the b a s i s o f the 1 9 6 5 i n p u t - o u t p u t r a t i o s f o r the 
I r a n i a n economy. I n p u t - o u t p u t r a t i o s f o r l a t e r y e a r s do n o t e x i s t . 
I n c a l c u l a t i n g the e f f e c t i v e r a t e s i n the t a b l e the ' C o r d e n ' method o f 
t r e a t i n g n o n - t r a d e d i n p u t s i s adopted . As we noted i n the f i r s t c h a p t e r 
t h i s method t r e a t s n o n - t r a d e d i n p u t s ( w a t e r , e l e c t r i c i t y , t r a n s p o r t e t c . ) 
a s a p a r t o f v a l u e added i t s e l f , so t h a t v a l u e added would then c o n s i s t 
o f wages, s a l a r i e s and p r o f i t s p l u s the c o n t r i b u t i o n o f n o n - t r a d e d i n p u t s . 
Comparing t a b l e 3 - 3 w i t h t a b l e 3 - 2 i t can be seen t h a t i n most 
case s e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n i s g r e a t e r than nomina l p r o t e c t i o n . T h i s i s 
to be expected i n v i e w o f the cascaded s t r u c t u r e o f nominal t a r i f f s . 
The T r a n s p o r t equipment i n d u s t r y group has the h i g h e s t l e v e l o f e f f e c t i v e 
p r o t e c t i o n which i s about 8 t imes a s h i g h a s the nominal p r o t e c t i o n 
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T a b l e 3 - 3 : E f f e c t i v e P r o t e c t i o n - I r a n i a n M a n u f a c t u r i n g I n d u s t r y 1 9 6 5 
I n d u s t r y Group Avera te Rate o r P r o t e c t i o n Rank 
( P e r c e n t ) 
Food Manufac tur ing 2 2 . 4 1 2 
Beverages 1 1 4 . 6 4 
Tobacco 2 7 4 . 1 3 
T e x t i l e s 7 4 . 4 7 
Paper and P r i n t i n g - 2 . 1 1 3 
L e a t h e r P r o d u c t s 4 3 4 . 1 2 
Rubber P r o d u c t s 8 2 . 2 6 
C h e m i c a l s 1 1 1 . 0 5 
B a s i c Meta l s 2 3 . 6 1 1 
Non M e t a l l i c M i n e r a l s 2 8 . 4 1 0 
Meta l P r o d u c t s 5 0 . 5 9 
Machinery 6 0 . 8 8 
T r a n s p o r t Equipment 8 6 6 . 0 1 
* I n c l u d e s e l e c t r i c as w e l l a s n o n - e l e c t r i c m a c h i n e r y . 
U n i t e d N a t i o n s , Economic Commission f o r A s i a and the P a r E a s t , 
E f f e c t i v e P r o t e c t i o n and I n t e r r e g i o n a l T r a d e op . c i t . , p . 7 1 . 
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t h a t i t e n j o y s . T h i s i s because the i n d u s t r y m a i n l y performsassembly 
o p e r a t i o n s and i t s v a l u e added, e v a l u a t e d a t f r e e t r a d e p r i c e s , i s r a t h e r 
l o w . The same i s a l s o t r u e 6Y such i n d u s t r i e s a s rubber and c h e m i c a l s 
which a l s o perform b a s i c a l l y p r o c e s s i n g o r packaging o p e r a t i o n s on imported 
raw m a t e r i a l s and components. Another i n d u s t r y group w i t h a h i g h r a t e o f 
e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n i s l e a t h e r . T h i s i s r a t h e r s u r p r i s i n g i n v iew o f 
the f a c t t h a t a l a r g e p a r t o f the output o f t h i s i n d u s t r y i s ' t r a d i t i o n a l 1 
i t i s a predominant ly s m a l l s c a l e i n d u s t r y and e x p o r t s a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t 
o f i t s o u t p u t . The h i g h e f f e c t i v e r a t e o f p r o t e c t i o n i s even more d i f f i -
c u l t to e x p l a i n s i n c e the nominal r a t e i s r e l a t i v e l y low a t 6 2 p e r c e n t . 
The o n l y e x p l a n a t i o n i s t h a t i n 1 9 6 5 the i n d u s t r y must have imported a 
r a t h e r l a r g e propor t ion o f i t s i n t e r m e d i a t e r e q u i r e m e n t s . There a r e 
i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t t h i s must have been due to e x c e p t i o n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s 
a f f e c t i n g the i n d u s t r y i n t h a t y e a r . I n l a t e r y e a r s the p r o p o r t i o n o f 
15 
imported i n p u t s used by the i n d u s t r y seem to have been lower . 
At the o ther end o f the d i s p e r s i o n o f e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n i s paper 
and p r i n t i n g which has a n e g a t i v e r a t e o f p r o t e c t i o n . T h i s means t h a t 
the i n d u s t r y pays more i n t a r i f f s and o ther t r a d e taxes on i t s imported 
i n p u t s than imports competing w i t h i t s products have to pay . I n t h i s 
way the i n d u s t r y i s d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t . The n e x t lowes t r a t e o f 
e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n i n 1 9 6 5 i s i n the b a s i c meta l i n d u s t r i e s . Another 
i n d u s t r y w i t h a low r a t e o f e f f e c t i v e p r o t e c t i o n i s n o n - m e t a l l i c m i n e r a l s . 
A l l these a r e predominant ly producers o f i n t e r m e d i a t e o r inves tment i t e m s . 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t h a t I r a n ' s b i g g e s t i n d u s t r i e s , food and t e x t i l e s 
appear to be not v e r y h e a v i l y p r o t e c t e d , a l though the e f f e c t i v e r a t e s t h e y 
e n j o y a r e s t i l l h i g h e r than the nominal r a t e s . As i t was noted i n the 
l a s t c h a p t e r , these a r e I r a n ' s o l d e s t manufactur ing i n d u s t r i e s . I t may 
t h u s be tempting to conclude t h a t the r e l a t i v e l y low r a t e o f p r o t e c t i o n 
f o r these i n d u s t r i e s i n d i c a t e s t h a t they have succeeded i n i n c r e a s i n g 
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t h e i r e f f i c i e n c y through t ime; t h a t they were i n i t i a l l y " i n f a n t " 
i n d u s t r i e s and have now grown u p . U n f o r t u n a t e l y however, no t n e a r l y 
enough i n f o r m a t i o n i s a v a i l a b l e t o support a d e f i n i t i v e s tatement i n 
t h i s r e g a r d . 
(b) - A d m i n s t r a t i v e Import C o n t r o l s . 
Another ins trument t h a t the government u s e s to p r o t e c t I r a n ' s 
i n d u s t r i e s i s an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e system o f import c o n t r o l . T h i s i n v o l v e s 
the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f a l l imports i n t o ' a u t h o r i z e d 1 , ' u n a u t h o r i z e d ' and 
• p r o h i b i t e d * c a t e g o r i e s ' ^ . The f i r s t c a t e g o r y , " a u t h o r i z e d " , encompasses 
a l l those i tems imports o f which do n o t r e q u i r e p r i o r a u t h o r i z a t i o n from 
any government body. I n c l u d e d under t h i s c a t e g o r y a r e the b u l k o f I r a n ' s 
imports o f i n t e r m e d i a t e and inves tment goods. I t e m s covered by the 
"author i zed" category accounted f o r the l a r g e s t s h a r e o f t h e c o u n t r y ' s 
imports over the 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 7 2 p e r i o d . R e c e n t l y however, i t s s h a r e i n t o t a l 
imports appears to have been g r a d u a l l y d e c l i n i n g , ma in ly because towards 
the end o f the 1 9 6 0 * s a number o f new i n d u s t r i e s produc ing i n t e r m e d i a t e 
and inves tment goods ( s t e e l , machine t o o l s , p e t r o c h e m i c a l s , e t c . ) were 
e s t a b l i s h e d and imports competing w i t h t h e i r products have been exc luded 
from the "author ized" category"*"^. Even so by 1 9 7 2 n e a r l y 7 5 percent 
o f I r a n ' s imports d i d n o t r e q u i r e any p r i o r a u t h o r i z a t i o n from the g o v e m -
ment . 
The second c a t e g o r y , ' u n a u t h o r i z e d ' , i n c l u d e s those goods f o r which 
i m p o r t e r s need p r i o r a u t h o r i t y from the government. As can be expec ted , 
t h i s c a t e g o r y covers n e a r l y a l l o f the goods t h a t a r e produced by I r a n ' s 
own manufac tur ing i n d u s t r i e s . Most imports s u b j e c t to p r i o r a p p r o v a l a r e 
l i c e n s e d by the M i n i s t r y o f Economy but an important p o r t i o n depend on the 
M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h . Other government a g e n c i e s c o n t r o l o n l y a s m a l l 
f r a c t i o n o f i m p o r t s . The M i n i s t r y o f Economy c o n t r o l s imports o f such 
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t h i n g s a s t y r e s and t u b e s , t e l e p h o n e s , i r o n and s t e e l p r o d u c t s , sheet 
g l a s s , t e x t i l e f i b r e s , p l a s t i c m a t e r i a l and p l a s t i c products and cement 
among many o t h e r goods. The M i n i s t r y o f H e a l t h on the o t h e r hand c o n t r o l s 
m a i n l y imports o f v a r i o u s p h a r m a c e u t i c a l and m e d i c a l p r o d u c t s , the b a s i c 
19 
c o n s t i t u e n t of c o s m e t i c s , v a r i o u s e s s e n c e s and d r i e d m i l k . 
I n many case s ' u n a u t h o r i z e d ' imports can o n l y be imported by 
i n d u s t r i a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s f o r t h e i r own u s e , r a t h e r than by commercial 
t r a d e r s . F o r example, u n r e f i n e d vege tab le o i l s , components o f t r a n s p o r t 
v e h i c l e s , t e l e v i s i o n and r a d i o s e t s and c e r t a i n o t h e r consumer d u r a b l e s 
can o n l y be imported by the r e s p e c t i v e f i r m s who use these i tems f o r 
20 
f u r t h e r p r o c e s s i n g and manufacture • 
So f a r a s f i n i s h e d consumer goods a r e concerned , the main g u i d e l i n e i n 
av/arding import l i c e n c e s appears t o be the achievement o f b a l a n c e between 
supp ly and demand o f the commodities i n q u e s t i o n • Hence i f domest ic 
product ion i s c o n s i d e r e d to be l e s s than the demand then the M i n i s t r y 
o f Economy would a u t h o r i z e s p e c i f i e d q u a n t i t i e s o f i m p o r t s . I n some 
cases import l i c e n s e s a r e granted to merchants on the u n d e r t a k i n g t h a t they 
a l s o market the domest ic p r o d u c t . F o r example f o r each ton o f n y l o n t h a t 
the merchants buy from domest ic producers they a u t o m a t i c a l l y get a l i c e n s e 
to import two tons (domest i c produc t ion o f n y l o n s a t i s f i e s a t h i r d o f I r a n ' s 
22 
needs) • A s i m i l a r procedure a p p l i e s to many commodities t h a t a r e domest-
i c a l l y produced but no t i n s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t i e s . 
Judg ing by the government's pronouncements and o b s e r v a t i o n s o f some 
w r i t e r s , i t appears t h a t a major c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t has a f f e c t e d the 
o p e r a t i o n o f l i c e n s i n g p o l i c i e s i s the d e s i r e to combat i n f l a t i o n a r y 
p r e s s u r e s and to f o r c e an improvement i n the q u a l i t y o f d o m e s t i c a l l y made 
goods even though domest ic produc t ion appears to be s u f f i c i e n t to meet 
23 
domestic demand . 
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These two c a t e g o r i e s account f o r n e a r l y a l l o f I r a n ' s i m p o r t s ; 
the ' p r o h i b i t e d 1 ca tegory seems to be r e l a t i v e l y i n s i g n i f i c a n t . The 
o n l y i tems t h a t appear t o be permanent ly i n the p r o h i b i t e d l i s t a r e 
r e p o r t e d t o be "arms, ammunit ion, photographic a p p a r a t u s f o r a i r p l a n e s 
( w i t h o u t s p e c i a l p e r m i s s i o n from the government); t r a n s m i t t e r s , t e l e g r a p h , 
t e lephone and w i r e l e s s a p p a r a t u s and a c c e s s o r i e s ( e x c e p t f o r government); 
r e c o r d s , tapes and p u b l i c a t i o n s c o n t r a r y to p u b l i c o r d e r , r e l i g i o n and 
m o r a l i t y ; commodities w i t h m i s l e a d i n g m a r k i n g s " ^ 
So f a r a s consumer goods a r e concerned , c e r t a i n i tems a r e o c c a s i o n a l l y 
put on the p r o h i b i t e d l i s t , but o n l y f o r r e l a t i v e l y short p e r i o d s , c o v e r i n g 
the i n i t i a l s t a g e s o f the domest ic product ion o f the goods i n q u e s t i o n . 
The government's pronouncements i n d i c a t e a r e l u c t a n c e to cut o f f imports 
o f consumer goods comple te ly . I n s t e a d the government at tempts to c u r t a i l 
imports by imposing s t r i c t r e g u l a t i o n s r e g a r d i n g the d i s t r i b u t i o n and 
s e r v i c i n g o f imported consumer d u r a b l e s . F o r example, imports o f passenger 
v e h i c l e s , probably the s i n g l e most h i g h l y p r o t e c t e d commodity i n I r a n , a r e 
not p r o h i b i t e d . However r e g u l a t i o n s which r e q u i r e i m p o r t e r s to m a i n t a i n 
an adequate l e v e l o f spare p a r t s ( w h i c h i n t u r n b e a r a v e r y heavy t a r i f f ) 
a s w e l l a s p r o v i d i n g f o r r e p a i r and s e r v i c e f a c i l i t i e s have kept imports 
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o f c a r s to a v e r y low l e v e l . 
The above d e s c r i p t i o n o f a d m i n s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s shows t h a t l i k e 
t a r i f f s they have a ' c a s c a d e ' s t r u c t u r e i n a s much a s l i c e n c i n g r e s t r i c -
t i o n s ma in ly a p p l y to consumer goods w h i l e i n t e r m e d i a t e and inves tment 
goods can e n t e r the country f r e e from such r e s t r i c t i o n s . T h e r e f o r e these 
a d m i n s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s bestow a s t r u c t u r e of p r o t e c t i o n on I r a n ' s manufac t -
u r i n g i n d u s t r i e s , which i s s i m i l a r to t a r i f f p r o t e c t i o n and i n f a c t r e i n -
f o r c e s i t . 
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( c ) - Import r e g i s t r a t i o n D e p o s i t s 
F i n a l l y , so f a r a s p r o t e c t i v e measures are concerned , t h e r e i s the 
system o f import r e g i s t r a t i o n d e p o s i t s . As i t s name i m p l i e s t h i s system 
i n v o l v e s the f r e e z i n g o f a c e r t a i n p a r t o f the i m p o r t e r ' s funds and thus 
r e s t r i c t s import f i n a n c e . Those impor ters a f f e c t e d have t o d e p o s i t s p e c i -
f i e d amounts w i t h the C e n t r a l Bank and can r e c o v e r them once the goods a r e 
r e l e a s e d from the Customs O f f i c e . The cos t to the i m p o r t e r i s t h e r e f o r e 
the e q u i v a l e n t o f the i n t e r e s t e a r n i n g s forgone . Prom the p o i n t o f v iew 
o f the government the advantage o f t h i s system i s t h a t the l e v e l o f imports 
can be manipu la ted by monetary p o l i c y . F o r example by r e d u c i n g the supp ly 
o f money o r r e s t r i c t i n g the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f c r e d i t the a u t h o r i t i e s can make 
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i t d i f f i c u l t f o r i m p o r t e r s to meet d e p o s i t requ irements • 
As can be expected however the system i s not used i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y and 
i s s t r u c t u r e d i n such a way a s to p r o t e c t import s u b s t i t u t e i n d u s t r i e s . 
I n 1971 about 210 i tems i n c l u d i n g most machinery and i n d u s t r i a l raw mat-
e r i a l a s w e l l a s p a r t s and components cou ld be imported w i t h no advanced 
d e p o s i t s . I n the same y e a r , 100 i tems i n c l u d i n g such t h i n g s a s o i l , s e e d s , 
paper , c e r t a i n i r o n and s t e e l p r o d u c t s some types o f machinery and p a r t s 
and c e r t a i n s c i e n t i f i c i n s t r u m e n t s were s u b j e c t to advanced d e p o s i t s e q u i v -
a l e n t to 4 0 percent o f the v a l u e o f the imported p r o d u c t s . A l l o ther 
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goods were , i n 1 9 7 1 > , s u b j e c t to a 100 percent depos i t requirement ' . 
I t has been e s t i m a t e d t h a t , on the b a s i s o f a commercial r a t e o f 
i n t e r e s t o f 15 percent per annum and an average d e p o s i t t ime o f n i n e 
months, the i n t e r e s t cos t amounts t o a 3 percent t a r i f f e q u i v a l e n t on those 
commodities s u b j e c t to a depos i t r a t e o f 1+0 p e r c e n t and a 7 percent t a r i f f 
28 
e q u i v a l e n t on imports s u b j e c t to a 100 percent depos i t • 
p r o t e c t i o n , one needs to a d j u s t the e f f e c t i v e t a r i f f r a t e s i n t a b l e 3-5 
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f o r the i n t e r e s t c o s t s mentioned above and a l s o f o r the i m p l i c i t c o s t s 
r e s u l t i n g from a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s . T h i s cou ld not be attempted 
s i n c e data i n the r e q u i r e d d e t a i l and f o r a l l i n d i v i d u a l i n d u s t r y groups 
a r e not a v a i l a b l e . However we have seen t h a t both a d m i n s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s 
and the d e p o s i t requirements have a s t r u c t u r e s i m i l a r to t h a t o f t a r i f f s . 
However, q u a n t i t a t i v e l y , t a r i f f s a r e f a r more important than the o t h e r 
two. Thus a s we have seen d e p o s i t requ irements amount to a nominal t a r i f f 
e q u i v a l e n t o f between 3 to 7 percent which i n comparison w i t h t a r i f f s a r e 
v e r y low. I n a d d i t i o n a d m i n s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l s a p p l y o n l y to about 2 5 p e r -
cent o f a l l o f I r a n ' s imports and i n most c a s e s exc lude o u t r i g h t p r o h i b i t i o n . 
T h e r e f o r e i t seems s a f e to conclude t h a t t a r i f f s by themse lves g ive u s 
a f a i r l y a c c u r a t e i n d i c a t i o n o f the d i r e c t i o n as w e l l as the magnitude o f 
p r o t e c t i o n i n the manufac tur ing s e c t o r . ^ 9 
I I - Promot iona l P o l i c i e s 
As was mentioned i n the beg inn ing o f t h i s chapter government p o l i c y 
has attempted to prov ide i n c e n t i v e s f o r i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n both by p r o t e c -
t i v e and a l s o what a r e c a l l e d ' p r o m o t i o n a l ' measures . I n t h i s s e c t i o n we 
d e a l w i t h the v a r i o u s forms t h a t the l a t t e r s e t o f measures have t a k e n . 
As was e x p l a i n e d i n some d e t a i l i n chapter one, even though i n 
t h e o r e t i c a l terms promot ional measures may c o n s t i t u t e a more o p t i m a l s e t 
o f p o l i c i e s , i n p r a c t i c e they a r e o f t e n l e s s a t t r a c t i v e than p r o t e c t i v e 
measures . T h i s i s because the f i n a n c i n g o f promot iona l measures p r e s e n t s 
many d i f f i c u l t i e s i n deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s . They o f t e n l a c k an e f f i c i e n t 
t a x a t i o n system and tend to r e l y on t r a d e t a x e s f o r a major p a r t o f t h e i r 
r e v e n u e s . 
I n I r a n however t h e s i t u a t i o n h s s . i n t h i s r e s p e c t , been ( su i t e d i f f e r -
ent from most o t h e r deve lop ing c o u n t r i e s because o f the e x i s t e n c e o f o i l 
r e v e n u e s . O i l has prov ided I r a n v/ith a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e and e a s i l y 
m o b i l i z e d revenue throughout most o f the p e r i o d under s t u d y . T h e r e f o r e 
f i n a n c i n g o f promot iona l p o l i c i e s has not been a major problem. I n 
what f o l l o w s we w i l l c o n s i d e r these p o l i c i e s under two head ings : 
( a ) - Long and medium term c r e d i t f o r i n d u s t r y ; and (b ) - Other promo-
t i o n a l measures* 
( a ) - Long and Medium Term C r e d i t f o r I n d u s t r y 
T h i s has undoubtedly been the most e f f e c t i v e promot iona l measure 
and h a s , e q u a l l y undoubtedly , had a powerfu l s t i m u l a t i n g e f f e c t on 
I r a n i a n m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y . S i n c e the middle o f the 1 9 5 0 ' s the 
government has s e t up a number o f f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s as a means o f 
d i v e r t i n g p u b l i c money t o p r i v a t e i n d u s t r y f o r l ong and medium term 
purposes . To a p p r e c i a t e t h e importance o f t h i s f o r I r a n i a n m a n u f a c t u r i n g 
i t must be r e a l i z e d t h a t b e f o r e the middle o f the 1 9 5 0 ' s no domest ic 
i n s t i t u t i o n p r o v i d i n g such a s e r v i c e e x i s t e d and t h a t i t s l a c k was i n 
many ways the most i n h i b i t i n g f a c t o r f o r the progress o f I r a n i a n manufac t -
• 30 ur ing- ' . 
I n f a c t f i n a n c i a l markets i n I r a n were dominated by b a z a a r merchants 
cum money- lenders and a few commercial b a n k s . The l a t t e r however were 
p r a c t i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l to the b a z a a r o p e r a t o r s and as Benedick has a p t l y 
remarked the main d i s t i n c t i o n between them was the i m p r e s s i v e l y modern 
b u i l d i n g s which housed the commercial banks^". 
The r e s u l t o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n was t h a t a l l c r e d i t to i n d u s t r y was o f 
a v e r y s h o r t d u r a t i o n and o f t e n a t e x h o r b i t a n t r a t e s o f i n t e r e s t . The 
s h o r t d u r a t i o n meant t h a t the c r e d i t c o u l d o n l y be used f o r working c a p i t a l 
purposes . Even f o r such purposes the b a r g a i n i n g p o s i t i o n o f i n d u s t r i a l i s t s 
v i s a v i s the b a z a a r money- lenders was v e r y weak - hence t h e h i g h r a t e s o f 
i n t e r e s t . I n most c a s e s b a z a a r money- lenders were prominent wholesa le 
d e a l e r s o f important domest ic and imported raw m a t e r i a l and consumer goods. 
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T h e r e f o r e i n d u s t r i a l i s t s had t o depend on them both f o r o b t a i n i n g i n p u t s 
and a l s o f o r market ing o u t l e t s : 
Such c i r c u m s t a n c e s were an important o b s t a c l e to i n d u s t r i a l deve lop-
ment i n I r a n and a c c e n t u a t e d the a l r e a d y e x i s t i n g p r e f e r e n c e f o r a l t e r n a t i v e 
investment o u t l e t s such as r u r a l and urban l a n d and r e a l - e s t a t e , c a r p e t s , 
j e w e l r y and indeed money- lending . 
S i n c e about 1 9 5 5 however the government has p l a y e d an i n c r e a s i n g l y 
a c t i v e p a r t i n m a t t e r s o f i n d u s t r i a l f i n a n c e and a s s i s t e d i n c h a n e l l i n g 
s u b s t a n t i a l funds to p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l i s t s through p u b l i c and s e m i - p u b l i c 
l e n d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s . Between 1 9 5 6 and 1 9 6 1 two government c o n t r o l l e d 
b o d i e s , the I n d u s t r i a l C r e d i t Bank ( I C B ) and the s o - c a l l e d R i a l R e v a l u a t i o n 
Fund ( R R F ) ^ , t o g e t h e r extended 7 » 4 6 l m i l l i o n r i a l s to p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l -
i s t s . T h i s was probably the s i n g l e most important f a c t o r i n the u n p r e c -
edented upsurge i n p r i v a t e manufac tur ing investment d u r i n g these y e a r s . 
E a c h loan f i n a n c e d between a t h i r d to a h a l f o f the cos t o f approved 
p r o j e c t s and hence the t o t a l p r i v a t e c a p i t a l m o b i l i z e d i n t o manufac tur ing 
by the above l o a n s was qui te s u b s t a n t i a l . As we noted i n the l a s t c h a p t e r 
the g r e a t e s t p a r t o f t h i s investment was d i r e c t e d towards a s m a l l number 
o f i n d u s t r i e s ma in ly t e x t i l e s and s u g a r i n an attempt to reduce the i m p o r t -
ance o f imports i n the t o t a l supply o f t h e i r p r o d u c t s . 
S ince 1 9 5 9 w i t h the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the I n d u s t r i a l and Mining 
Development Bank o f I r a n ( iMDBl) the o p e r a t i o n s o f the o t h e r bod ie s has 
been overshadowed. The RRF has ceased o p e r a t i o n w h i l e the I C B has tended 
to supplement the l e n d i n g a c t i v i t i e s o f the IMDBI, p r o v i d i n g s m a l l e r , work-
i n g c a p i t a l , l o a n s to f i r m s a l r e a d y a s s i s t e d by the IMDBI Because o f 
the v e r y important p o s i t i o n t h a t the IMDBI has occup ied i n the development 
o f I r a n i a n manufac tur ing i n d u s t r y i t i s worthwhi le to c o n s i d e r i t s n a t u r e 
and major f u n c t i o n s b r i e f l y . 
The IMDBI was e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1 9 5 9 a s a p r i v a t e l y owned j o i n t - s t o c k 
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company. I t was to f u n c t i o n as a development f i n a n c e company. As 
such the p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e o f the Bank was to a s s i s t i n the c r e a t i o n , 
expansion and modern i sa t ion o f i n d u s t r i a l e s t a b l i s h m e n t s "which a r e 
e s s e n t i a l l y p r i v a t e i n c h a r a c t e r ^ . To a c h i e v e these o b j e c t i v e s the 
IMDBI was empowered to engage i n medium and l o n g term l e n d i n g , c o n v e r t -
a b l e l o a n s , e q u i t y p a r t i c i p a t i o n , guarantees and u n d e r w r i t i n g . The 
Bank can a l s o a s s i s t i n the t r a n s f e r o f s t a t e , f a c t o r i e s to p r i v a t e hands , 
undertake r e s e a r c h and t e c h n i c a l s t u d i e s o f i n d u s t r i a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s and 
i n i t i a t e p i l o t p l a n t s ^ . 
Although the IMDBI i s a p r i v a t e company i n r e a l i t y i t f u n c t i o n s a s a 
s e m i - p u b l i c i n s t i t u t i o n . The share c a p i t a l o f the Bank i s 1 0 0 p e r c e n t 
owned by I r a n i a n and f o r e i g n p r i v a t e i n d i v i d u a l s and c o n c e r n s , however, 
a t the t ime o f foundat ion n e a r l y 6 3 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l r e s o u r c e s t h a t 
the Bank had a t i t s d i s p o s a l were s u p p l i e d by the g o v e r n m e n t ^ . These 
were m a i n l y i n the form o f s o - c a l l e d 'managed l o a n s ' ( t h a t i s , funds 
adminstered by the IMDBI on b e h a l f o f the government f o r which the Bank 
was to r e c e i v e an agreed agency f e e ) and a l s o an i n t e r e s t :ffree l o a n from 
the N a t i o n a l Bank . I n a d d i t i o n the government has guaranteed the I M D B I 1 s 
b o r r o w i n g ^ . 
Y e t , i n s p i t e o f the predominance o f p u b l i c funds i n the r e s o u r c e s 
o f the Bank t h e r e was c o n s i d e r a b l e emphasis on the p r i v a t e s t a t u s o f t h e 
IMDBI both i n law and i n f a c t ^ . As we s h a l l see t h e Bank s t i l l remains 
a v e r y important ins trument o f government p o l i c y tovfards the p r i v a t e s e c t o r 
and i t s l e n d i n g and o t h e r p o l i c i e s a r e v e r y c l o s e l y c o o r d i n a t e d wi th govern-
ment p o l i c y . N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e a c t u a l l e n d i n g and f i n a n c i a l o p e r a t i o n s 
o f the Bank - e v a l u a t i o n o f l o a n a p p l i c a t i o n s , a p p r o v a l and disembursment 
Q-f l o a n s — were t o b^ f r © 6 f r o n .TOv^mnen t i n f l i i R T i c s ^ ^ * Tri fYi""h, 
has been o b s e r v e d , the IMDBI r e p r e s e n t s a pragmat ic mixture o f government 
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money and p r i v a t e management. The p r i v a t e s t a t u s o f the bank has 
f a c i l i t a t e d the p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f major f o r e i g n banks and i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
development a g e n c i e s i n i t s o p e r a t i o n s . The IMDBI has a t t r a c t e d sub-
s t a n t i a l f o r e i g n exchange l o a n s from the World Bank and from the Euro?? 
d o l l a r m a r k e t ^ . 
I t s p r i v a t e s t a t u s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , the IMDBI s i n c e i t s foundat ion 
has q u i c k l y developed a s a major l i n k between the government and the 
p r i v a t e s e c t o r i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g ^ . I n p a r t i c u l a r the government has 
r e l i e d m a i n l y on the IMDBI to a c h i e v e P l a n t a r g e t s i n the p r i v a t e s e c t o r . 
P l a n procedure i n the manufac tur ing s e c t o r , a s p r a c t i s e d d u r i n g the T h i r d 
and F o u r t h Development P l a n s i n v o l v e s p r o j e c t i n g ' p h y s i c a l ' a s w e l l a s 
' f i n a n c i a l ' t a r g e t s ^ . ' P h y s i c a l * t a r g e t s , i n g e n e r a l r e f e r to p u b l i c 
inves tment i n i n d i v i d u a l l y s p e c i f i e d p r o j e c t s . ' F i n a n c i a l ' t a r g e t s on 
the o t h e r hand , r e f e r m a i n l y ( though not e x c l u s i v e l y ) to the d e s i r e d l e v e l 
o f p r i v a t e investment i n b r o a d l y d e f i n e d c a t e g o r i e s o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g indus try^ 
However d e t a i l s e l e c t i o n and f i n a n c i n g o f such p r o j e c t s i s l e f t t o the 
IMD3I and to a s m a l l e r ex tent to the I C B ^ " . Dur ing the T h i r d P l a n long 
and medium term l e n d i n g by the IMDBI d i r e c t l y accounted f o r 1 7 p e r c e n t o f 
t o t a l p r i v a t e investment i n manufacturing'1*"-'. But because each loan a g r e e -
ment r e q u i r e d t h a t the i n d u s t r i a l i s t should commit something l i k e t w o - t h i r d s 
o f the c o s t o f the p r o j e c t h i m s e l f , i t can be e s t i m a t e d t h a t I M D B I ' s o p e r -
a t i o n s m o b i l i z e d more than 5 0 p e r c e n t o f t o t a l p r i v a t e i n v e s t m e n t . 
S i m i l a r l y , dur ing the F o u r t h P l a n IMDBI he lped m o b i l i z e 5 7 p e r c e n t o f 
t o t a l p r i v a t e inves tment i n m a n u f a c t u r i n g ^ . C o n s i d e r i n g t h a t the IMDBI 
o n l y d e a l s w i t h l a r g e i n v e s t o r s , i t s l ower l i m i t f o r a s s i s t a n c e be ing 5 
m i l l i o n r i a l s , i t s predominant i n f l u e n c e on the development o f m a n u f a c t u r -
the promotion, f i n a n c i n g and d i r e c t i o n o f a lmost e v e r y major p r i v a t e venture 
i n the manufac tur ing s e c t o r ^ . 
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I t s h o u l d a l s o be added t h a t the IMDBI ( a s w e l l a s t h e I C B ) has 
been a r a t h e r cheap source o f development f i n a n c e f o r p r i v a t e i n d u s t r i a l s 
i s t s . The i n t e r e s t r a t e charged by the IMDBI has over the p e r i o d ranged 
between 6 to 9 percent w h i l e the 'market ' r a t e o f i n t e r e s t has been much 
I Q 
h i g h e r o f t e n f l u c t u a t i n g around 3 0 percent 4 " • 
C o n s i d e r i n g the p a t t e r n o f IMDBI f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e , i t can be 
sa id' t h a t import s u b s t i t u t e i n d u s t r i e s have been the main b e n e f i c i a r y . 
To some e x t e n t t h i s can be seen from t a b l e 3 - 4 below which shows a b r e a k -
down o f IMD3I f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e by manufac tur ing i n d u s t r y o v e r t h e 
1 9 5 9 - 1 9 7 2 p e r i o d : 
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T a b l e 3 - 4 : C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f IMDBI f i n a n c i a l A s s i s t a n c e * by 
M a n u f a c t u r i n g I n d u s t r y : 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 7 2 , m i l l i o n r i a l s , 
c u r r e n t p r i c e s . 
I n d u s t r y Group Amount 
Food P r o c e s s i n g 3 , 7 1 3 o l 
T e x t i l e s 4 , 9 3 5 . 0 
Footwear 4 0 7 . 0 
Wood and F u r n i t u r e 1 2 4 . 4 
Paper and P r i n t i n g 2 , 3 0 5 . 0 
L e a t h e r and L e a t h e r P r o d u c t s 2 2 0 . 1 
Rubber P r o d u c t s 8 7 1 . 5 
Chemica l s and Chemica l P r o d u c t s 1 , 5 9 7 . 8 
Petroleum P r o d u c t s 4 5 0 . 9 
N o n - M e t a l l i c M i n e r a l P r o d u c t s 4 , 4 4 0 . 4 
B a s i c Meta l P r o d u c t s 2 , 6 3 6 . 6 
L i g h t Meta l P r o d u c t s 1 , 4 9 5 . 8 
I n d u s t r y Machinery 5 4 1 . 9 
E l e c t r i c a l Machinery 2 , 9 4 2 . 2 
T r a n s p o r t Equipment 4 , 6 1 9 . 1 
M i s c e l l a n e o u s 2 5 9 * 6 
* I n c l u d e l o a n s as w e l l a s e q u i t y inves tment committed by the IMDBI . 
Source: I n d u s t r i a l and Mining Development Bank o f I r a n , T h i r t e e n t h 
Annual Report o f the Board o f D i r e c t o r s to the G e n e r a l 
Assembly o f S h a r e h o l d e r s f o r the Y e a r 1 3 5 1 ( 1 9 7 2 - 1 9 7 3 , p . 5 1 . 
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A comparison between the above t a b l e and t a b l e 2 - 3 i n the p r e v i o u s 
chapter i s i n s t r u c t i v e . T h i s w i l l show t h a t the group o f i n d u s t r i e s 
w i t h more than 5 0 p e r c e n t i m p o r t - s u b s t i t u t i n g growth i n output have 
absorbed more than 5 1 percent o f t o t a l IMDBI f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e . 
However t h i s does not r e v e a l the f u l l exten,d o f IMDBI 1 s c o n t r i b u t i o n 
to import s u b s t i t u t i o n i n I r a n i a n manufac tur ing i n d u s t r y . I n f a c t a 
c l o s e r examinat ion o f inves tment promotions by the Bank shows t h a t the 
l a r g e m a j o r i t y o f them have been import r e p l a c i n g . T h i s does not f u l l y 
emerge from a comparison o f the two t a b l e s because o f the h i g h l y aggreg-
a t e d n a t u r e o f the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n u s e d . F o r example many o f the IMDBI 
f i n a n c e d p r o j e c t s covered b y ' t e x t i l e s ' have been e i t h e r f o r the more 
expens ive type o f t e x t i l e f a b r i c p r e v i o u s l y imported or f o r s y n t h e t i c 
y a m s and o t h e r i n t e r m e d i a t e products a l s o p r e v i o u s l y imported . 
S i m i l a r l y , a l though ' m e t a l produc t s ' a s a whole have a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l 
import s u b s t i t u t e component ( s ee t a b l e 2 - 3 ) , IMDBI f i n a n c e d p r o j e c t s 
under ' l i g h t meta l p r o d u c t s ' have a lmost a l l been import r e p l a c i n g . 
T h i s i s to be expected s i n c e , a s has been n o t ed a l r e a d y , t h e IMDBI i s 
o n l y concerned w i t h the l a r g e s c a l e and modern s e c t i o n s o f I r a n i a n 
manufac tur ing i n d u s t r y . 
The f i g u r e s i n t a b l e 3 - 4 - r e f e r to the a b s o l u t e amount o f IMDBI 
f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e i n v a r i o u s m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n d u s t r y . I t would 
o b v i o u s l y be d e s i r a b l e to show the share o f IMDBI f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e 
and the c a p i t a l m o b i l i z e d by these i n t o t a l p r i v a t e inves tment i n each 
manufac tur ing i n d u s t r y group. I t has no t been p o s s i b l e to o b t a i n enough 
i n f o r m a t i o n f o r t h i s purpose over the 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 7 2 p e r i o d . 
Some d a t a , r e f e r i n g to the 1 9 6 8 - | 9 7 2 ( t h e E o u r t h P l a n ) and c o n c e r n -
i n T t ' N 9 ccinbined a c t i v i t i p . r . n f t h p T T . T I P . T OTI.CL I , R I B - . — a * r a n ^ ' ^ i ^ t ' v ' - ^ i ' " ' 
are u s e f u l f o r our p u r p o s e s . A c c o r d i n g l y t a b l e 3 - 5 shows the share o f 
91 
f i n a n c i a l ass i s tance by the two development banks and the private 
c a p i t a l mobilized by these in t o t a l private investment over the I968-
1972 period: 
Table 3—5s Sources of Pr ivate Investment in Manufacturing: 1968-1972, 
mi l l ion r i a l s , current p r i c e s . 
Industry Group 1 - IMDBI & 2 - Pr ivate Capi ta l 3 - Sum of 1 & 2 
ICB Credits'? Mobilized by as a Percentage 
IMDBI & ICB 
C r e d i t s . 
of Tota l Pr ivate 
Investment. 
Food, beverages 
and tobacco 7»281 
T e x t i l e s and 
clothing 6,042 
Paper & pr int ing 3,439 
Leather 295 
Chemicals and 
petrochemicals 3,200 
Non-metallic minerals 6,100 
Metal products 
and Bas ic metals 8,755 
Machinery, non-e l ec tr i c 700 
Machiner, e l e c t r i c 1,581 
Transport equipment 3>500 
12,639 
10,639 
11,561 
481 
4,930 
7,950 
17,075 
1,300 
3,259 
11,900 
79 
68 
90 
11 
50 
94 
49 
77 
93 
98 
* Includes loans and equity investment 
Source: Plan Organisation, F i f t h National Development Plan 1973-1978 
(Tehran, 1973), p.879 ( i n P e r s i a n ) . 
This table shows the importance of development banks as a source 
of finance for Iran ian manufacturing industry . The only industr ies 
that have a r e l a t i v e l y small share in the above table are e i ther those 
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with substant ia l government investment or those with a large ' t r a d i t i o n a l ' 
component which in e f f e c t means that they are comprised of a large c o l l -
ection of small businesses most of which cannot obtain finance from the 
development banks. Thus public investment in petrochemicals and iron 
and s t ee l explains the r e l a t i v e l y small shares of 'chemicals and petro-
chemicals' as wel l as 'metal products and bas ic metals*. The small share 
for ' l eather ' on the other hand i s explained by the t r a d i t i o n a l character 
of the industry . 
(b) - Other Promotional Measures 
I n addition to making long and medium term credi t a v a i l a b l e , the 
government has helped private i n d u s t r i a l i s t s in a v a r i e t y of other ways. 
A l l i n d u s t r i a l establishments enjoy very generous depreciation tax al low-
ances. In addition a l l income reserved f o r the expansion of plant capacity 
are exempted from taxat ion. A l l new f a c t o r i e s , excluding those within 
120 kilometers radius of Tehran and 50 kilometers radius of I s f h a n , are 
exempted for the f i r s t f i v e years and in some cases for the f i r s t ten 
years of operations. Those establishments within a 50 kilometers radius 
of Isfhan enjoy a 50 percent reduction, while those ins ide 120 kilometer 
radius of Tehran are not e n t i t l e d to any tax r e d u c t i o n ^ . 
Another area of help to industry i s the f ree or subsidized provision 
of technical and managerial a s s i s tance . The development banks (the IMDBI 
and the ICB) supplement t h e i r f i n a n c i a l ass is tance by help in technica l 
and managerial matters. I n fact t e chn ica l and marketing f e a s i b i l i t y 
studies are always an e s s e n t i a l preliminary to approval of loan a p p l i c -
at ions . The cost of such studies are e i ther completely or p a r t i a l l y 
borne by the development banks. To a large extent, i t i s t h i s aspect of 
the a c t i v i t i e s or the development banks which lends s ign i f i cance to the 
"mobilization" of pr ivate c a p i t a l . By ident i fy ing possible projects and 
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c a r e f u l l y evaluating t h e i r p r o f i t i b i l i t y , development banks in e f f ec t 
provide 'blue p r i n t s ' for private investors-*^. T h e i r f i n a n c i a l ass i s tance 
provides added incentiveo 
Since 1956 another body, the I n d u s t r i a l Management I n s t i t u t e , has 
a l so been increas ing ly act ive i n t h i s f i e l d . For example during the 
Third Plan th i s I n s t i t u t e organised tra in ing courses for 5»000 management 
personel . Although no detai led information on the a c t i v i t i e s of the 
I n s t i t u t e are a v a i l a b l e , the general impression given i s that i t s oper-
at ions have been of a reasonable qua l i ty and improving^. During the 
Fourth Development Plan a sum of 2,875 mi l l i on r i a l s o f Plan Funds 
a l located to the manufacturing sector were spent through the I n d u s t r i a l 
Management I n s t i t u t e and other bodies, for the improvement of marketing, 
accounting and other management techniques and also for subsidis ing the 
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cost of t echnica l and f e a s i b i l i t y studies . 
Apart from these various measures a l l of which have been d i r e c t l y 
aimed at the manufacturing sector , we should a l so remember that manufact-
uring has benefited great ly from the improvement in i n f r a - s t r u c t u r a l 
s e r v i c e s . 
I n the m i d - f i f t i e s such serv ices in I ran were very inadequate. 
For example, so f a r as transport and communications were concerned a study 
by the Plan Organisation pointed out that the "obvious and severe bo t t l e -
necks in I r a n ' s transport and communications (are ) l i m i t i n g the l e v e l of 
trade and commerce, causing d i s tort ions in marketing and p r i c e s , increas -
ing costs and the price l e v e l and r e s t r i c t i n g economic opportunities and 
growth"53. S i m i l a r l y the e l e c t r i c i t y supply industry i n I r a n was very 
underdeveloped. Most i n d u s t r i a l establishments of any s ize had to 
frequent breakdown of what public f a c i l i t i e s which ex is ted . I t i s easy 
to see however that t h i s was very uneconomic and great ly added to the 
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costs of the enterprise^*-. 
I n the context of three Development Plans covering the period under 
study, the government has invested vast sums for the improvement of 
i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e s . The Second Plan a l located near ly 58 percent of i t s 
funds to road and r a i l construction and the bui lding of a few large dams 
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(which were mainly used for e l e c t r i c power provision) . During the 
Third and Fourth Plans , although the emphasis on i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e r e l a t -
i v e l y decl ined, nevertheless upwards of 41.3 and 29.2 percent of (much 
larger) Plan funds were a l located for such purposes^ . 
As a r e s u l t of such investment s i g n i f i c a n t improvements i n major 
economic i n f r a - s t r u c t u r e s have taken place . Although exact f igures for 
the early years of the period under consideration are not a v a i l a b l e , there 
i s no doubt that the road network has expanded subs tant ia l l y . The length 
of a l l weather roads, in p a r t i c u l a r , has at l e a s t doubled, reaching 12,000 
kilometers i n 1972. As a r e s u l t there has been a vast expansion of motor 
transport over the period. This i s indicated by the fac t that the use of 
gasolene expanded by 300 percent between 1955 and 19.69^ • S i m i l a r 
improvements have taken place i n r a i l and a i r transport . These improve-
ments gain an added s ign i f i cance in Iran because the country i s vas t , i t s 
t e r ra in rugged and hos t i l e and i t s population r e l a t i v e l y scat tered . I t 
i s inconceivable that without such improvements the development of large 
scale manufacturing would have progressed as much as i t has. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Domestic and Foreign Pr ivate Investment in 
Manufacturing: 1955-1972 
One of the r e s u l t s of the p o l i c i e s of import subst i tut ion and 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n that were described in the l a s t chapter has been the 
emergence of a r e l a t i v e l y large and dynamic private sector i n manufactur-
ind industry . Both domestic and foreign private c a p i t a l have part i c ipated 
in the growth of I r a n i a n manufacturing industry . I n the following two 
sections t h e i r respective ro les in the growth of manufacturing industry 
w i l l be considered separately: 
I - Domestic Pr ivate Investment in Manufacturing 
Before the middle of the 1950's private par t i c ipat ion in manufactur-
ing industry was rather l imi t ed . The government had a dominant pos i t ion , 
owning and contro l l ing most of the larger and more modern manufacturing 
p lants . This s i tuat ion was l a r g e l y explained by the fact that the previous 
phase of the country's i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , back in the 1930's f had been 
almost exc lus ive ly a state run a f f a i r . Many of the state owned plants 
were ostensibly establ ished to "demonstrate" that such investment could be 
profitable"'". I n pract ice however the very scope of government investment 
in industry l e f t very l i t t l e room for the development of an active private 
sector . Most of the state owned manufacturing plants ex i s t ing in the 
1950's were inher i ted from the government's e a r l i e r d i rec t involvement in 
industry. 
I n addition to t h i s h i s t o r i c a l f a c t , there were strong doubts, widely 
expressed in the 1950's, as to the wi l l ingness and more importantly the 
capabi l i ty of private owners of c a p i t a l f o r par t i c ipa t ion i n industry . 
I t was argued that most businessmen came from old merchant and landowning 
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fami l ies and tended to regard t h e i r investment in plant and machinery i n 
the same l i g h t as t h e i r previous involvement in land or commercial c a p i t a l . 
Most businessmen were also inc l ined to d i s t rus t partners and kept away from 
cooperative ventures. An eminent I r a n i a n economist described t h e i r behav-
iour in the following terms: 
"Conservatism, drive for quick p r o f i t s and a high discount rate of 
the future are t h e i r common c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Although no greedier 
or l e s s G-od-fearing than businessmen eleswhere, they are unduly 
i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c : a well-known Persian proverb - i f partners were 
a good thing to have God would have gotten himself one-characterises 
t h e i r mentality" 3 . 
Another I ran ian economist, a future Director of the Plan Organisation 
described the att i tude and behaviour of the t y p i c a l Iranian businessmen 
in almost i d e n t i c a l terms: 
"This ind iv idua l has a strong preference for small chances of 
large gains over large chances of small gains . He searches 
s t e a d i l y for investment opportunities with quick turnover. 
He r a r e l y ser ious ly considers business opportunities which 
require heavy i n i t i a l investment and pay a small but steady 
return over a long p e r i o d . . . . P r o f i t s are not u s u a l l y reinvested 
in the same business , because of the strong tendency of the i n -
d iv idual to spread h i s investment t h i n l y in d i f f erent a c t i v i t i e s . 
In short , the "Golden Rule" that guides inves tment . . . i s : gat i n 
quickly and get out qu ick ly 1 ^ 
I t i s thus against such a background that the subsequent development of 
a private sector in manufacturing i s r e a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t , t h i s development 
s ignal led a "notable break with t r a d i t i o n " - \ 
The second h a l f of the 1950's for the f i r s t time witnessed the growth 
of private investment i n manufacturing on a r e a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t s c a l e . 
In the four years between 1956 and 1960 private investment in manufacturing 
doubled, r i s i n g from 60 to 120 mi l l i on dol lars per year^. In the subsequent 
period, 1960-1972 private investment has cons is tent ly accounted for upwards 
of 60 percent of t o t a l f ixed investment in manufacturing^. Even during 
the Fourth Plan when, because of the emphasis on heavy industry, the l e v e l 
o f government investment in manufacturing increased subs tant ia l l y , the 
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private sector s t i l l accounted for more than 60 percent of t o t a l inves t -
ment^. 
According to information published by the Ministry of Economy, in 
1972 twenty-s is out o f the t h i r t y - f o u r larges t manufacturing establishments 
in I r a n , each employing more than a thousand persons were owned by private 
9 
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s • Using f i x e d investment and turnover as a c r i t e r i o n o f 
s i z e , s i x t y - f o u r out of the seventy fac tor i e s that had a f i x e d investment 
of more than 100 mi l l i on r i a l s and a year ly turnover of more than 250 
mi l l ion r i a l s were owned by private i n v e s t o r s ^ . Thus by the end of the 
period under our consideration, private i n d u s t r i a l i s t s were f i rmly estab-
l i s h e d in the large scale and modern sections of I ran ian manufacturing 
industry. Added to these were the f a r l a r g e r m u l t i p l i c i t y of medium and 
small scale plants and workshops throughout the country, a l l of which were 
n a t u r a l l y in private hands. 
Over the period, private investment, along with the changing structure 
of I r a n i a n industry , has become increas ing ly d i v e r s i f i e d . I n the 1950's 
private investment in manufacturing was concentrated on a few consumer 
goods such as t e x t i l e s and some processed foods as wel l as b a s i c construc-
tion m a t e r i a l s ^ . During the 1960's, by contrast , a much wider range of 
i n d u s t r i e s , including many producing intermediate goods benef i ted from 
private investment. The Fourth Plan envisaged that the private sector 
would develop industr ies producing paper, f o i l i n g m i l l s , a r t i f i c i a l f i b r e s , 
chemicals, e l e c t r o n i c s , f i l t e r s , motor v e h i c l e s , motor c y c l e s , b i c y c l e s , 
compressors, cables, weighing equipment, pipes and so on. Many of these 
12 
industr ies were to be developed v/ith the cooperation of foreign investors • 
There i s not enough information on a deta i led breakdown of i n d u s t r i a l 
ue velupuieii o by fciits ui'j.v"aLe geulOi* uUx-iug tuts FuUi'Ui ri.au oiiu Liitjrei'Oi'e i u 
i s not possible to confirm that the above named industr ies d id a c t u a l l y 
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benef i t from private investment. Nevertheless i t i s knomthat t o t a l 
private investment in manufacturing exceeded the projected l e v e l s i g n i f i -
c a n t l y ^ . Hence i t i s probable that these industr ies did a t t r a c t substant-
i a l investment from the private sec tor . 
At a more aggregate l e v e l , some information on private investment in 
various manufacturing industr ies i s avai lable which tends to support the 
above conclusion. This information i s presented in t a b l e 4-1 below which 
shows both the l e v e l and the share of pr ivate i n t o t a l investment for the 
duration of the Fourth plan. 
Table 4-1 Pr ivate Investment in Manufacturing during the Fourth 
Plan i n Mi l l i on R i a l s . 
Industry 
Food, Beverages & 
Tobacco 
T e x t i l e s , Clothing 
& Footwear 
Paper & Pringing 
Leather & Fur 
Rubb e r,Chemicals 
& Pharme'cuticals 
Non-Metallic Minerals 
Bas i c Metals & 
Metal Products 
Machinery & Transport 
Equipments 
Private Investment 
25,331 
23,822 
16,700 
7,100 
18,388 
15,000 
27,000 
23,000 
Share of Pr ivate 
in t o t a l i n v e s t -
ment. 
72 Percent 
77 
100 
100 
43 
100 
38 
60 
* includes carpets and handicraft industr ies 
• * includes e l e c t r i c a l and n o n - e l e c t r i c a l machinery. 
Source: Plan Organisation, F i f t h Nat ional Development P lan , 1973-1978 p,879. 
Ministry of Economy, I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s for 1972-1973, P-26 
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Another fac t that i s perhaps indicat ive of the dynamism of I r a n ' s 
private manufacturing sector i s the increas ingly wider s o c i a l base o f 
private i n d u s t r i a l i s t s . Yfaereas during the 1950's indiv iduals of 
"tradi t ional" backgrounds - former bazaar merchants or big landlords -
were dominant among I r a n ' s i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , by the end of the 1960's the 
s i tuat ion had changed appreciably. 
Ranking highly among I r a n ' s i n d u s t r i a l i s t s are western tra ined young 
Iran ians from the old wealthy fami l i e s who have diverted t h e i r fami l i e s ' 
fortunes to i n d u s t r i a l persuits"^1". I n many of the ex i s t ing fac tor i e s 
which were "previously directed by 'bazaar* mentality owner-managers" 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y has been "devolving to young men (often t h e i r sons) formally 
15 
educated i n i n d u s t r i a l management pr inc ip les" . 
Added to these are many other soc ia l groups who i n e a r l i e r times 
Y*ould not have shown much i n t e r e s t in i n d u s t r i a l investment. Among these 
are many success fu l profess ionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers) , r e t i r e d 
high-ranking c i v i l servants and former m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s using t h e i r 
adminstrative or technica l s k i l l s , as wel l as savings, in private ventures"^. 
Even more s i g n i f i c a n t i s the fac t that "a number of I r a n ' s success fu l entre-
preneurs have ar i sen from the lowly c i v i l servant familes ( o f f i c e boys, 
messenger or c l erks ) that never enjoyed the s ta tus , prest ige or the power 
of the I ran ian e l i t e " ^ . The emergence of a large and expanding middle 
and entrepreneria l c lass i s in many ways one of the most important devel -
opments i n the economy and society o f I r a n in the post-war y e a r s . 
Thi s upsurge in private manufacturing industry has taken place in an 
economy that has i t s e l f been growing very f a s t , l a r g e l y under the influence 
of government development and other expenditure financed by expanding o i l 
r e v e n u e s . ^ Between 1959 ana- 1972, f or which r e l a t i v e l y r e l i a b l e nat ional 
income data are a v a i l a b l e , -per capita Gross National Products (GNP) 
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increased at an average annual compound rate of growth of 7.7 percent 
19 
reaching 494 do l lars in 1972 . 
Manufacturing industry has thus enjoyed a fas t growing market for i t s 
products; i t has been a r e l a t i v e l y easy matter for private i n d u s t r i a l i s t s 
to take advantage of the investment opportunities that such a growing 
economy o f f e r s . I n addition to contributing to high l e v e l of demand, 
public investment has also helped to stimulate private investment i n 
manufacturing in a more d i r e c t way. For example, public investments i n 
roads, have given r i s e to large investment expenditure in automobile assembly, 
20 
tyre manufacturing and other car accessories • 
However, expanding markets and investment opportunities are the nec-
essary but not always a lso the s u f f i c i e n t condition for the actual mater ia l -
i sa t i on of the investment; they are "an inv i ta t ion rather than a determin-
21 
ant" of private investment • I t i s protection and other p o l i c i e s that 
secure the domestic market and increase the rewards from manufacturing 
r e l a t i v e to other types of investment that provide the ultimate stimulus 
for the private sector . I t i s in t h i s sense that the p o l i c i e s of import 
subst i tut ion that we considered in the l a s t chapter have been the main 
determinant of the rapid expansion of private manufacturing industry in 
-r 22 I r a n . 
The government has also influenced private manufacturing investment 
through i t s l i cenc ing po l i cy . Vfe have not been able to gather enough 
d e t a i l on th i s aspect of po l i cy . What information there i s f a i l s to 
convey a r e l i a b l e p icture of the o v e r a l l importance of investment l i c e n c -
ing as a part of the pol icy package. This i s the reason why l i cenc ing and 
other control mechanisms were not treated in the l a s t chapter which dealt 
25 
I n general , however, i t seems that the main aim of l i cenc ing p o l i c i e s 
10'7 
has been to encourage r e l a t i v e l y large scale production and i n pa r t i cu la r 
to prevent the emergence of a large number o f small plants a l l attempting 
to take advantage o f protection-induced high p r o f i t s . This i s important 
i n view o f the ' i m i t a t i v e ' character o f much o f the private investment that 
occurred i n the l a t e 1950's • The evidence that we have been able to 
piece together from several sources suggests tha t the government has been 
f a i r l y successful i n t h i s respect. This can be seen from table 4-2 below 
which l i s t s the number of plants producing or assembling a number o f 
manufactured products. The table also shows the t o t a l volume o f each 
commodity. I n the selection o f the products more weight has been given 
to those industr ies that were established i n the 1960*s. 
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Table 4-2 Number o f private sector fac tor ies producing selected 
manufactured products i n 1972. 
Product Number o f Factories Unit Volume o f t o t a l 
output 
Passenger vehicles 4 it 50,528 
Buses, trucks and vans 8 it 20,404 
Motor cycles 2 it 31,720 
Automobile tyres 2 tons 31A2& 
Batteries 4 uni t s 95,700 
Nylon f i b r e s 4 n.a . 
Washing pov;ders 5 tons 351 
Glass 2 tons 48,000 
Paper 1 000 tons 756 
VYall paper 2 tons 380 
Light bulbs 2 000 un i t s 11,000 
Television bulbs 3 n .a . 
Television 19 000 un i t s 170 
Radio,radiogramme s 
and gramaphones 6 000 un i t s 185 
Light steel products 2 n .a . 
Water heaters 10 uni t s 65,000 
Coolers 12 000 un i t s 175 
Refrigerators 22 000 un i t s 187 
Refractory br icks 2 n.a . 
Gas coolers 23 000 un i t s 223 
Space heaters 11 000 uni ts 563 
Sources: Min i s t ry of Economy, I ranian I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s f o r l j f o l 
op. c i t . , pp. 18-20; I n d u s t r i a l and Mining Development Bank 
o f I r a n , Thirteenth Annual Report o f the Board o f Directors 
to the General Assembly of Shareholders f o r the Year 1351, 
op. c i t . , pp.27-39; Behrouz, J . ( e d . ) , I ran Almanac and 
Book o f Facts, (Tehran, 1973) pp. 238-247. 
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Based on t h i s evidence alone we cannot say whether or not po ten t ia l 
.economies o f scale have been achieved i n those industr ies where such 
economies can be rea l ized . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t would appear that f o r 
certain consumer durables, such as t e l ev i s ion sets the number of producing 
uni t s may be too large. Nevertheless taking account of the r e l a t i v e l y 
large volume o f production as we l l as the prospects f o r the growth i n demand, 
i t may be reasonable to suggest that I r an has managed to escape the worst 
of the waste and inef f icenc ies a r i s ing out o f domestic "competition" i n 
protected indus t r ies . 
I n view of the strong monopolistic tendencies indicated by the above 
table i t i s in te res t ing to note t ha t , while most manufactured products were 
obviously more expensive than c . i . f . imports, the domestic price which the 
consumer faced changed very l i t t l e during the 1960*s. A study by Dragoslav 
Avramovic i n 1970 provided data that showed only a modest r i se i n the price 
o f a large number of manufactured goods between 1959 and 1968; while f o r 
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many other manufactured products prices ac tua l ly f e l l over the same per iod. 
As Avramovic suggests, the l i k e l y explanation f o r t h i s i s that p r i o r to 
domestic production, import merchants and d i s t r i bu to r s must have enjoyed 
very large p r o f i t margins, and that protect ion i n e f f e c t t ransferred these 
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p r o f i t s to domestic producers without having much impact on pr ices . 
What has been said so f a r indicates that the package o f pol ic ies 
adopted have been successful i n s t imulat ing and d i rec t ing the private 
manufacturing sector i n I r a n . I t i s , however, by no means suggested that 
these po l ic ies put an end to the e a r l i e r speculative practices or unprod-
uctive investments. Such practices continued i n force , l a rge ly i n the 
form of speculation i n urban land and real-estate . The re su l t ing i n f l a t i o n 
consideration, become an acute problem. Furthermore, e f f o r t s i n se t t ing 
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up a stock exchange i n Tehran as a means o f a t t r a c t i n g smaller savings 
in to industry have not r e a l l y been very successful and a number o f serious 
problems remain. A large number o f potent ia l investors "simply have not 
considered pieces o f paper representing company stock as an a t t r ac t ive 
repository of wealth and are unwi l l i ng to t rus t t h e i r savings i n minor i ty 
„27 snares" 
At a somewhat more fundamental l e v e l some observers of the Iranian 
economy have expressed the fear tha t , with the r e l a t ive abundance of o i l 
revenues, there may be l i t t l e incentive f o r productive enterprise. I t 
i s pointed out that i n the circumstances o f an o i l r i c h economy, where 
" i t i s found easier to make rather than earn money", there may be l i t t l e 
incentive to produce real output and "there may develop a tendency among 
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po ten t ia l entrepreneurs to become actual rent iers" . Hence the tempt-
at ion f o r a large number of talented,people, (as wel l as> other resources) 
to be diverted to an unduly large "service economy", .swelling the ranks of 
the government bureacracy and the trading-commercial community. 
While th±sr notion o f a ' r e n t i e r ' economy is . . in teres t ing and has 
important implications f o r the development o f o i l exporting countries, 
i t s impact i s obviously d i f f i c u l t to assess empir ica l ly f o r an ind iv idua l 
economy. I n par t icu la r f o r a country l i k e I ran which, unl ike many other 
o i l exporters, has a large population and a d i v e r s i f i e d economy, the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s would be even greater. I t should also be remembered that 
during the period that we are concerned wi th the magnitude of o i l revenues 
was not that great. I n 1972 I r an ' s per capita income from o i l was around 
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62 dol lars • Considering the period as a whole, I ran ' s per capita 
revenue from o i l averaged at only 49 dol lars per year between 1955 and 
, Q 7 o . 3 0 
On one aspect o f the ' rent ier* nature o f o i l exporting countries -
111 
the ro le o f the government bureaucracy - i t i s possible to be somewhat 
more s p e c i f i c . I t ean be argued that because o i l revenues d i r e c t l y accrue 
only to the government, i t i s i n a pos i t ion to o f f e r "the prospect o f 
h ighly paid jobs and prestigious posit ions and may thus a t t r a c t manage-
ment personnel and s k i l l e d labour away from private manufacturing industry 
where they are most needed"^. As a matter o f f ac t the government bureau^ 
cracy i n I ran - the M i n i s t r i e s , the Plan Organisation, the Central Bank and 
many other public agencies - pay remarkably high salar ies , by Iranian stand-
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ards, f o r t h e i r q u a l i f i e d manpower requirements. 
Although adequate data on the r e l a t i ve salary structures as between 
private industry and the bureaucracy do not ex i s t , what information there i s 
seems to confirm the expectation that private i n d u s t r i a l i s t s have had to 
pay comparable salaries f o r t h e i r q u a l i f i e d employees. Consequently i t 
does not appear that the pr ivate sector has ac tua l ly suffered from a short-
age o f q u a l i f i e d manpower, i n fac t i t has even been suggested that i t i s 
nov/ the government that faces recruitment problems so -far as high l e v e l 
manpower i s concerned: 
"The problem i n an economy doubling inside a decade i s that there 
are not enough men o f talent to go around. Moreover, the govern-
ment has to compete on unequal terms. For every young technocrat 
tha t jo ins government several now j o i n business...The Foreign 
M i n i s t r y ' s r e c ru i t i ng problems, once the easiest are now enormous. 
I n the economic minis t r ies and in the Prime Min i s t e r ' s Of f ice a 
host o f young people go when t h e i r bosses go, not out o f p o l i t i c a l 
pique, but because most of them, having done t h e i r s t i n t i n govern-
ment, now understandably covet the rewards of the pr ivate sector"33. 
However, even though the pr ivate sector has been able to compete 
wi th the bureaucracy i n a t t r ac t i ng q u a l i f i e d manpower, t h i s has been 
achieved at the cost of an unduly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d remuneration structure 
nn j-ViTm private ssctnr* C^in ?*c^;=.^:!r^Tl^"'.^ .^ ;^T, V'n.n T^ri^r;"^P..^ r*^:^. "hVi-Tf-. ~ ~ s 
consequence o f the high salary l e v e l f o r q u a l i f i e d manpower, "there i s a 
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tremendous gap wi th in any Iranian company between the wages o f the lowest 
34 
and the highest paid employees" • The same researcher has observed 
ra t ios of highest to lowest salary levels ranging between 7.5:1 and 17:1. 
He has also pointed out that these ra t ios probably underestimate the t rue 
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di f fe rence . 
I I - Direct Private Foreign Investment i n Manufacturing 
One of the most notable features of the growth of the I ranian 
manufacturing sector during the 1960's and ear ly 1970's i s the increas-
ing ly active pa r t i c ipa t ion of pr ivate foreign investors . For various 
reasons there was very l i t t l e fo re ign investment i n I ran outside the o i l 
industry before the 1950's^. Private foreign investment i n manufacturing 
industry was t o t a l l y non-existent. 
In 1955 the government passed the 'Law f o r the At t r ac t ion and Protec-
t ion o f Foreign Investment' (henceforth re fe r red to as the Lav/). 
Basically the Law of fe red fore ign pr ivate cap i t a l the same l ega l status 
as l oca l cap i t a l and enabled fore ign investors to enjoy the various incent-
ives and pr iv i leges - tax holidays, easy credi t and protect ion from imports-
that Iranian investors could enjoy. I n addit ions, the Law s t ipula ted 
that investors could repatr iate p r o f i t s as wel l as the o r i g i n a l cap i ta l 
out o f I r a n . F i n a l l y the law also provided f o r f u l l compensation to 
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fore ign investors i n the event of na t iona l i sa t ion . • 
I t i s in te res t ing that i n spite o f such l i b e r a l incentives and 
guarantees there was no immediate rush o f foreign investment in to I r a n . 
There was probably some apprehension on the part o f fore ign investors: 
the o i l industry had been nat ional ized only a few years before the passage 
ment even though the government had succeeded i n imposing a pro-western 
package of po l i c i e s . In addi t ion to p o l i t i c a l uncer ta in t ies , econom-
i c a l l y I ran d id not present very a t t r ac t ive opportunit ies f o r foreign 
investment e i ther , apart from the o i l indust ry . The country was very 
poor - although no adequate nat ional income data f o r the years before 
1359 exis t - per capita GNF was probably less than 125 dol lars i n the mid-
f i f t i e s . More than 75 percent o f the population l i v e d and worked i n small 
and isolated vi lages, while the programme f o r major investments i n i n f r a -
structure was at i t s very beginning. 
However a more important reason f o r the r e l a t i v e l y low l eve l of 
private foreign investment during the second h a l f o f the 1950's i s the 
fac t that i n that period I ran was s t i l l at an early stage of i t s import 
subs t i tu t ion . A l l manufacturing a c t i v i t y was concentrated i n the prod-
uct ion o f a small number of non-durable consumer goods and a few construct 
t i o n mater ials . None of these industr ies were new i n I ran - they were a l l 
f i r s t established i n the 1930's. Consequently I ranian private i n d u s t r i a l -
i s t s were f i r m l y established i n these l ines and had no incentive f o r seeking 
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foreign partners f o r t h e i r know-how or organisational a b i l i t y . What 
help they needed i n the early stages of the enterprise was of ten forthcoming 
from equipment s u p p l i e r s ^ . 
Government po l icy at the time i n fac t was a r e f l e c t i o n of th is 
s i t ua t i on ; i t was r e l a t i v e l y l i b e r a l wi th respect to foreign trade and 
much less pro tec t ion is t than i n the 1960*s and early 1970*s. As was 
noted i n the las t chapter the main stimulus to private investment i n 
manufacturing was a very l i b e r a l c red i t po l i cy rather than a high t a r i f f 
wa l l or other r e s t r i c t ions on imports. Therefore fore ign f i rms d id not 
face any major problems i n se l l ing i n the Iranian market and thus had 
— J •_ _ ^ - J '_ _ L v ~J — j." C—"li™— v ~ L « i ^ !Z.Zl>Z\l. C u ^ I uC>x i^uw Cou.ii. ul'jr • jjcuvtceii 
1956 and 1963 the t o t a l value o f private investment to the manufacturing 
41 sector was only &\1 m i l l i o n r i a l s • 
Since about 19&f however, there has been an upsurge in the i n f l o w 
o f private fore ign investment in to the Iranian economy, the bulk o f 
which has gone to the manufacturing sector. Between 1964- and 1972 
the t o t a l gross in f low o f private fore ign investment to I ran amounted 
to 12,771 m i l l i o n r i a l s . More than 80 percent o f th i s t o t a l was invested 
i n manufacturing i n d u s t r y ^ . 
The main reason f o r th i s upsurge i s to be sought i n government 
po l i cy , although other factors such as the underlying p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y 
2.3 
and r i s i n g o i l revenues were also important. As we have already seen, 
during the 1960's there was a much greater emphasis on i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n 
o f the country. This i n turn implied a r e l a t i v e l y greater emphasis on 
new industries producing durable consumer goods, chemical and pharmeceutical 
products and a number o f other industr ies producing intermediate or cap i ta l 
goods. But such industr ies were beyond the capab i l i ty o f I ranian investors 
and hence foreign help and technology had to be brought i n . 
TChile i t i s well-known that such help can be sought i n forms other 
than d i rec t private investment, there is reason to believe that the govern-
ment d id not evaluate the various costs and benef i ts o f a l ternat ives to 
1,1, 
d i rec t foreign investment such & s l i cencing and other agreements. 
I t seems that the government assumed that fore ign investment i s superior 
because d i rec t equity pa r t i c ipa t ion would give investors a stake i n running 
the industry e f f i c i e n t l y and p r o f i t a b l y . The only requirement was that 
fore ign investors should share t h e i r p r o f i t s , which because o f the protec-
t i o n awarded of ten amounted to monopoly p r o f i t s ' , w i t h l oca l in t e res t s . 
Hence the insistence on the j o i n t venture form of private fore ign invest-
ment. 
The role of the IMDBI i n a t t r a c t i n g fore ign investment in to the manu-
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f ac tu r ing sector has been very important and merits some consideration, 
When the IMDBI was f i r s t established i n 1959» 40 percent o f i t s share 
capi ta l was owned by a large number of American and European f i n a n c i a l 
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and manufacturing companies. These foreign shareholders had a ma jo r i ty 
vote i n the board o f di rectors of the IMDBI and appointed i t s chairman 
during the f i r s t f i v e years o f o p e r a t i o n ^ . As table 4-3 below shows 
foreign investors i n the IMDBI included some o f the largest f i n a n c i a l 
and manufacturing corporations i n Europe and America. The table also 
shows the amount invested by each of these: 
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Table 4-3 IMDBI'S Foreign shareholders (1959) ~ Amounts i n Dollars 
Name Amount Invested 
Lazard Freres & Co. 241,667 
Chase In te rna t iona l Investment Corporation 241,667 
In te rna t iona l Basic Corporation 150,000 
The F i r s t Boston Coisporation 100,000 
Lazard Brothers & Company L t d , 50,000 
Lloyds Bank L t d , 50,000 
Midlands Bank L t d . 50,000 
English E l e c t r i c Company L t d . 50,000 
Simon Carves L t d , 50,000 
Lazard Freres & Cie 125,000 
Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas 125,000 
Societe Financier de Transport et d'Enterprise 
Indus t r i e l l e s 200,000 
Sal Oppenheim J r . & Cie 125,000 
Deutsch Bank A.G-. 125,000 
Amsterdamsche Bank N.V. 100,000 
Netherlandsche Handel-Masstachappi, N.V. 50,000 
Hollandsche Bank-Unie N.V. 150,000 
Mediobanca 50,000 
Montacatina 50,000 
Fiat 50,000 
Total 2,133,354 
Source: U.S. Benedick, I n d u s t r i a l Finance i n I r a n , Harvard Universi ty 
Press (1964) p.251. 
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The important th ing that should be noted i n the above table i s 
that each par t ic ipant committed a very small sum (9 of them only invested 
50,000 do l la rs each) considering that they are a l l large companies. 
I t has been suggested that each investor committed small sums because they 
were not p r imar i ly interested i n d i rec t monetary rewards from t h e i r inves t -
ments. Rather, i t would seem that they were mainly interested i n " f e e l i n g 
the country o u t " ^ : committing meagre sums was probably regarded as "the 
cheapest way to obtain, on a continuing basis, information on investment 
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opportunit ies and possible l o c a l partners f o r t h e i r c l i en t s " . I n f a c t 
the IMDBI was founded w i t h future fore ign investment very much i n mind. 
From the beginning i t was agreed tha t i t should "have access to banking 
and investment i n s t i t u t i o n in the indus t r i a l i zed countries which could 
contribute valuable experience and use fu l contacts f o r a t t r a c t i ng foreign 
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investment and s k i l l s to Iranian indust ry" . 
The IMDBI h a s , subsequent to i t s foundation, played a very important 
part i n a t t r ac t i ng fore ign investment to I ran ' s manufacturing indus t r i es . 
Many of the industries that the IMDBI has helped to establish i n I ran have 
been new to the country and have involved complicated technologies and 
know-how. I n a l l such cases the IMDBI has helped to f i n d a suitable foreign 
investor and has brought them and l o c a l investors together. Between 1353 
and 1972 a quarter o f a l l IMDBI loans had been advanced to companies wi th 
substantial fore ign p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Considering the period from the middle 
o f the 1960's to 1972 the proportion o f j o i n t ventures i n the t o t a l number 
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of f i rms assisted by the IMDBI i s even greater. 
S imi l a r l y , many of the companies i n which the IMDBI i t s e l f holds equity 
investment also have foreign p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Over the 1959-1972 period 
h r l f 1 f i f t f cp ! r.r.r-.-r.r.Ti'. r r . -.-r. v : V i - ' - H - = T J T s T J T T n ^ o r . V . o £ p - l t l i c r c . 
Again the proportion o f j o i n t ventures i s greater i f only the period from 
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the middle o f the 1960's i s considered. I t appears that i n a number o f 
cases IMBDI's own investment i n j o i n t ventures has been necessary f o r the 
success of negotiat ion between foreign and domestic investors - foreigners 
have not been prepared to accept minor i ty shares unless the IMDBI also 
par t ic ipates i n the p ro j ec t . • "When IMDBI holds the voting balance o f a 
company, both fore ign and I ranian shareholders can hold minor i ty shares 
without f ee l ing that they have ceded control to each other. As IMDBI vets 
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the management too the system seems to work". 
IMDBI has been concerned wi th foreign investment involving ventures 
between fore ign and I ranian private investors . But there have also been 
a number of j o i n t ventures between foreign investors and the public sector. 
Towards the end o f the Third and during the Fourth Plan the government 
undertook d i rec t investment i n a number o f industr ies which i t believed the 
pr ivate sector was not interested i n developing and i n those which, because 
of s trategic considerations such as defence, should be i n public hands. 
These industr ies included i ron and s t ee l , machine.tools, t r ac to r s , petro-
chemicals and a number of others. Some o f these industr ies - such as 
i ron and steel - were to be developed wi th technical and f i n a n c i a l ass is t -
ance from the Soviet- Union and other Eastern European countries and there-
fore no private fore ign investment was involved. I n others, however, 
the government r e l i e d on j o i n t ventur-es between private foreign investors 
and public companies that i t would establish f o r the purpose. 
The National Petrochemical Company of I r a n , f o r example, has been 
involved i n a number of j o i n t ventures f o r the production o f various 
petrochemical products. S imi l a r ly the Min i s t ry o f Water and Power has 
set up j o i n t ventures with foreign investors f o r the manufacture o f water 
and e l ec t r i c meters, transformers and water pumps. The Min i s t ry o f Post, 
Telegraphs and Telephones has also been involved i n j o i n t ventures making 
119 
55 telephones, micro-wave and other telecommunication instruments. 
So f a r as the pattern of fore ign investment i n manufacturing - i t s 
d i s t r i b u t i o n i n d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s - i s concerned, i t has already been 
indicated that i n general industries that have been new and involved 
complex technologies have been the main bene f i c i a r i e s . This can be 
confirmed i n table 4-4 below which presents a breakdown o f foreign invest -
ment i n the manufacturing sector between the years 19&f and 1972. The 
f igures relate t o fore ign investments which have been registered wi th the 
Center f o r the A t t r ac t i on and Protection o f Foreign investment i n I r a n , 
I t has been suggested there may be some foreign investment which i s not 
registered wi th t h i s Center even though a l l foreign investors are l e g a l l y 
required to do so."^ However th i s cannot be o f a large magnitude since 
there i s no advantage i n not being registered wi th the Center. 
I n any case i t i s agreed that the f igures i n t a b l e ^ r e f l e c t the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n between d i f f e r e n t industr ies cor rec t ly , even though they may 
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underestimate the absolute magnitude o f such investment: 
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Table 4-4 Gross In f l ow o f Foreign Capital and loans to Iranian 
Manufacturing Industry Through the Center f o r the 
At t r ac t i on and Protection o f Foreign Investment; 
t o t a l f o r 1964-1972, m i l l i o n r i a l s . 
Industry Amount Invested 
o 
Rubber 1,275 
Pharmeceuticals & Chemicals 1,966 
Elec t r i ca l s 1,316 
M e t a l l u r g i c a l 1,275 
Building Materials 760 
Fetrochemicals 2,317 
Automobile Industry 785 
Food 319 
Motor O i l 263 
Glass & China Wear 318 
Tota l 10,857 
Source: Bank Marbazi I r a n , Annual Reports and Balance Sheet 
and 1972. 
I t can be seen that petrochemicals, chemicals, e l e c t r i c a l s , metal lur-
gicals and rubber have had the highest amount of fore ign investment. 
S i g n i f i c a n t l y there does not appear to have been any investment i n t e x t i l e s , 
while foods and bu i ld ing materials have a t t racted only small amounts. 
The reason f o r the r e l a t i v e l y low l e v e l o f fore ign investment i n automobile 
industry i s that the largest car f i r m i n Iran was established by loca l 
interests and assembles passenger vehicles under a l icensing agreement wi th 
a B r i t i s h Company. JO The f igu re i n the table refers to fore ign investment 
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i n a number o f much smaller vehicles assembly f i r m s . The largest among 
these - a j o i n t venture with a French car producer - assembled only 
7,500 un i t s i n 1972 compared to 42,000 un i t s assembled under l icence, by 
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the largest f i r m . 
Because o f the pa r t i cu la r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n used i t i s very d i f f i c u l t 
to compare the value o f foreign investment i n each industry wi th that o f 
t o t a l investment i n the same indust ry . I t has thus not been possible to 
provide de ta i led information on the quant i ta t ive importance o f fore ign 
pr ivate investment i n d i f f e r e n t indus t r ies . However, i t i s f a i r l y clear 
that fore ign pr ivate cap i ta l has not been an important source of investment 
finance f o r I r an ' s manufacturing indus t r ies . Taking the period 1964-1971 
and considering the manufacturing sector as a whole, fore ign investment 
amounts to no more t h a n 5 percent of t o t a l f i x e d investment .^ I t i s also 
doubtful that i n any single manufacturing industry foreign cap i t a l has been 
the dominant or even the major source o f investment.^"*" 
In spite o f th i s however j o i n t venture f i rms do seem to occupy an 
important posi t ion i n many of I r an ' s fas tes t growing indus t r ies . These 
f i rms control a large share of the market f o r chemicals, pharmeceuticals, 
petrochemicals and e l e c t r i c a l appliances and have a dominant pos i t ion i n 
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rubber and glass industr ies • There are also a number of i n d u s t r i a l 
products i n which j o i n t venture f i rms control the ent i re market. Thus i n 
the case o f such products as e l e c t r i c a l ba t t e r i e s , b a l l bearings, synthetic 
yarns, compressors, l i g h t bulbs and diesel engines "no purely domestic 
producers e x i s t " ^ . 
The importance o f foreign pr ivate investment i n I ranian industry i s 
enhanced by the fac t that foreign partners i n practice dominate j o i n t 
ventures i n which they invpst. evsn though in most r.f..^.9.r. •fr.-rr-^.^r: : r v s - t v " 3 
are allowed only minor i ty ownership. The dominance o f fore ign investors 
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i n j o i n t ventures arises from t h e i r superior posi t ion with regard to 
advanced technology and management. What research there has been 
suggests t h a t many, or perhaps the ma jo r i ty of j o i n t ventures are 
managed by expatriates and that fore ign partners excercise control i n 
matters o f f e a s i b i l i t y and technical studies, choice and design o f 
products, accounting, inventory con t ro l , personel and other organisational 
matters. 
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Chapter 5 
Some Problems o f Import Subst i tut ion i n I ran 
We noted i n chapter one that generally speaking the progress o f 
import subs t i tu t ion i n developing countries has faced a number o f obstacles 
and that as a resul t a sense o f disi l lusionment wi th th i s pa r t i cu la r path 
to economic development has set i n . To re i te ra te b r i e f l y , most economists 
have argued that the package of pol ic ies used to encourage i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n 
have involved an excessive and harmful disregard f o r comparative advantage, 
and that these po l ic ies have great ly overstated the social cost of labour 
and understated the social cost o f cap i ta l wi th the resul t that nei ther 
fac tor has been used economically. Thus import subs t i tu t ion has of ten 
favoured cap i t a l intensive process and industr ies which provide l i t t l e 
employment and i n most cases operate wel l below t h e i r capacity. 
The same disregard f o r comparative advantage has resulted i n the 
neglect of agr icul ture and exports o f a l l k inds . Low income i n agr icul ture 
and lack o f exports have meant that import subst i tute indus t r ies , confined 
to r e l a t i v e l y small urban markets, have been unable to take advantage o f 
scale economies and hence have remained high cost and i n e f f i c i e n t . A l l 
these problems have meant that prospects f o r the continued growth o f manu-
factur ing industr ies are not good. 
I n t h i s chapter we examine the experience of I ran wi th regard to 
t h i s sort of problem. I t i s obvious that to make any k ind o f d e f i n i t i v e 
statement or judgement on such fundamental issues as those l i s t e d above 
requires the k ind o f in-depth research which has been beyond the scope o f 
"bhi-s studv. Ths *3i-Qcu ss icn t?1?.^  v r i l l fol!Lov.r vri!!!] T'.f^T'fV^T'c.o. "H^ - T*n m^^y^^-n 
general terms, i t i s nevertheless hoped that i t w i l l present a balanced 
assessment o f I r an ' s experience over the period o f t h i s study. 
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The chapter i s divided in to two sections. I n section I the question 
of f ac to r i n t ens i ty i n the manufacturing sector w i l l be examined. I t 
w i l l be shown that government pol ic ies have favoured the use o f cap i ta l 
r e l a t ive to labour. Two implications o f th i s wi th in the l i m i t s permitted 
by the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f data, are then considered. These are: (a) employ-
ment i n manufacturing and (b) the posi t ion o f small scale establishments. 
I n section I I we consider the posi t ion o f the manufacturing sector 
i n the wider context o f the Iranian economy. I n p a r t i c u l a r , i t w i l l 
be shown that by 1972 the manufacturing sector was h ighly dependent on 
imports and r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e integrated wi th the rest o f the Iranian 
economy. This was p a r t i c u l a r l y true of the more recently established 
indus t r ies . The s i tua t ion was fu r the r aggravated by the h ighly unequal 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f income and the disappointing performance o f agr icula ture . 
I - E f f e c t of Government Pol icy on Factor I n t ens i t y i n Manufacturing 
and i t s Impl ica t ions . 
I n broad terms the main economic e f f ec t o f government po l icy has been 
to encourage the use o f cap i t a l in r e l a t i o n to labour. This i s t rue both 
o f government measures to encourage and protect the private sector and also 
of i t s own d i rec t investment i n manufacturing. 
For protection alone, the bias towards capi ta l i n t e n s i t y can be eas i ly 
demonstrated. Assuming that the ranking o f d i f f e r e n t industr ies according 
to e f f e c t i v e protection indicates the d i rec t ion o f the resource p u l l w i th in 
the manufacturing sector, we are i n a posi t ion to examine whether these 
resource;: pu l l s have been i n favour o f cap i ta l intensive indus t r i es . 
For t h i s purpose we also need to rank industr ies according to an order o f 
capi ta l i n t e n s i t y . I n the absence o f capi tal- labour ra t ios fo r various 
industries we have used Lary's method fo r ranking industr ies according to 
capi ta l i n t e n s i t y . This method involves ranking industr ies according to 
131 
non-wage value added per employee, on the assumption that the l a t t e r i s 
an index o f the return on physical capital.^" 
Table 5-1 below presents a ranking o f I ranian industr ies according to 
e f f e c t i v e protection and also non-wage value added per-employee i n 1965• 
Table 5-1 E f f e c t i v e Protection and non-wage value added per employee 
f o r I ranian Manufacturing Industry i n 1965. Ranks indicated 
i n brackets. 
Industry E f f e c t i v e Protection Non-wg,ge Value Added 
Per-employee * 
Food 0.224 (11) 83 (8) 
Beverages 1.146 ( 3) 97 (5) 
Tobacco 2.471 ( 2) 1,367 (1) 
Text i les 0.744 ( 6) 85 (7) 
Paper & Pr in t ing - 0.021 (12) 93 (6) 
Rubber 0.822 ( 5) 107 (4) 
Chemicals 1.110 ( 4) 171 (2) 
Non-metallic minerals 0.284 ( 9) ;-,122 (3) 
Basic metals 0.236 (10) 56 (10) 
Metal Products 0.608 ( 7) 73 (9) 
Machinery 0.505 ( 8) 39 (11) 
Transport Equipment 8.666 ( 1) 107 (4) 
* I n thousand r i a l s , 1965 current prices 
Source: Table 3-3 i n chapter 3 f o r e f f e c t i v e protect ion; Min i s t ry o f 
Economy, I ranian I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s f o r 1969-1970, table j . 
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The table shows a f a i r l y close association between the rankings. 
This i s confirmed by a posi t ive rank corre la t ion c o e f f i c i e n t o f 0.601. 
I n other words i n 1965 the structure o f protection was i n favour o f 
capi ta l intensive indus t r i es . Although i t has not been possible to 
provide more up-to-date data f o r e f f e c t i v e pro tec t ion , there i s reason 
to believe that f o r l a t e r years the association between protection and 
capi ta l i n t ens i t y was at least as strong - i f not stronger - as i t was 
i n 1965J t a r i f f levels on a number o f consumer goods were reduced i n the 
early 1970's: new cap i ta l intensive industr ies such as i ron and steel and 
machine tools were awarded protection as they started production. 
The structure o f protection apart, the other major incentive f o r 
manufacturing, long and medium term cred i t by the development banks, has 
had a s imi lar e f f e c t . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true o f the IMDBI. An analysis 
of the relevant data contained i n the annual reports o f the IMDBI shows that 
through the 19601s the composition o f f i n a n c i a l assistance by the Bank has 
s h i f t e d away from food processing, t e x t i l e and other l i g h t industr ies to 
such industr ies as paper and p r i n t i n g , special s t ee l , engineering and 
sheet glass. 
Both these sets o f po l i cy incentives as wel l as the government's own 
investment during the 1960's have brought about a major s h i f t i n the 
structure o f manufacturing industry . This can be seen i n table 5-2 which 
shows value added i n i nd iv idua l industry groups as a percentage o f value 
added by the whole sector i n two years - 1962 and 1972 (value added data 
f o r ind iv idua l industr ies before 1962 are not ava i l ab l e ) . There i s no 
reason to believe that the two years selected are unrepresentative; the 
trend indicated i s reasonably accurate. There was an economic recession 
depressed, however i t i s u n l i k e l y that the r e l a t ive pos i t ion o f each industry 
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was changed to an extent that would e f f e c t our analysis: 
Table 5-2: Changing structure o f value added i n urban manufacturing 
(Value added by each industry group as a percentage o f a l l 
manufacturing). 
Industry 1962 1972 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco 36.3 23.4 
Text i les 24.5 12.8 
Clothing 3.3 9.8 
Furniture 2.3 1.6 
Paper and Pr in t ing 1.3 2.6 
Leather 1.5 0.4 
Rubber 0.8 2.1 
Chemicals 4.1 8.2 
Non-metallic minerals 8.2 10.1 
Basic metals 0.3 6.4 
Metal products 7.3 6.0 
Machinery 0.9 6.0 
Transport equipments 7.9 9.2 
Note: Columns do not add up to 100 due to exclusion o f 'o ther 
indus t r ies ' & rounding. 
Source: Min i s t ry o f Economy, Iranian I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s f o r 1970-1971 
op. c i t . p . l 
Min i s t ry o f Economy, I ranian I n d u s t r i a l S t a t i s t i c s f o r 1972-1973 
op. c i t i p . 4 1 . 
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The table shows a rather dramatic decline i n the share o f foods, 
t e x t i l e s , f u r n i t u r e and leather. On the other hand, the shares o f 
chemicals, rubber, basic metals, transport equipments as w e l l as paper 
and p r i n t i n g have risen s i g n i f i c a n t l y over the per iod. I n other words 
the structure o f I ranian industry has s h i f t e d away from those industr ies 
which, broadly speaking, are labour intensive to those that are cap i t a l 
in tens ive . 
We have so f a r been concerned with the e f f e c t of government po l i cy 
on f ac to r i n t ens i t y through changes i n the overa l l structure o f the manu-
facture sector. In addi t ion however i t i s almost certain t h a t the system 
of incentives has influenced the choice o f techniques, at the ind iv idua l 
2 
industry l e v e l , i n favour o f a more cap i ta l intensive technology. I t 
i s o f course d i f f i c u l t to establish a l i n k between po l icy and choice o f 
techniques empir ica l ly since we do not have enough information o f a s u f f i -
c i en t l y disaggregated or 'micro ' nature f o r t h i s purpose. Nevertheless, 
given that a major e f f e c t o f the po l i cy framework, be i t i n the form o f 
duty-free imports o f cap i t a l equipment, low-interes t long term cred i t or 
a generous depreciation tax allowance, i s to lower the cost of c a p i t a l , 
i t i s reasonable to suggest that the policy.framework has had a s i g n i f i -
cant impact on the choice of techniques. 
I n any case; i t i s possible to observe a strong tendency towards a 
capi ta l intensive technology i n almost a l l industr ies over the period. 
This i s most obvious when we consider the replacement of t r a d i t i o n a l 
handicraf t producers wi th modern and fac tory based establishments. A 
study i n 1970 concluded that over the 1956-1966 decade "fac tory production 
(had) p r a c t i c a l l y eliminated t r a d i t i o n a l producers o f soap, candles, pot tery , 
wooden combs, locks , scissors, m i l l e d f l o u r and r ice and reduced grea t ly 
that o f a r t i san , producers o f shoes, hand-loom t e x t i l e s , leathers and 
many other goods''^. I t i s very l i k e l y that t h i s process has continued 
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4 over the rest o f the period. 
I n the already ex is t ing f ac to ry indust r ies , too, there has occurred 
widespread modernisation and replacement o f o ld equipment. During the 
second plan f o r example the government's investment i n industry i n f a c t 
l a rge ly consisted o f modernisation of a number o f large factor ies produc-
ing cotton t e x t i l e s , sugar and cement. Considering the reasons f o r the 
observed improvement i n p roduc t iv i ty i n Iranian manufacturing as a whole, 
one researcher has pointed out that the gain i n output per worker was "to 
a great ex ten t . . . . t he resul t o f the i n s t a l l a t i o n o f much greater (and 
more automatic) machinery" and not to any improvement a t t r ibu tab le to the 
5 
workforce i t s e l f . 
The cotton t e x t i l e industry which by 1972 was s t i l l I r an ' s most 
important fac tory industry provides a good example of the tendency towards 
a more cap i ta l intensive technology. Between 1956 and 1964 average per 
worker output o f c lo th increased at a rate of 12 percent per year. This 
can be seen i n table 5-3 below which shows some character is t ics of the 
cotton-synthetic t e x t i l e industry between 1956-1964. 
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Table 5-3: Some Characterist ics o f the Cotton-Synthetic Tex t i l e 
Industry 1956-1964 
1956 1964 % rate o f change 
No. o f fac tor ies 32 
No. o f spinning 
spindles 277,040 
No. o f weaving 
looms 4,797 
No. o f employees 19,697 
Production o f 
cloth (1,000 metres* 61,892 
Average production 
o f c lo th per 
employee (1,000 
metres)• 3,142 
44 
622,462 
14,275 
40,356 
330,594 
8,192 
+ 38 
+ 125 
+ 198 
+ 105 
+ 434 
161 
Source: Wil l iam H. Bartsch, 'The I n d u s t r i a l Labour Force o f I r an : 
Problems of Recruitment, Training and P r o d u c t i v i t y ' , 
The Middle East Journal, Winter 1971, p.25 
Not only was there an increase i n the amount o f equipment, but there 
was also a considerable replacement o f o l d equipment wi th f u l l y automatic 
spindles and looms which the above f igures cannot show.^ I n one modernis 
government fac to ry f o r example the i n s t a l l e d equipments were described as 
amongst "the most advanced and up-to-date" found any where i n the world .^ 
Having considered the s h i f t towards more cap i t a l intensive industr ies 
as wel l as the more cap i t a l intensive nature o f the technology i n various 
indus t r ies , we now examine the implications of these i n two related areas: 
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(a) - employment i n manufacturing; and (b) - the posi t ion o f small scale 
manufacturing establishments. 
(a) - Employment i n Manufacturing 
Before dealing wi th employment i n manufacturing s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t i s 
necessary t o describe b r i e f l y the major features o f the general employment 
conditions i n the country over the period. 
The most important feature was the much fas te r growth of population 
and labour force i n urban centers compared wi th the rest o f the country. 
Census data indicate that between 1956 and 1966 the average annual growth 
rate o f population i n towns and c i t i e s (defined as centers wi th 5,000 or 
more inhabitants) was 4«52 percent, while that o f the v i l l ages was only 
9 
1.92. These f igures indicate substantial net rural-urban migrat ion. 
One estimate i s that more than 70 percent o f the growth o f urban labour 
force over the 1956-1966 decade was comprised of migrants from v i l l a g e s . 
As may be expected, the larger c i t i e s have been the main rec ip ien t of r u r a l 
migrants. Tehran and suburbs, f o r example, received about 50 percent o f 
t o t a l migrants between 1956 and 1966."^ " 
Between I966 and 1972 the above trend continued. In f ac t there i s 
some evidence suggesting that the pace of rural-urban migration must have 
accelerated. For example while between 1956 and 1966 ag r i cu l t u r a l . employ-
ment increased about 1 percent annually, there are indicat ions of complete 
12 
stagnation between 1966 and 1972. Another piece o f evidence i s the 
decline i n the hourly wage rates f o r unsk i l l ed construction labourers 
between I969 and 1971> which i s probably due to a fas te r i n f l u x of r u r a l 
migrants seeking employment i n the construction industry."^ 
A va r i e ty o f fac tors - both 'push' and ' p u l l * - help to explain the 
above phenomenon. But, while the growth o f industries and superior urban 
amenities are an important f a c to r , the available evidence suggest that on 
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the whole the 'push' fac tors have been the more important reason f o r 
14 
r u r a l migrat ion. 
Among the various 'push' fac tors one can mention a series of bad harv-
ests as wel l as increasing mechanisation of agr icu l ture during the 1960's. 
The Plan Organisation has estimated that during the Third Plan alone 
340,000 a g r i c u l t u r a l workers were made redundant by the in t roduct ion o f 
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t rac tors and other farm machinery. This process probably accelerated 
during the Fourth Plan due to the e.mphasis on 'agro-industry* and large 
' f a rm corporations' as areas fo r investment .^ 
But probably the single most importa n t 'push' f ac to r has been the 
displacing e f f ec t s o f the land reform programme i n s t i t u t e d i n 1962. 
The reform e n t i t l e d only a r e l a t i v e l y small segment o f the r u r a l population 
to the ownership of d i s t r ibu ted l a n d s . ^ The reform law s p e c i f i c a l l y 
excluded the so-called Khusneshin population. The Khusneshins however, 
the vast ma jo r i ty o f whom are landless labourers, comprised up to 50 percent 
of the ru ra l population. A f t e r the reform employment opportunit ies f o r 
the Khusneshins were d r a s t i c a l l y reduced, mainly due to the small size o f 
peasant holdings. I t has been estimated that 70 percent o f peasants 
receiving land obtained less than f i v e hectars, although seven hectars i s 
considered "the minimum amount o f land a peasant fami ly must farm i n order 
18 
to maintain an adequate l i v i n g standard". As a resu l t not only were 
most peasants unable to employ landless labourers but i n f a c t competed wi th 
them f o r addi t ional work. The majo r i ty of Khusneshins were also unable 
to f i n d employment on the larger farms due to the already mentioned mech-
anisation on these farms. As one author has pointed out, i n the aftermath 
o f the land reform something l i k e "one m i l l i o n households of Khusneshins... . 
19 
I n such circumstances, the burden o f employment creation to a very large 
1 3 9 
extent f a l l s on the manufacturing sector. 'The importance o f manufacturing 
i n t h i s respect comes into sharper focus when we consider that many of 
Iran's service industries were probably already over staffed. This i s 
20 
largely true of commerce and probably also of government services. 
I n f a c t , as we have already noted (see chapter two) the increase i n 
employment i n manufacturing industries over the period has been quite rapid. 
Eetween 1956 aiid 1966 the increase i n manufacturing employment was greater 
than the increase i n employment i n a l l the d i f f e r e n t service a c t i v i t i e s 
21 
combined. More than twice as many jobs were created i n manufacturing 
22 
than i n construction, water and power combined. 
Between 1966 and 1972, too, the pace of employment creation i n manu-
facturing was r a p i d , both absolutely and also i n r e l a t i o n t o other sectors. 
Thus almost as many jobs were created i n manufacturing as i n the whole of 
the service sector, while the increase i n manufacturing employment was more 
?3 
than twice as many as i n construction, water and power combined. 
Altogether, between 1956 and 1972, well over a m i l l i o n new jobs were created 
2L. 
i n the manufacturing sector. 
This rapid growth rate notwithstanding, the question s t i l l remains as 
to whether the increase i n manufacturing employment was s u f f i c i e n t to prevent 
urban "unemployment" from becoming a serious problem i n I r a n . We are not 
i n a position to provide anything l i k e a d e f i n i t e answer to t h i s question. 
However, based on the observations of a number of authors as well as some 
research work, i t seems that by the end of 1972 the problems of "unemploy-
ment" among unskilled workers existed and that on the whole (and especially 
i n the larger c i t i e s ) i t was serious. One author, on the basis o f f i e l d 
research ( i n 1971-1972) among r u r a l migrants points out that: 
"A majority of former a g r i c u l t u r a l - workers not only f a i l to f i n d 
adequate employment in Tehran, but they often l i v e i n worse condi-
tions than those prevailing i n the v i l l a g e s . Thousands of r u r a l 
migrants are crowded i n t o squatter settlements i n the southern and 
eastern sections of the c i t y . Living quarters frequently consist 
1^0 
of small one-roem mud huts v/hich may be shared by more than 
one family. Sanitary conditions are far below even the most 
minimal standards•...Khusneshin labourers encounter similar 
problems i n Isfahan, Mashed, Tabriz, and smaller c i t i e s , 
although perhaps on a smaller scale".^ 
Earlier work by William Bartsch, concerned with the employment s i t u -
ation i n the 1956-1966 decade, too, pointed to the existence of "unemploy-
ment" and various degrees of "under-employment"/"disguised unemployment" 
in the urban areas. 
Apart from the probable inadequacy of the number o f jobs available 
i n manufacturing, the qualit y o f the employment created also deserves 
comment since t h i s w i l l enable us to gain some insight i n t o the effects, 
of government policy. 
From the available data i s i s easily apparent that the largest 
addition to manufacturing employment over the 1956-1972 period was provided 
by small units i n r u r a l and urban areas. Over t h i s period, small u n i t s , 
defined as employing less than ten workers, created nearly four times as 
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many jobs as large u n i t s , defined as employing ten or more workers. 
Moreover, within the small sub-sector, most jobs were created by what might 
be described as 'cottage* or 'household' industries where the self-employed, 
part-time, or seasonal labour dominated. For example , i t has been 
estimated that between 1956 and 1966 more than twice as many jobs were 
created i n carpet-weaving than i n ^he whole of the large scale urban 
manufacturing. ^ 
?/"e are not seeking to emphasise the low productivity or perhaps the 
'backward' nature of employment in such occupations, rather we wish to 
point out that modem and large scale industries which have had a l l the 
incentives and privileges and nearly a l l the attention of the planners and 
creation. For example, between I969 and 1971 large manufacturing establish-
ments absorbed an average o f 82 percent of a l l the funds invested i n urban 
manufacturing, during the same period only an average of 33 percent o f the 
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28 ubran manufacturing labour force were working i n large establishments. 
(b) - The Position of Small Scale Manufacturing 
As has already been mentioned the main recipient of government 
incentives have been the large scale and modern manufacturing u n i t s . This 
i s most clear when we consider the allocation of long or medium term c r e d i t . 
The IMDBI which i s the most important source of such funds refuses a l l 
applications f o r less than f i v e m i l l i o n r i a l s . This i n effect deprives 
the vast majority of the smaller businesses. The ICB was o r i g i n a l l y 
supposed to f i l l the gap and provide long or medium term credit f o r small 
firms. I n practice however, as we have seen, the ICB to a very large 
extent acts as an a n c i l l a r y to the IMDBI, providing working capital loans 
for those firms already assisted or d i r e c t l y set up by the IMDBI. The 
commercial banks, which have had a very rapid growth over the period, have 
not assisted the smaller businesses very much either. In fact t h e i r main 
area of interest continued to be domestic and import trade. I t appears 
however that towards the end of the period under study the commercial banks 
began to take an interest i n i n d u s t r i a l finance. But small i n d u s t r i a l 
businesses s t i l l f a c e many problems i n obtaining loans f o r anything more 
than one year. The main d i f f i c u l t y i s t h e i r lack of a b i l i t y to provide 
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s u f f i c i e n t c o l l a t e r a l covering the loan. Generally speaking, personal 
savings as well as loans from close friends and relatives have continued 
to be by f a r the most important and frequent source of finance f o r small 
manufacturing businesses.^ 
So f a r as protective policies are concerned, i t i s almost certain 
t h a t , again, the main beneficiaries have been the larger firms. This i s 
so because, p a r t l y due to t h e i r f i n a n c i a l weakness and p a r t l y because of 
the kind of market that they cater f o r , smaller businesses handle a much 
smaller amount of tradable inputs. This i s true both so f a r as t h e i r use 
Ik2 
of imported capital equipment is.concerned and, more importantly, t h e i r 
use of imported intermediate inputs such as spare parts and components.^" 
In short therefore, the policy framework has descriminated against 
small manufacturing u n i t s . The wisdom of t h i s policy may be questioned 
on two related grounds, the f i r s t c r i t i c i s m concerns the important, indeed 
predominant role of small units i n employment creation, which we have already 
b r i e f l y considered. 
The second c r i t i c i s m i s , i n a sense, more important. There i s 
s u f f i c i e n t evidence, that contrary to what might at f i r s t be imagined the 
small scale sector i s not dominated by handicraft and other t r & d i t i o n a l 
a c t i v i t i e s , although these provide most of the jobs. In terms of output 
and value added however, small units involved i n a c t i v i t i e s defined as 
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•intermediate* and 'modem' are predominant. This has been shown by 
an analysis of the structure of small urban manufacturing i n 1968. The 
results of the analysis are reproduced i n table 5-4 below: 
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Table 5-4: Gross Value Added (GVA) i n Major Small Scale Manufacuring 
A c t i v i t i e s : Level, Structure and Rank, 
A c t i v i t i e s GVA i n Percent o f Fercent of Rank i n 
M i l l i o n Rials Group Total Total 
T r a d i t i o n a l * 
Carpets 1,469 
Spinning 1,169 
Metal Works 1,137 
Other Traditional 419 
A l l Traditional 4 ,194 
3 5 . 1 6.28 3 
27.9 4 .99 6 
27.I 4.85 8 
9.9 (1 .78) 
100.0 17.90 
Intermediate* 
Bread 5 ,211 
Clothing 865 
Sug ar 678 
Footwear 605 
Bricks, Tiles etc. 506 
Veg. O i l and Others 358 
Cereals, M i l l i n g 303 
Others 1,459 
A l l Intermediate 9,985 
52.5 22.47 1 
8.7 3.72 10 
6.8 2.98 11 
6 . 1 2 .61 12 
5 . 1 2.18 14 
3.6 1.54 15 
3 . 1 1.33 17 
14.1 (6 .04) 
100.0 42.80 
Modern* 
Kn i t t i n g M i l l s 1,842 
Metal Products 1,348 
Repair Motor Vehicles 1,186 
Wood Works 1,115 
Cement, Concrete Pro. 901 
S p i r i t s 540 
Furniture 349 
Repair Motorcycles 286 
Others 1,092 
A l l Modern 8,659 
21.6 8.01 2 
15.7 5.82 4 
13.8 5.12 5 
13.1 4.86 7 
10.5 3.89 9 
6.3 2.34 13 
4.1 1 .52 16 
3.3 1.22 18 
11.6 (4 .32) 
100.0 37.10 
* See the source f o r the pa r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n of ' t r a d i t i o n a l * , 
'intermediate' and'modern' a c t i v i t i e s used. 
Source: Robert Mabro, 'Industry', Employment and Income Policies for I r a n , 
Mission Working Paper No. V., p.21 (unpublished Memeograph) . 
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The table reveals some interesting features of small manufacturing 
i n Iran. F i r s t of a l l , there i s a sig n i f i c a n t degree of d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . 
Thus apart from the production of bread, no other a c t i v i t y accounts f o r 
as much as 9 percent of the t o t a l of gross value added. As can be seen, 
small scale manufacturing provides a very wide range of products including 
a large number of mass consumption goods. Secondly, 'modern' a c t i v i t i e s 
are in turn more d i v e r s i f i e d than the other two categories. Furthermore 
a number of 'modern1 a c t i v i t i e s rank highly i n the table. The high ranks 
of k n i t t i n g m i l l s , metal products and motor vehicle repair i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t , since, broadly speaking these types of a c t i v i t i e s can act 
"as a nursery for the t r a i n i n g of mechanics and craftsmen" and help i n 
"increasing the f a m i l i a r i t y of semi-modern technology, i n creating an 
environment where the t o o l s , the mode of thinking and products of an indust-
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r i a l society slowly penetrate". 
In t h i s context, the c r i t i c i s m o f government policy i s that the 
structure of incentives have not helped i n the realisation of the potent-
i a l i t i e s of the small sector. No doubt the small sector has to some extent 
benefited i n d i r e c t l y from government action and policy. For example the 
strong government protection of the automobile industry has i n turn helped 
the large number of car repair workshops. More generally, small businesses 
have benefited from the generally high level of demand which i s again largely 
a consequence of substantial public expenditure, although small firms have 
had only a negligible share of the contracts handed out by the government. 
Ind i r e c t 'spin offs* o f government policy notwithstanding, the above 
c r i t i c i s m s t i l l holds. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , the structure of incentives 
have not encouraged the formation of organic l i n k s between large and small 
^T^C. rpv,n,- n ^ , i ^ i~«-r« 1 .v, - : l r . - , - f * ^ m.->-P.-.-.-. .-•-r>r> — 
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advanced technology to a l l sectors of Iranian manufacturing. Instead 
the system of incentives has strongly favoured v e r t i c a l integration. 
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I n fact i t i s possible to observe a steady process of v e r t i c a l integration 
35 
among the larger firms a l l through the 1960's. By 1972 the Ministry 
of Economy vfas pointing to v e r t i c a l integration as a major characteristic 
of the evolution of the larger firms i n I r a n . ^ 
I I - I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and Economic Development i n I r a n . 
In the present chapter we have so f a r been concerned with the 
effects of government policy on developments i n the manufacturing sector 
i t s e l f . The remainder attempts to deal with somewhat broader issues that 
are nevertheless related to developments within the manufacturing sector. 
Sp e c i f i c a l l y , we deal w i t h two broad issues that seem relevant f o r the 
subsequent development of the manufacturing sector and the economy as a 
whole. The f i r s t issue concerns the place of manufacturing i n the national 
economy i n terms of i t s l i n k s with the other economic sectors. The 
second, and closely related issue, concerns the r e l a t i v e performances of 
the a g r i c u l t u r a l and manufacturing sectors. This i s very important since 
by 1972 agriculture and related a c t i v i t i e s s t i l l provided employment f o r 
40 percent of the labour force and a l i v e l i h o o d f o r over 60 percent of the 
t o t a l population of the country. 
(a) - The Place of Manufacturing i n the National Economy 
By 1972 manufacturing a c t i v i t i e s were responsible f o r generating 
nearly 16.5 percent of GNP i n I r a n . ^ I n 1959> the ea r l i e s t year f o r 
which r e l i a b l e national income data are available, manufacturing value 
added accounted f o r 9 percent of GNP. Thus, over the 1955-1972 period, 
the share of manufacturing in the GNP must have nearly doubled. Over 
roughly the same period ', the percentage share of rienufacturinervplovment 
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i n t o t a l labour force increased from about 13»4 to nearly 1 9 . 8 . 
Over t h i s period manufacturing has been the fastest growing non-oil 
sector. I n terms of i t s contribution to overall development, the 
rapid growth of manufacturing has undoubtedly had some positive impact 
t o the extent that i t has stimulated the growth of such a c t i v i t i e s as 
construction, transport and a number of other services. More generally, 
i t i s probably also reasonable to suggest that the expansion of manufact-
uring has produced certain external economies; i t has f a c i l i t a t e d the 
gradual t r a i n i n g of s k i l l e d labour and management, influenced the rate 
of urbanisation and brough about 'a slow transformation of a t r a d i t i o n a l 
milieu i n t o a technically orientated environment 1.^ 
But i n spite of th i s manufacturing a c t i v i t i e s were s t i l l rather 
isolated from the rest of the economy. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true o f 
the more recently established industries. The older industries such 
as t e x t i l e s ^ d the smaller business generally were r e l a t i v e l y more 
integrated i n t o the domestic economy. In f a c t , as was b r i e f l y noted i n 
chapter 2 , most of the newly established manufacturing industries t o a 
large extent were engaged i n assembly operations using imported parts and 
components. Table 5-5 below shows the share of imported inputs i n the 
s ales value fo r a number of commodities i n 1969. There i s no reason to 
believe that between I969 and 1972 the situation changed a great deal. A 
number of projects f o r the domestic production of imported inputs were 
undertaken i n the late 1960's and early 1970's and by 1972 most of these 
were s t i l l either under construction or had just come on stream. Subse-
quent to 1972 an increasing number of these projects have started operation 
with various degrees of success. However no detailed information i n t h i s 
regard i s yet available. 
As they are, the figures i n table 5-5 c l e a r l y indicate that Iranian 
a c t i v i t i e s based on imported material. The former category include some 
14? 
Table 5—5s Iranian Industry: Import Dependence {136$) 
Light Consumer Goods 
Sugar 
Meat Packing 
Cotton Textiles 
Footwear 
Canned F r u i t and Vegetable 
Woollen Textiles 
Vegetable Gils 
Pharmaceuticals 
Share of Imported inputs 
i n Sales Value3-
2 
10 
10-20 
10-20 
40 
50 
60 
Percent 
Durable Consumer Goods 
E l e c t r i c a l fans 
Radios 
Space heaters 
Refrigerators 
A i r Coolers 
TV Sets 
26 
37-50 
4-0 
40 (understated) 
60 
60 
Transport Equipments 
Diesel Engines 
Trucks 
Buses 
Passenger Cars 
Tyres 
Intermediate Products 
DDB (Dodecil Benzane)* 
PVCb 
Caustic Soda 
Glass (Sheet) 
Paper 
Paints 
Synthetic Fibres 
Rolled Steel 
33-43 
4-8 
n.a. (Probably as Tracks) 
50 
50 
10 
10 
10 
10 
25 
4-5 
n.a. 
60 
(above 50?) 
Capital Goods 
Cement 
Carbon Steel 
Telephones 
Electric Meters 
Telephone Exchanges 
Steel V/ires 
Pumps 
Transformers 
H e c t r i c Switchgear 
20 
20 
20 
20 
20 
30 
40 
45 
80 " 
a) Imported components include material, semi-finished products and spare 
parts. Both direct and indirect imports are included, (the in d i r e c t 
content being defined as imported materials bought on the home market 
rather than d i r e c t l y imported by the user) 
(b) Project under construction; planned values. 
Source: Dragoslav Avramov, 'In d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n o f Iran: The Records, The 
problems and the Prospects 1, Tahqiqate-e-Eqtesadi. Spring 1970,ppl9-20. 
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of Irants older industries such as t e x t i l e s , food processing and construc-
t i o n materials. This category also includes more recently established 
industries producing intermediate chemical and petrochemical products. 
I t should however be remembered that the figures i n table 5-5 pertaining 
to t h i s l a t t e r group of products are mostly project estimates r e f e r r i n g to 
the planned rather than the actual r a t i o of imported inputs i n t o t a l sales 
value. We have no information on the subsequent performance of the 
projects i n question. 
The import intensive category includes nearly a l l the more recently 
established import-substitute a c t i v i t i e s . These include a l l those indust-
ries producing domestic appliances, automobiles and other transport equip-
ments, steel products and capital goods that are material intensive. 
The high import dependency of the fastest growing sections of manufact-
uring i n turn implies that i t s linkages with the rest of the economy i n 
terms of inter-sectoral purchases i s rather l i m i t e d . A study by the 
International Labour Organisation which developed a Social Accounting 
Matrix f o r 1972, showed that s i x industry groups which between them nearly 
exhaust the l i s t of Iran's newly established manufacturing a c t i v i t i e s -
transport equipments, chemicals, basic metals,metal products, machinery 
and non-metallic minerals - purchased only 4 percent of the t o t a l domestic-
a l l y produced intermediate goods/1" The same group of industries provided 
only 4 . 6 percent of t o t a l sales of domestically produced intermediate goods 
to other sectors. These facts clearly indicate that the establishment of 
new a c t i v i t i e s had not yet transformed manufacturing in t o a 'leading' sector 
in the sense of i t p u l l i n g the rest of the economy by imparting an impetus 
and widespread linkages. 
(b) - Manufacturing, Agriculture and Economic Development 
So f a r as the above situation i s concerned, Iranian agriculture provides 
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a case i n point. Newly established a c t i v i t i e s have v i r t u a l l y no 
contact with agriculture, and live-stock sectors. The older industries 
producing l i g h t consumer goods such as cotton t e x t i l e s and a number of 
processed foods obtain the bulk of t h e i r raw materials from agriculture 
and live-stock sectors. But with the development of manufacturing and 
the growth of new import-dependent a c t i v i t i e s , the importance of agric-
u l t u r a l inputs i n manufacturing a c t i v i t i e s as a whole has declined. 
3y 1972, a l l manufacturing a c t i v i t i e s were purchasing only about 
16 percent of t h e i r intermediate requirements from the a g r i c u l t u r a l and 
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live-stock sectors. I n the same year, agriculture and live-stock bought 
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about 13 percent of t h e i r intermediate requirements from manufacturing. 
Thus, i t appears that manufacturing's forward linkage with agriculture i s even 
weaker than i t s backward linkage£ agriculture i s not a si g n i f i c a n t market 
f o r the products of manufacturing. 
These facts lend further support to e a r l i e r statements regarding the 
iso l a t i o n o f the manufacturing sector from the rest of the economy. At 
the same time these facts point to the rather primitive state of Iranian 
agriculture. Thus not only does agriculture use small amounts of domest-
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i c a l l y manufactured inputs, but i t s imports of such items are also small. 
This i s i n sharp contrast with manufacturing which i n 1972 absorbed about 
75 percent of a l l intermediate imports. 
Considering the period as a whole, the performance of agriculture and 
live-stock has been very disappointing. Available data show that over 
the 1959-1971 period value added by agriculture and live-stock gre?/ at 
an average compound rate of 3.2 percent i n real terms.^ Over the same 
time period, Iran's population grew at an average annual rate of 2.9 per-
„,.v.-i- T.T-,^ . - .. „ 1-.. ...... t i u : 1-- - J . • •; 
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to keep up with the growth i n population. But i n the context of the 
Iranian economy, where per capita income has been r i s i n g very rapidly and 
1 5 0 
where the population's propensity t o consume food i s quite high, t h i s i s 
not a very satisfactory performance. I n fact i n the l a t e 1960's and 
early 1970's the government resorted to increasing food imports to meet 
domestic demand and dampen down i n f l a t i o n . This, i n turn had been due 
t o the fact that f o r a s i g n i f i c a n t number of food items, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
live-stock products such as red meat, imports have not been an adequate 
substitute f o r the domestic product and have encountered consumer r e s i s t -
50 
ance. 
Considering the reasons f o r the sluggish performance of agriculture, 
i t should , from the outset be realized that rapid growth and development of 
agriculture i n Iranian conditions i s a very d i f f i c u l t task. The greater 
part of the country escapes being a desert very narrowly indeed. Outside 
the Caspian l i t t o r a l , water shortage i s a very serious problem a l l over the 
country. The r u r a l population i s very sparsely settled over a vast t e r r a i n . 
The las t Population Census i n 1966 revealed that about 84 percent of the 
r u r a l population l i v e d i n villages with less than 500 inhabitants. 
Furthermore, 61 percent of r u r a l population l i v e d i n villages with less 
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than 250 inhabitants. The implications of t h i s in terms of i n f r a -
s t r u c t u r a l requirements of r u r a l development are obvious. Providing 
every v i l l a g e with adequate feeder roads, i r r i g a t i o n networks, basic educa-
t i o n and health f a c i l i t i e s , and various extension services - a l l necessary 
ingredients f o r sustained r u r a l development - i s very expensive. 
Inherent d i f f i c u l t i e s apart, government policy i s nevertheless in 
large measure responsible f o r the r e l a t i v e stagnation of agriculture i n 
Iran. 3)o some extent, of course, t h i s r e f l e c t s a conscious choice. Thus, 
as we noted i n chapter three, one of the major reasons for emphasising 
i n d u s t r i a l development i n tnT? Fourth Pl?.r. vmr. that " v r . l ^ r " t v - ~.~v~ r.*.; 1 t^r.-."! 
sector, i t i s less affected by natural and climatic conditions, (and that 
i t ) i s more capable of adopting the nature of i t s products to the require-
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52 ments of the economy". Therefore the various protective and promotional 
incentives that manufacturing has enjoyed should be regarded as, i n e f f e c t , 
a conscious discrimination against agriculture. The easiest way to demon-
strate t h i s point i s to note that, i n sharp contrast to the manufacturing 
sector, private enterprise has been a f a r less important factor i n the 
development of agr i c u l t u r e . During the Fourth Development Plan f o r example 
only about 11.2 percent of a l l private investment was absorbed by a g r i c u l -
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ture and related a c t i v i t i e s . This i s very small considering that even 
by 1972-and a f t e r years of relative decline - the a g r i c u l t u r a l sector gener-
ated about 20 percent of GNP in Iran: 
Public developpment expenditure, too, has not favoured the a g r i c u l t u r a l 
sector. Thus during the Third Plan, even though agriculture was designated 
as "the most important sector i n the economy", only about 49 b i l l i o n r i a l s , 
representing 21.3 percent of t o t a l public development expenditure was actu-
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a l l y spent on agriculture. Moreover, the above figure covered expend-
i t u r e on such diverse a c t i v i t i e s as i r r i g a t i o n , land reform, r u r a l development 
and conservation of natural resources among others. Development expenditure 
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was therefore rather t h i n l y spread on a wide range of a c t i v i t i e s . 
During the Fourth Development Plan f i x e d investment expenditure by the 
public sector i n agriculture and animal husbandry was projected at 24.0 
b i l l i o n r i a l s . This represented only about 6.2 percent of t o t a l fixed 
investment by the public s e c t o r . B u t i t appears that the government has 
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had d i f f i c u l t y i n spending even t h i s small al l o c a t i o n . 
We have already noted one important implication of the slow growth 
of agriculture: i n f l a t i o n and mounting food imports. Another implication, 
which i s of a more fundamental and long term character, relates to the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of income. 
Although no data d i r e c t l y r e l a t i n g to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of income i n 
Iran are available, there are s u f f i c i e n t indications that the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
1 5 2 
of income i n the country i s highly unequal. One useful indicator, for 
example, i s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of family consumption expenditure. I n 
table 5-6 below we present a decile d i s t r i b u t i o n of family expenditure 
r e l a t i n g to 1969: 
Household Deciles % Share of Total Cumulative 
(Ascending order) Consumption Percentages 
Lowest Decile (Dl) 1.5 1.5 
(D2) 2.5 4.0 
(D3) 4.0 8.0 
(Dt) 4.5 12.5 
(D5) 5.0 17.5 
(D6) 6.5 24-.0 
(D7) 8.5 52.5 
(D8) 11.0 43.5 
(D9) 16.5 60.0 
Highest Decile(DlO) 40.0 100.0 
Source: H. Oshima, 'Income D i s t r i b u t i o n 1 Mission Working Paper No.II, 
International Labour Organisation Mission on Employment and Income 
Policies for I r a n , (Unpublished Mimeograph, Feb. 1973)» P>4-
The table shows that consumption expenditure i n Iran i s very unequally 
d i s t r i b u t e d . I t should also be remembered that the d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
income i s more unequal than the d i s t r i b u t i o n of consumption expenditure 
since the higher income groups obviously save a great deal more. For the 
lowest income groups, i n f a c t , there are several pieces of evidence pointing 
to s i g n i f i c a n t dis-savings. For example i t i s well known that a large segment 
of the r u r a l population i s almost perpetually i n debt, either to r u r a l 
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money-lenders or to government banks. 
1 5 3 
Another i n d i c a t i o n p o i n t i n g to a v e r y u n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of 
income i s the a p p a r e n t l y h i g h E n g e l c o e f f i c i e n t ( t h e f r a c t i o n of n a t i o n a l 
income s p e n t on food) i n I r a n . I t has been e s t i m a t e d t h a t i n 1 9 6 6 - 6 7 
t h e E n g e l c o e f f i c i e n t f o r I r a n was 41 p e r c e n t . T h i s f a c t i s c o n s i s t e n t 
w i t h g r e a t income i n e q u a l i t y because i t i m p l i e s t h a t t h e r e a r e l a r g e 
numbers of f a m i l i e s i n the low income b r a c k e t s who have v e r y h i g h E n g e l 
c o e f f i c i e n t s w h i l e the s m a l l number of h i g h income f a m i l i e s w i t h low 
E n g e l c o e f f i c i e n t s do not o f f s e t the former.' 
I n s h o r t , so f a r a s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of income i s c o n c e r n e d , "an 
extreme form o f d u a l i s m ( h a s ) d e v e l o p e d i n I r a n w i t h v e r y h i g h incomes 
i n t h e top d e c i l e s and v e r y low incomes i n the l o w e r d e c i l e s and 
r e l a t i v e l y low incomes i n the m i d d l e d e c i l e s " . ^ 
F u r t h e r m o r e , the r e l e v a n t p o i n t from our p o i n t of view i s t h a t 
p r o b a b l y the s i n g l e most i m u o r t a n t s o u r c e of t h i s i n e q u a l i t y i s the 
l a r g e gap between f a m i l y incomes i n r u r a l and urban a r e a s . E s t i m a t e s 
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f o r t h e r a t i o o f r u r a l - u r b a n f a m i l y incomes v a r y from 1:6 to 1:4. 
Moreover, i t would seem r e a s o n a b l e to s u g g e s t t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e 
p o s i t i o n of r u r a l f a m i l i e s i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of income has d e t e r i o r a t e d . 
T h i s view i s s u p p o r t e d by the w i d e s p r e a d e x i s t e n c e o f a heavy debt burden 
a l r e a d y r e f e r r e d to and a l s o by t h e f a c t t h a t a l a r g e p a r t of t h e r u r a l 
p o p u l a t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g nomadic t r i b e s ) have b e n e f i t e d v e r y l i t t l e from 
the i n c r e a s e i n n a t i o n a l income: 
"Some 1.3 m i l l i o n ( r u r a l f a m i l i e s ) who have not j o i n e d ( r u r a l 
c o o p e r a t i v e s ) a r e v e r y b a d l y o f f : t h e i r l a n d i s l o c a t e d i n remote 
dry a r e a s and cannot be i r r i g a t e d ; o f t e n t h e y have no a c c e s s t o 
t r a n s p o r t and communications and a r e t h e r e f o r e i s o l a t e d from th e 
r e s t of the economy".62 
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Concluding Remarks 
I n t h i s study we have shown that I r a n i a n manufacturing industry, 
a c t i v e l y stimulated by vari o u s i n c e n t i v e s , has grown very r a p i d l y s i n c e 
the middle of the 1950's. We have a l s o shown that, as i n most other 
developing c o u n t r i e s , t h i s growth has been import-replacing and 
oriented towards the home market while export expansion was not a 
s i g n i f i c a n t part of the p o l i c y package for most of the period under 
study. I n the e a r l y 1970's the government has apparently paid more 
a t t e n t i o n to exports, but t h i s has not as yet s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d the 
character of manufacturing growth i n I r a n . 
Chapter 5» dealing with the problems of import s u b s t i t u t i o n i n 
I r a n , suggested that government p o l i c i e s may have been unduly i n 
favour of c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e i n d u s t r i e s and processes and that over the 
period under study urban unemployment seems to have been a s e r i o u s 
problem. There i s a l s o overwhelming evidence of a very unequal 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of income and the slow growth of a g r i c u l t u r e i n I r a n . 
As we noted i n the f i r s t chapter t h i s s i t u a t i o n can have adverse 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f or the future growth of manufacturing because i t l i m i t s 
the s i z e of the domestic market* ^ n °ther developing countries, 
i n f a c t , t h i s seems to have been an important f a c t o r i n ex p l a i n i n g 
the slowing down of i n d u s t r i a l growth a f t e r the i n i t i a l r a p i d gains 
of import s u b s t i t u t i o n . 
Vie have found no evidence of t h i s i n the case of I r a n , however. 
In the l a s t few years of our period i n f a c t there was a rap i d 
a c c e l e r a t i o n of manufacturing growth. I t can be s t a t e d with" 
reasonable confidence that, even without the fo u r - f o l d i n c r e a s e i n o i l 
p r i c e s that took place i n 1973i the prospect for the continued growth 
of manufacturing i n I r a n would have remained s a t i s f a c t o r y . The reason 
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for t h i s of course i s that even before 1973 I r a n ' s o i l revenue was 
considerable and was growing s t e a d i l y . 
I n other developing c o u n t r i e s problems such as e x c e s s i v e c a p i t a l 
i n t e n s i t y , unemployment and backwardness of a g r i c u l t u r e often s e t an 
immediate obstacle i n the way of continued r a p i d manufacturing advance. 
This can be e a s i l y seen i f manufacturing growth i s based on import 
s u b s t i t u t i o n , s i n c e once imports are s u b s t i t u t e d future growth has to 
be based on the growth of domestic incomes. But even i f the s t r a t e g y 
chosen i s export orientated, problems could a r i s e s i n c e i t may w e l l 
be that s u c c e s s f u l export::: need a f a i r l y l a r g e domestic base. 
I r a n i s much more fortunate i n t h i s r e s p e c t , because o i l revenue 
provides for the p o s s i b i l i t y of expanding markets independently of what 
happens to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of incomes or a g r i c u l t u r e . Hence a f t e r 
the i n i t i a l r e p l a c i n g of imports of consumer goods manufacturing can 
take advantage of the oi l - b a s e d exogenous growth i n incomes. Even 
though i n d u s t r i e s may be very i n e f f i c i e n t and high cost, they could 
s t i l l hope to gain from the r i s e i n incomes and expand t h e i r markets, 
much more e a s i l y than i n d u s t r i e s i n other c o u n t r i e s l e s s fortunate than 
I r a n . G e n e r a l l y speaking, i t may w e l l be j u s t i f i e d to remark that, 
whereas i n other developing c o u n t r i e s one can d i s t i n g u i s h between 
•easy' and ' d i f f i c u l t ' stages of import s u b s t i t u t i o n , i n I r a n the 
whole process i s r e l a t i v e l y 'easy'. 
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